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## **APPENDIXES**

# A. Country Risk

Table 26

# **Countries And Regions**

REGION	
Western Europe	
Southern Europe	· · · · ·
Western + Southern Europe	
East Europe	
Central Europe	
Eastern Europe and Central Asia	-
Middle East	
Africa	-

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North America		
Central America		··· · · ··· · · ·
Latin America		· · · ·
The Caribbean		····· ·· ·· ·· ··
Asia-Pacific		
Central Asia	· · · · · · · · · · · ·	
East Asia		• · ··
Australia NZ	<b>.</b>	
COUNTRY	REGION	
South Africa	Africa	
Egypt	Africa	
Nigeria	Africa	· · ·
Algeria	Africa	•••••

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Могоссо	Africa
Angola	Africa
Tunisia	Africa
Ethiopia	Africa
Ghana	Africa
Kenya	Africa
Tanzania	Africa
Uganda	Africa
Botswana	Africa
Congo, Democratic Republic of	Africa
Gabon	Africa
Senegal	Africa

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Mozambique	Africa
Burkina Faso	Africa
Zambia	Africa
Congo, Republic of	Africa
Zimbabwe	Africa
Eritrea	Africa
Indonesia	Asia-Pacific
Taiwan	Asia-Pacific
Thailand	Asia-Pacific
Malaysia	Asia-Pacific
Philippines	Asia-Pacific
Vietnam	Asia-Pacific

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Bangladesh	Asia-Pacific
Sri Lanka	Asia-Pacific
Cambodia	Asia-Pacific
Laos	Asia-Pacific
Papua New Guinea	Asia-Pacific
Mongolia	Asia-Pacific
Australia	Australia NZ
New Zealand	Australia NZ
Guatemala	Central America
Costa Rica	Central America
Panama	Central America
Honduras	Central America

India	Central Asia
Pakistan	Central Asia
Kazakhstan	Central Asia
Bhutan	Central Asia
Poland	Central Europe
Czech Republic	Central Europe
Romania	Central Europe
Hungary	Central Europe
Slovakia	Central Europe
Bulgaria	Central Europe
Croatia	Central Europe
Serbia	Central Europe

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Lithuania	Central Europe
Latvia	Central Europe
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Central Europe
Estonia	Central Europe
Albania	Central Europe
Macedonia	Central Europe
China	East Asia
Japan	EastAsia
South Korea	East Asia
Hong Kong	East Asia
Singapore	East Asia
Macau	East Asia

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Greece	Eastern Europe
Slovenia	Eastern Europe
Cyprus	Eastern Europe
Russia	Eastern Europe and Central Asia
Ukraine	Eastern Europe and Central Asia
Belarus	Eastern Europe and Central Asia
Azerbaijan	Eastern Europe and Central Asia
Georgia	Eastern Europe and Central Asia
Brazil	Latin America
Mexico	Latin America
Argentina	Latin America
Colombia	Latin America

Venezuela	Latin America
Peru	Latin America
Chile	Latin America
Ecuador	Latin America
Bolivia	Latin America
Uruguay	Latin America
El Salvador	Latin America
Paraguay	Latin America
Trinidad and Tobago	Latin America
Suriname	Latin America
Belize	Latin America
Turkey	Middle East

Saudi Arabia	Middle East
United Arab Emirates	Middle East
Israel	Middle East
Qatar	Middle East
Kuwait	Middle East
Iraq	Middle East
Oman	Middle East
Lebanon	Middle East
Jordan	Middle East
Bahrain	Middle East
United States	North America
Canada	North America

Italy	Southern Europe
Spain	Southern Europe
Portugal	Southern Europe
Dominican Republic	The Caribbean
Jamaica	The Caribbean
Bahamas	The Caribbean
Barbados	The Caribbean
Curacao	The Caribbean
Cayman Islands	The Caribbean
Grenada	The Caribbean
Turks and Caicos	The Caribbean
Germany	Western Europe

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United Kingdom	Western Europe
France	Western Europe
Netherlands	Western Europe
Belgium	Western Europe
Sweden	Western Europe
Switzerland	Western Europe
Austria	Western Europe
Norway	Western Europe
Denmark	Western Europe
Finland	Western Europe
Ireland	Western Europe
Luxembourg	Western Europe

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Iceland	Western Europe
Malta	Western Europe

# **B.** Competitive Position

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Table 27

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# List Of Industries, Subsectors, And Standard Competitive Position Group Profiles

INDUSTRY	SUBSECTOR	COMPETITIVE POSITION GROUP PROFILE
Transportation cyclical	Airlines	Capital or asset focus
	Marine	Capital or asset focus
	Trucking	Capital or asset focus
Auto OEM	Automobile and truck manufacturers	Capital or asset focus
Metals and mining downstream	Aluminum	Commodity focus/cost driven
	Steel	Commodity focus/cost driven

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Metals and mining upstream	Coal and consumable fuels	Commodity focus/cost driven
	Diversified metals and mining	Commodity focus/cost driven
	Gold	Commodity focus/cost driven
	Precious metals and minerals	Commodity focus/cost driven
Homebuilders and developers	Homebuilding	Capital or asset focus
Oil and gas refining and marketing	Oil and gas refining and marketing	Commodity focus/scale driven
Forest and paper products	Forest products	Commodity focus/cost driven
	Paper products	Commodity focus/cost driven
Building Materials	Construction materials	Capital or asset focus
Oil and gas integrated, exploration and production	integrated oil and gas	Commodity focus/scale driven
	Oil and gas exploration and production	Commodity focus/scale driven

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Agribusiness and commodity foods	Agricultural products	Commodity focus/scale driven
Real estate investment trusts (REITs)	Diversified REITs	Real-estate specific*
	Health care REITS	Real-estate specific*
<u></u>	Industrial REITs	Real-estate specific*
	Office REITs	Real-estate specific*
	Residential REITs	Real-estate specific*
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Retail REITs	Real-estate specific*
	Specialized REITs	Not applicable**
-	Self-storage REITs	Real-estate specific*
	Net lease REITs	Real-estate specific*
· · · ·	Real estate operating companies	Real-estate specific*
Leisure and sports	Casinos and gaming	Services and product focus

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	Hotels, resorts, and cruise lines	Services and product focus
	Leisure facilities	Services and product focus
Commodity chemicals	Commodity chemicals	Commodity focus/cost driven
	Diversified chemicals	Commodity focus/cost driven
	Fertilizers and agricultural chemicals	Commodity focus/cost driven
Auto suppliers	Auto parts and equipment	Capital or asset focus
	Tires and rubber	Capital or asset focus
	Vehicle-related suppliers	Capital or asset focus
Aerospace and defense	Aerospace and defense	Services and product focus
Technology hardware and semiconductors	Communications equipment	Capital or asset focus
	Computer hardware	Capital or asset focus
	Computer storage and peripherals	Capital or asset focus

	Consumer electronics	Capital or asset focus
	Electronic equipment and instruments	Capital or asset focus
	Electronic components	Capital or asset focus
	Electronic manufacturing services	Capital or asset focus
	Technology distributors	Capital or asset focus
<u>.</u>	Office electronics	Capital or asset focus
	Semiconductor equipment	Capital or asset focus
	Semiconductors	Capital or asset focus
Specialty Chemicals	Industrial gases	Capital or asset focus
	Specialty chemicals	Capital or asset focus
Capital Goods	Electrical components and equipment	Capital or asset focus
	Heavy equipment and machinery	Capital or asset focus

	Industrial componentry and consumables	Capital or asset focus
	Construction equipment rental	Capital or asset focus
	Industrial distributors	Services and product focus
Engineering and construction	Construction and engineering	Services and product focus
Railroads and package express	Railroads	Capital or asset focus
	Package express	Services and product focus
	Logistics	Services and product focus
Business and consumer services	Consumer services	Services and product focus
	Distributors	Services and product focus
	Facilities services	Services and product focus
	General support services	Services and product focus
	Professional services	Services and product focus

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Midstream energy	Oil and gas storage and transportation	Commodity focus/scale driven
Technology software and services	Internet software and services	Services and product focus
	IT consulting and other services	Services and product focus
	Data processing and outsourced services	Services and product focus
	Application software	Services and product focus
	Systems software	Services and product focus
	Consumer software	Services and product focus
Consumer durables	Home furnishings	Services and product focus
	Household appliances	Services and product focus
	Housewares and specialties	Services and product focus
	Leisure products	Services and product focus
<b>. . . . .</b>	Photographic products	Services and product focus

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	Small appliances	Services and product focus
Containers and packaging	Metal and glass containers	Capital or asset focus
	Paper packaging	Capital or asset focus
Media and entertainment	Ad agencies and marketing services companies	Services and product focus
	Ad-supported online content platforms	Services and product focus
	Broadcast networks	Services and product focus
ų	Cable TV and OTT networks	Services and product focus
	Newspapers/magazines	Services and product focus
- -	Data publishing	Services and product focus
	E-Commerce (services)	Services and product focus
	Educational publishing	Services and product focus

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	Film and TV programming production	Capital or asset focus
	Miscellaneous media and entertainment	Services and product focus
	Motion picture exhibitors	Services and product focus
	Music publishing and recording	Services and product focus
··· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Outdoor advertising	Services and product focus
	Printing	Commodity focus/scale driven
	Radio stations	Services and product focus
	Local TV stations	Services and product focus
Oil and gas drilling, equipment and services	Onshore contract drilling	Commodity focus/scale driven
	Offshore contract drilling	Capital or Asset Focus
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Oil and gas equipment and services (oilfield services)	

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Retail and restaurants	Catalog retail	Services and product focus
·····	Internet retail	Services and product focus
	Department stores	Services and product focus
	General merchandise stores	Services and product focus
	Apparel retail	Services and product focus
	Computer and electronics retail	Services and product focus
	Home improvement retail	Services and product focus
	Specialty stores	Services and product focus
	Automotive retail	Services and product focus
	Home furnishing retail	Services and product focus
Health care services	Health care services	Commodity focus/scale driven
		· ···· ·
Transportation infrastructure	Airport services	National industries and utilities

	Highways	National industries and utilities
	Railtracks	National industries and utilities
	Marine ports and services	National industries and utilities
Environmental services	Environmental and facilities services	Services and product focus
Regulated utilities	Electric utilities	National industries and utilities
	Gas utilities	National industries and utilities
	Multi-utilities	National industries and utilities
	Water utilities	National industries and utilities
Unregulated power and gas	Independent power producers and energy traders	Capital or asset focus

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-	Merchant power	Capital or asset focus
Pharmaceuticals	Branded pharmaceuticals	Services and product focus
	Generic pharmaceuticals	Commodity focus/scale driven
Health care equipment	High-tech health care equipment	Product focus/scale driven
	Low-tech health care equipment	Commodity focus/scale driven
Branded nondurables	Brewers	Services and product focus
	Distillers and vintners	Services and product focus
	Soft drinks	Services and product focus
	Packaged foods and meats	Services and product focus
	Торассо	Services and product focus
	Household products	Services and product focus

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	Apparel, footwear, accessories, and luxury goods	Services and product focus
· ·· ·· · · · · · · · ·····	Personal products	Services and product focus
Telecommunications and cable	Cable and satellite	Services and product focus
	Alternative carriers	Services and product focus
	Integrated telecommunication services	Services and product focus
	Wireless towers	Capital or asset focus
	Data center operators	Capital or asset focus
	Fiber-optic carriers	Capital or asset focus
	Wireless telecommunication services	Services and product focus

\*See "Key Credit Factors For The Real Estate Industry." \*\*For specialized REITs, there is no standard CPGP, as the CPGP will vary based on the underlying industry exposure (e.g., a forest and paper products REIT).

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#### 1. Analyzing subfactors for competitive advantage

193. Competitive advantage is the first component of our competitive position analysis. Companies that possess a sustainable competitive advantage are able to capitalize on key industry factors or mitigate associated risks more effectively. When a company operates in more than one business, we analyze each segment separately to form an overall view of its competitive advantage. In assessing competitive advantage, we evaluate the following subfactors:

- Strategy;
- --- Differentiation/uniqueness, product positioning/bundling;
- Brand reputation and marketing;
- Product/service quality;
- Barriers to entry, switching costs;
- Technological advantage and capabilities, technological displacement; and
- Asset profile.

#### a) Strategy

194. A company's business strategy will enhance or undermine its market entrenchment and business stability. Compelling business strategies can create a durable competitive advantage and thus a relatively stronger competitive position. We form an opinion as to the source and sustainability (if any) of the company's competitive advantage relative to its peers'. The company may have a differentiation advantage (i.e., brand, technology, regulatory) or a cost advantage (i.e., lower cost producer/servicer at the same quality level), or a combination.

195. Our assessment of a company's strategy is informed by a company's historical performance and how realistic we view its forward-looking business objectives to be. These may include targets for market shares, the percentage of revenues derived from new products, price versus the competition's, sales or profit growth, and required investment levels. We evaluate these objectives in the context of industry dynamics and the attractiveness of the markets in which the company participates.

#### b) Differentiation/uniqueness, product positioning/bundling

196. The attributes of product or service differentiation vary by sector, and may include product or services features, performance, durability, reliability, delivery, and comprehensiveness, among other measures. The intensity of competition may be lower where buyers perceive the product or service to be highly differentiated or to have few substitutes. Conversely, products and services that lack differentiation, or offer little value-added in the eyes of customers, are generally commodity-type products that primarily compete on price. Competition intensity will often be highest where limited or moderate investment (R&D, capital expenditures, or advertising) or low employee skill levels (for service businesses) are required to compete. Independent market surveys, media commentaries, market share trends, and evidence of leading or lagging when it comes to raising or lowering prices can indicate varying degrees of product differentiation.

197. Product positioning influences how companies are able to extend or protect market shares by offering popular products or services. A company's abilities to replace aging products with new ones, or to launch product extensions, are important elements of product positioning. In addition, the ability to sell multiple products or services to the same customer, known as bundling or cross-selling, (for instance, offering an aftermarket servicing contract together with the sale of a new appliance) can create a competitive advantage by increasing customers' switching costs and fostering loyalty.

#### c) Brand reputation and marketing

198. Brand equity measures the price premium a company receives based on its brand relative to the generic equivalent. High brand equity typically translates into customer loyalty, built partially via marketing campaigns. One measure of advertising effectiveness can be revenue growth compared with the increase in advertising expenses.

199. We also analyze re-investment and advertising strategies to anticipate potential strengthening or weakening of a company's brand. A company's track record of boosting market share and delivering attractive margins could indicate its ability to build and maintain brand reputation.

#### d) Product/service level quality

200. The strength and consistency of a value proposition is an important factor contributing to a sustainable competitive advantage. Value proposition encompasses the key features of a product or a service that convince customers that their purchase has the right balance between price and quality. Customers generally perceive a product or a service to be good if their expectations are consistently met. Quality, both actual and perceived, can help a company attract and retain customers. Conversely, poor product and service quality may lead to product recalls, higher-than-normal product warnings, or service interruptions, which may reduce demand. Measures of customer satisfaction and retention, such as attrition rates and contract renewal rates, can help trace trends in product/service quality.

201. Maintaining the value proposition requires consistency and adaptability around product design, marketing, and quality-related operating controls. This is pertinent where product differentiation matters, as is the case in most noncommodity industries, and especially so where environmental or human health (concerns for the chemical, food, and pharmaceutical industries) adds a liability dimension to the quality and value proposition. Similarly, regulated utilities (which often do not set their own prices) typically focus on delivering uninterrupted service, often to meet the standards set by their regulator.

#### e) Barriers to entry, switching costs

202. Barriers to entry can reduce or eliminate the threat of new market entrants. Where they are effective, these barriers can lead to more predictable revenues and profits, by limiting pricing pressures and customer losses, lowering marketing costs, and improving operating efficiency. While barriers to entry may enable premium pricing, a dominant player may rationally choose pricing restraint to further discourage new entrants.

203. Barriers to entry can be one or more of: a natural or regulatory monopoly; supportive regulation; high transportation costs; an embedded customer base that would incur high switching costs; a proprietary product or service; capital or technological intensiveness.

204. A natural monopoly may result from unusually high requirements for capital and operating expenditures that make it uneconomic for a market to support more than a single, dominant provider. The ultimate barrier to entry is found among regulated utilities, which provide an essential service in their 'de juris' monopolies and receive a guaranteed rate of return on their investments. A supportive regulatory regime can include rules and regulations with high hurdles that discourage competitors, or mandate so many obligations for a new entrant as to make market entry financially unviable.

205. In certain industrial sectors, proprietary access to a limited supply of key raw materials or skilled labor, or zoning laws that effectively preclude a new entrant, can provide a strong barrier to entry. Factors such as relationships, long-term contracts or maintenance agreements, or exclusive distribution agreements can result in a high degree of customer stickiness. A proprietary product or service that's protected by a copyright or patent can pose a significant hurdle to new competitors.

#### f) Technological advantage and capabilities, technological displacement

206. A company may benefit from a proprietary technology that enables it to offer either a superior product or a commodity-type product at a materially lower cost. Proven research and development (R&D) capabilities can deliver a differentiated, superior product or service, as in the pharmaceutical or high tech sectors. However, optimal R&D strategies or the importance or effectiveness of patent protection differ by industry, stage of product development, and product lifecycle.

207. Technological displacement can be a threat in many industries; new technologies or extensions of current ones can effectively displace a significant portion of a company's products or services.

## g) Asset profile

208. A company's asset profile is a reflection of its reinvestment, which creates tangible or intangible assets, or both. Companies in similar sectors and industries usually have similar reinvestment options and, thus, their asset profiles tend to be comparable. The reinvestment in "heavy" industries, such as oil and gas, metals and mining, and automotive, tends to produce more tangible assets, whereas the reinvestment in certain "light" industries, such as services, media and entertainment, and retail, tends to produce more intangible assets.

209. We evaluate how a company's asset profile supports or undermines its competitive advantage by reviewing its manufacturing or service creation capabilities and investment requirements, its distribution capabilities, and its track record and commitment to reinvesting in its asset base. This may include a review of the company's ability to attract and retain a talented workforce; its degree of vertical integration and how that may help or hinder its ability to secure supply sources, control the value-added part of its production chain, or adjust to technological developments; or its ability develop a broad and strong distribution network.

#### 2. Analyzing subfactors for scale, scope, and diversity

210. In assessing the relative strength of this component, we evaluate four subfactors:

- Diversity of product or service range;
- Geographic diversity;
- Volumes, size of markets and revenues, and market shares; and
- Maturity of products or services.

211. In a given industry, entities with a broader mix of business activities are typically lower risk, and entities with a narrower mix are higher risk. High concentration of business volumes by product, customer, or geography, or a concentration in the production footprint or supplier base, can lead to less stable and predictable revenues and profits. Comparatively broader diversity helps a company withstand economic, competitive, or technological threats better than its peers.

212. There is no minimum size criterion, although size often provides a measure of diversification. Size and scope of operations is important relative to those of industry peers, though not in absolute terms. While relatively smaller companies can enjoy a high degree of diversification, they will likely be, almost by definition, more concentrated in terms of product, number of customers, or geography than their larger peers in the same industry.

213. Successful and continuing diversification supports a stronger competitive position. Conversely, poor diversification weakens overall competitive position. For example, a company will weaken its overall business position if it enters new product lines and countries where it has limited expertise and lacks critical mass to be a real competitor to the incumbent market leaders. The weakness is greater when the new products or markets are riskier than the traditional core business.

214. Where applicable, we also include under scale, scope, and diversity an assessment of the potential benefits derived from unconsolidated (or partially consolidated) investments in strategic assets. The relative significance of such an investment and whether it is in an industry that exhibits high or, conversely, low correlation with the issuer's businesses would be considered in determining its potential

benefits to scale, scope, and diversity. This excludes nonstrategic, financial investments, the analysis of which does not fall under the competitive position criteria but, instead, under the capital structure criteria.

#### a) Diversity of product or service range

215. The concentration of business volumes or revenues in a particular or comparatively small set of products or services can lead to less stable revenues and profits. Even if this concentration is in an attractive product or service, it may be a weakness. Likewise, the concentration of business volumes with a particular customer or a small group of customers, or the reliance on one or a few suppliers, can expose the company to a potentially greater risk of losing and having to replace related revenues and profits. On the other hand, successful diversification across products, customers, and/or suppliers can lead to more stable and predictable revenues and profits, which supports a stronger assessment of scale, scope, and diversity.

216. The relative contribution of different products or services to a company's revenues or profits helps us gauge its diversity. We also evaluate the correlation of demand between product or services lines. High correlation in demand between seemingly different product or service lines will accentuate volume declines during a weak part of the business cycle.

217. In most sectors, the share of revenue a company receives from its largest five to 10 customers or counterparties reveals how diversified its customer base is. However, other considerations such as the stability and credit quality of that customer base, and the company's ability to retain significant customers, can be mitigating or accentuating factors in our overall evaluation. Likewise, supplier dependency can often be measured based on a supplier's share of a company's operating or capital costs. However, other factors, such as the degree of interdependence between the company and its supplier(s), the substitutability of key supply sources, and the company's presumed ability to secure alternative supply without incurring substantial switching costs, are important considerations. Low switching costs (i.e. limited impact on input price, quality, or delivery times as a result of having to adapt to a new supply chain partner) can mitigate a high level of concentration.

#### b) Geographic diversity

218. We assess geographic diversity both from the standpoint of the breadth of the company's served or addressable markets, and from the standpoint of how geographically concentrated its facilities are.

219. The concentration of business volumes and revenues within a particular region can lead to greater exposure to economic factors affecting demand for a company's goods or services in that region. Even if the company's volumes and revenues are concentrated in an attractive region, it may still be vulnerable to a significant drop in demand for its goods and services. Conversely, a company that serves multiple regions may benefit from different demand conditions in each, possibly resulting in greater revenue stability and more consistent profitability than a more focused peer's. That said, we consider geographic diversification in the context of the industry and the size of the local or regional economy. For instance, companies operating in local industries (such as food retailers) may benefit from a well-entrenched local position.

220. Generally, though, geographically concentrated production or service operations can expose a company to the risk of disruption, and damage revenues and profitability. Even when country risks don't appear significant, a company's vulnerability to exogenous factors (for example, natural disasters, an epidemic, labor or political unrest) increases with geographic concentration.

#### c) Volumes, size of markets and revenues, market share

221. Absolute sales or unit volumes and market share do not, by themselves, support a strong assessment of scale, scope, and diversity. Yet superior market share is a positive, since it may indicate a broad range of operations, products, or services.

222. We view volume stability (relative to peers') as a positive especially when: a company has demonstrated it during an economic downturn; if it has been achieved without relying on greater price concessions than competitors have made; and when it is likely to be sustained in the future. However, volume stability combined with shrinking market share could be evidence of a company's diminishing prospects for future profitability. We assess the predictability of business volumes and the likely degree of future volume stability by analyzing the company's performance relative to peers' on several industry factors: cyclicality; ability to adapt to technological and regulatory threats; the profile of the customer base (stickiness); and the potential life cycle of the company's products or services.

223. Depending on the industry sector, we measure a company's relative size and market share based on unit sales; the absolute amount of revenues; and the percentage of revenues captured from total industry revenues. We also adjust for industry and company specific qualitative considerations. For example, if an industry is particularly fragmented and has a number of similarly sized participants, none may have a particular advantage or disadvantage with respect to market share.

#### d) Maturity of products or services

224. The degree of maturity and the relative position on the lifecycle curve of the company's product or service portfolio affect the stability and sustainability of its revenues and margins. It is important to identify the stage of development of a company's products or services in order to measure the life cycle risks that may be associated with key products or services.

225. Mature products or services (e.g. consumer products or broadcast programming) are not necessarily a negative, in our view, if they still contribute reliable profits. If demand is declining for a company's product or service, we examine its track record on introducing new products with staying power. Similarly, a company's track record with product launches is particularly relevant.

#### 3. Analyzing subfactors for operating efficiency

226. In assessing the relative strength of this component, we consider four subfactors:

- Cost structure,
- Manufacturing processes,
- Working capital management, and
- Technology.

227. To the extent a company has high operating efficiency, it should be able to generate better profit margins than peers that compete in the same markets, whatever the prevailing market conditions. The ability to minimize manufacturing and other operational costs and thus maximize margins and cash flow--for example, through manufacturing excellence, cost control, and diligent working capital management-will provide the funds for research and development, marketing, and customer service.

## a) Cost structure

228. Companies that are well positioned from a cost standpoint will typically enjoy higher capacity utilization and be more profitable over the course of the business cycle. Cost structure and cost control are keys to generating strong profits and cash flow, particularly for companies that produce commodities, operate in mature industries, or face pricing pressures. It is important to consider whether a company or any of its competitors has a sustainable cost advantage, which can be based on access to cheaper energy, favorable manufacturing locations, or lower and more flexible labor costs, for example.

229. Where information is available, we examine a company's fixed versus variable cost mix as an indication of operating leverage, a measure of how revenue growth translates into growth in operating income. A company with significant operating leverage may witness dramatic declines in operating profit if unit volumes fall, as during cyclical downturns. Conversely, in an upturn, once revenues pass the breakeven point, a substantial percentage of incremental revenues typically becomes profit.

#### b) Manufacturing process

230. Capital intensity characterizes many heavy manufacturing sectors that require minimum volumes to produce acceptable profits, cash flow, and return on assets. We view capacity utilization through the business cycle (combined with the cost base) as a good indication of manufacturers' ability to maintain profits in varying economic scenarios. Our capacity utilization assessment is based on a company's production capacity across its manufacturing footprint. In addition, we consider the direction of a company's capacity utilization in light of our unit sales expectations, as opposed to analyzing it plant-by-plant.

231. Labor relations remain an important focus in our analysis of operating efficiency for manufacturers. Often, a company's labor cost structure is driven by its history of contractual negotiations and the countries in which it operates. We examine the rigidity or flexibility of a company's labor costs and the extent to which it relies on labor rather than automation. We analyze labor cost structure by assessing the extent of union representation, wage and benefit costs as a share of cost of goods sold (when available), and by assessing the balance of capital equipment vs. labor input in the manufacturing process. We also incorporate trends in a company's efforts to transfer labor costs from high-cost to low-cost regions.

#### c) Working capital management

232. Working capital management--of current or short-term assets and liabilities--is a key factor in our evaluation of operating efficiency. In general, companies with solid working capital management skills exhibit shorter cash conversion cycles (defined as days' investment in inventory and receivables less days' investment in accounts payable) than their lower-skilled peers. Short cash-conversion cycles could, for instance, demonstrate that a company has a stronger position in the supply chain (for example, requiring suppliers or dealers to hold more of its inventory). This allows a company to direct more capital than its peers can to other areas of investment.

### d) Technology

233. Technology can play an important role in achieving superior operating efficiency through effective yield management (by improving input/output ratios), supply chain automation, and cost optimization.

234. Achieving high yield management is particularly important in industries with limited inventory and high fixed costs, such as transportation, lodging, media, and retail. The most efficient airlines can achieve higher revenue per available seat mile than their peers, while the most efficient lodging companies can achieve a higher revenue per available room than their peers. Both industries rely heavily on technology to effectively allocate inventory (seats and rooms) to maximize sales and profitability.

235. Effective supply chain automation systems enable companies to reduce investments in inventory and better forecast future orders based on current trends. By enabling electronic data interchange between supplier and retailer, such systems help speed orders and reorders for goods by quickly pinpointing which merchandise is selling well and needs restocking. They also identify slow moving inventory that needs to be marked down, making space available for fresh merchandise.

236. Effective use of technology can also help hold down costs by improving productivity via automation and workflow management. This can reduce selling, general, and administrative costs, which usually represent a substantial portion of expenditures for industries with high fixed costs, thus boosting earnings.

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[Tables 28-30 have been deleted.]

# C. Cash Flow/Leverage Analysis

#### 1. The merits and drawbacks of each cash flow measure

## a) EBITDA

237. EBITDA is a widely used, and therefore a highly comparable, indicator of cash flow, although it has significant limitations. Because EBITDA derives from the income statement entries, it can be distorted by the same accounting issues that limit the use of earnings as a basis of cash flow. In addition, interest can be a substantial cash outflow for speculative-grade companies and therefore EBITDA can materially overstate cash flow in some cases. Nevertheless, it serves as a useful and common starting point for cash flow analysis and is useful in ranking the financial strength of different companies.

## b) Funds from operations (FFO)

238. FFO is a hybrid cash flow measure that estimates a company's inherent ability to generate recurring cash flow from its operations independent of working capital fluctuations. FFO estimates the cash flow available to the company before working capital, capital spending, and discretionary items such as dividends, acquisitions, etc.

239. Because cash flow from operations tends to be more volatile than FFO, FFO is often used to smooth period-over-period variation in working capital. We consider it a better proxy of recurring cash flow generation because management can more easily manipulate working capital depending on its liquidity or accounting needs. However, we do not generally rely on FFO as a guiding cash flow measure in situations where assessing working capital changes is important to judge a company's cash flow generating ability and general creditworthiness. For example, for working-capital-intensive industries such as retailing, operating cash flow may be a better indicator than FFO of the firm's actual cash generation.

240. FFO is a good measure of cash flow for well-established companies whose long-term viability is relatively certain (i.e., for highly rated companies). For such companies, there can be greater analytical reliance on FFO and its relation to the total debt burden. FFO remains very helpful in the relative ranking of

companies. In addition, more established, healthier companies usually have a wider array of financing possibilities to cover potential short-term liquidity needs and to refinance upcoming maturities. For marginal credit situations, the focus shifts more to free operating cash flow--after deducting the various fixed uses such as working capital investment and capital expenditures--as this measure is more directly related to current debt service capability.

# c) Cash flow from operations (CFO)

241. The measurement and analysis of CFO forms an important part of our ratings assessment, in particular for companies that operate in working-capital-intensive industries or industries in which working capital flows can be volatile. CFO is distinct from FFO as it is a pure measure of cash flow calculated after accounting for the impact on earnings of changes in operating assets and liabilities. CFO is cash flow that is available to finance items such as capital expenditures, repay borrowing, and pay for dividends and share buybacks.

242. In many industries, companies shift their focus to cash flow generation in a downturn. As a result, even though they typically generate less cash from ordinary business activities because of low capacity utilization and relatively low fixed-cost absorption, they may generate cash by reducing inventories and receivables. Therefore, although FFO is likely to be lower in a downturn, the impact on CFO may not be as great. In times of strong growth the opposite will be true, and consistently lower CFO compared to FFO without a corresponding increase in revenue and profitability can indicate an untenable situation.

243. Working capital is a key element of a company's cash flow generation. While there tends to be a need to build up working capital and therefore to consume cash in a growth or expansion phase, changes in working capital can also act as a buffer in case of a downturn. Many companies will sell off inventories and invest a lower amount in raw materials because of weaker business activities, both of which reduce the amount of capital and cash that is tied up in working capital. Therefore, working capital fluctuations can occur both in periods of revenue growth and contraction and analyzing a company's near-term working capital needs is crucial for estimating future cash flow developments.

244. Often, businesses that are capital intensive are not working-capital-intensive: most of the capital commitment is upfront in equipment and machinery, while asset-light businesses may have to invest proportionally more in inventories and receivables. That also affects margins, because capital-intensive businesses tend to have proportionally lower operating expenses (and therefore higher EBITDA margins),

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while working-capital-intensive businesses usually report lower EBITDA margins. The resulting cash flow volatility can be significant: because all investment is made upfront in a capital-intensive business, there is usually more room to absorb subsequent EBITDA volatility because margins are higher. For example, a capital-intensive company may remain reasonably profitable even if its EBITDA margin declines from 30% to 20%. By contrast, a working-capital-intensive business with a lower EBITDA margin (due to higher operating expenses) of 8% can post a negative EBITDA margin if EBITDA volatility is large.

## d) Free operating cash flow (FOCF)

245. By deducting capital expenditures from CFO, we arrive at FOCF, which can be used as a proxy for a company's cash generated from core operations. We may exclude discretionary capital expenditures for capacity growth from the FOCF calculation, but in practice it is often difficult to discriminate between spending for expansion and replacement. And, while companies have some flexibility to manage their capital budgets to weather down cycles, such flexibility is generally temporary and unsustainable in light of intrinsic requirements of the business. For example, companies can be compelled to increase their investment programs because of strong demand growth, technological changes, or to meet environmental regulatory requirements. Regulated entities (for example, telecommunications companies) might also face significant investment requirements related to their concession contracts (the understanding between a company and the host government that specifies the rules under which the company can operate locally).

246. Positive FOCF is a sign of strength and helpful in distinguishing between two companies with the same FFO. In addition, FOCF is helpful in differentiating between the cash flows generated by more and less capital-intensive companies and industries.

247. In highly capital-intensive industries (where maintenance capital expenditure requirements tend to be high) or in other situations in which companies have little flexibility to postpone capital expenditures, measures such as FFO to debt and debt to EBITDA may provide less valuable insight into relative creditworthiness because they fail to capture potentially meaningful capital expenditures. In such cases, a ratio such as FOCF to debt provides greater analytical insight.

248. A company serving a low-growth or declining market may exhibit relatively strong FOCF because of diminishing fixed and working capital needs. Growth companies, in contrast, exhibit thin or even negative FOCF because of the investment needed to support growth. For the low-growth company, credit analysis

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weighs the positive, strong current cash flow against the danger that this high level of cash flow might not be sustainable. For the high-growth company, the opposite is true: weighing the negatives of a current cash deficit against prospects of enhanced cash flow once current investments begin yielding cash benefits. In the latter case, if we view the growth investment as temporary and not likely to lead to increased leverage over the long-term, we'll place greater analytical importance on FFO to debt rather than on FOCF to debt. In any event, we also consider the impact of a company's growth environment in our business risk analysis, specifically in a company's industry risk analysis (see section B).

# e) Discretionary cash flow (DCF)

249. For corporate issuers primarily rated in the investment-grade universe, DCF to debt can be an important barometer of future cash flow adequacy as it more fully reflects a company's financial policy, including decisions regarding dividend payouts and share buybacks. In addition, potential M&A can represent a very significant use of cash and is an important component in cash flow analysis.

250. The level of dividends depends on a company's financial strategy. Companies with aggressive dividend payout targets might be reluctant to reduce dividends even under some liquidity pressure. In addition, investment-grade companies are less likely to reduce dividend payments following some reversals--although dividends ultimately are discretionary. DCF is the truest reflection of excess cash flow, but it is also the most affected by management decisions and, therefore, does not necessarily reflect the potential cash flow available.

# D. Diversification/Portfolio Effect

### 1. Academic research

251. Academic research recently concluded that, during the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, conglomerates had the advantage over single sector-focused firms because they had better access to the credit markets as a result of their debt co-insurance and used the internal capital markets more efficiently (i.e., their core businesses had stronger cash flows). Debt co-insurance is the view that the joining-together of two or more firms whose earnings streams are less-than-perfectly correlated reduces the risk of default of the merged firms (i.e., the co-insurance effect) and thereby increases the "debt

capacity" or "borrowing ability" of the combined enterprise. These financing alternatives became more valuable during the crisis. (Source: "Does Diversification Create Value In The Presence Of External Financing Constraints? Evidence From The 2007-2009 Financial Crisis," Venkat Kuppuswamy and Belen Villalonga, Harvard Business School, Aug. 19, 2011.)

252. In addition, fully diversified, focused companies saw more narrow credit default swap spreads from 2004-2010 vs. less diversified firms. This highlighted that lenders were differentiating for risk and providing these companies with easier and cheaper access to capital. (Source: "The Power of Diversified Companies During Crises," The Boston Consulting Group and Leipzig Graduate School of Management, January 2012.)

253. Many rated conglomerates are either country- or region-specific; only a small percentage are truly global. The difference is important when assessing the country and macroeconomic risk factors. Historical measures for each region, based on volatility and correlation, reflect regional trends that are likely to change over time.

# **E. Financial Policy**

# 1. Controlling shareholders

254. Controlling shareholder(s)--if they exist--exert significant influence over a company's financial risk profile, given their ability to use their direct or indirect control of the company's financial policies for their own benefit. Although the criteria do not associate the presence of controlling shareholder(s) to any predefined negative or positive impact, we assess the potential medium- to long-term implications for a company's credit standing of these strategies. Long-term ownership--such as exists in many family-run businesses--is often accompanied by financial discipline and reluctance to incur aggressive leverage. Conversely, short-term ownership--such as exists in private equity sponsor-owned companies--generally entails financial policies aimed at achieving rapid returns for shareholders typically through aggressive debt leverage.

255. The criteria define controlling shareholder(s) as:

- A private shareholder (an individual or a family) with majority ownership or control of the board of directors;
- A group of shareholders holding joint control over the company's board of directors through a shareholder agreement. The shareholder agreement may be comprehensive in scope or limited only to certain financial aspects; and
- A private equity firm or a group of private equity firms holding at least 40% in a company or with majority control of its board of directors.

256. A company is not considered to have a controlling shareholder if it is publicly listed with more than 50% of voting interest listed or when there is no evidence of a particular shareholder or group of shareholders exerting 'de facto' control over a company.

257. Companies that have as their controlling shareholder governments or government-related entities, infrastructure and asset-management funds, and diversified holding companies and conglomerates are assessed in separate criteria.

### 2. Financial discipline

### a) Leverage influence from acquisitions

258. Companies may employ more or less acquisitive growth strategies based on industry dynamics, regulatory changes, market opportunities, and other factors. We consider management teams with disciplined, transparent acquisition strategies that are consistent with their financial policy framework as providing a high degree of visibility into the projected evolution of cash flow and credit measures. Our assessment takes into account management's track record in terms of acquisition strategy and the related impact on the company's financial risk profile. Historical evidence of limited management tolerance for significant debt-funded acquisitions provides meaningful support for the view that projected credit ratios would not significantly weaken as a result of the company's acquisition policy. Conversely, management teams that pursue opportunistic acquisition strategies, without well-defined parameters, increase the risks that the company's financial risk profile may deteriorate well beyond our forecasts.

259. Acquisition funding policies and management's track record in this respect also provide meaningful insight in terms of credit ratio stability. In the criteria, we take into account management's willingness and capacity to mobilize all funding resources to restore credit quality, such as issuing equity or disposing of assets, to mitigate the impact of sizable acquisitions on credit ratios. The financial policy framework and related historical evidence are key considerations in our assessment.

### b) Leverage influence from shareholder remuneration policies

260. A company's approach to rewarding shareholders demonstrates how it balances the interests of its various stakeholders over time. Companies that are consistent and transparent in their shareholder remuneration policies, and exhibit a willingness to adjust shareholder returns to mitigate adverse operating conditions, provide greater support to their long-term credit quality than other companies. Conversely, companies that prioritize cash returns to shareholders in periods of deteriorating economic, operating, or share price performance can significantly undermine long-term credit quality and exacerbate the credit impact of adverse business conditions. In assessing a company's shareholder remuneration policies, the criteria focus on the predictability of shareholder remuneration plans, including how a company builds shareholder expectations, its track record in executing shareholder return policies over time, and how shareholder returns compare with industry peers'.

261. Shareholder remuneration policies that lack transparency or deviate meaningfully from those of industry peers introduce a higher degree of event risk and volatility and will be assessed as less predictable under the criteria. Dividend and capital return policies that function primarily as a means to distribute surplus capital to shareholders based on transparent and stable payout ratios--after satisfying all capital requirements and leverage objectives of the company, and that support stable to improving leverage ratios--are considered the most supportive of long term credit quality.

### c) Leverage influence from plans regarding investment decisions or organic growth strategies

262. The process by which a company identifies, funds, and executes organic growth, such as expansion into new products and/or new markets, can have a significant impact on its long-term credit quality. Companies that have a disciplined, coherent, and manageable organic growth strategy, and have a track record of successful execution are better positioned to continue to attract third-party capital and

maintain long-term credit quality. By contrast, companies that allocate significant amounts of capital to numerous, unrelated, large and/or complex projects and often incur material overspending against the original budget can significantly increase their credit risk.

263. The criteria assess whether management's organic growth strategies are transparent, comprehensive, and measurable. We seek to evaluate the company's mid- to long-term growth objectives--including strategic rationales and associated execution risks--as well as the criteria it uses to allocate capital. Effective capital allocation is likely to include guidelines for capital deployment, including minimum return hurdles, competitor activity analysis, and demand forecasting. The company's track record will provide key data for this assessment, including how well it executes large and/or complex projects against initial budgets, cost overruns, and timelines.

## 3. Financial policy framework

# a) Comprehensiveness of financial policy framework

264. Financial policies that are clearly defined, unambiguous, and provide a tight framework around management behavior are the most reliable in determining an issuer's future financial risk profile. We assess as consistent with a supportive assessment, policies that are clear, measurable, and well understood by all key stakeholders. Accordingly, the financial policy framework must include well-defined parameters regarding how the issuer will manage its cash flow protection strategies and debt leverage profile. This includes at least one key or a combination of financial ratio constraints (such as maximum debt to EBITDA threshold) and the latter must be relevant with respect to the issuer's industry and/or capital structure characteristics.

265. By contrast, the absence of established financial policies, policies that are vague or not quantifiable, or historical evidence of significant and unexpected variation in management's long-term financial targets could contribute to an overall assessment of a non-supportive financial policy framework.

# b) Transparency of financial policies

266. We assess as supportive financial policy objectives that are transparent and well understood by all key stakeholders and we view them as likely to influence an issuer's financial risk profile over time. Alternatively, financial policies, if they exist, that are not communicated to key stakeholders and/or where there is limited historical evidence to support the company's commitment to these policies, are non-supportive, in our view. We consider the variety of ways in which a company communicates its financial policy objectives, including public disclosures, investor presentation materials, and public commentary.

267. In some cases, however, a company may articulate its financial policy objectives to a limited number of key stakeholders, such as its main creditors or to credit rating agencies. In these situations, a company may still receive a supportive classification if we assess that there is a sufficient track record (more than three years) to demonstrate a commitment to its financial policy objectives.

## c) Achievability and sustainability of financial policies

268. To assess the achievability and sustainability of a company's financial policies, we consider a variety of factors, including the entity's current and historical financial risk profile; the demands of its key stakeholders (including dividend and capital return expectations of equity holders); and the stability of the company's financial policies that we have observed over time. If there is evidence that the company is willing to alter its financial policy framework because of adverse business conditions or growth opportunities (including M&A), this could support an overall assessment of non-supportive.

### 4. Financial policy adjustments--examples

269. Example 1: A moderately leveraged company has just been sold to a new financial sponsor. The financial sponsor has not leveraged the company yet and there is no stated financial policy at the outset. We expect debt leverage to increase upon refinancing, but we are not able to factor it precisely in our forecasts yet.

Likely outcome: FS-6 financial policy assessment, implying that we expect the new owner to implement an aggressive financial policy in the absence of any other evidence.

270. Example 2: A company has two owners—-a family owns 75%, a strategic owner holds the remaining 25%. Although the company has provided S&P Global Ratings with some guidance on long-term financial objectives, the overall financial policy framework is not sufficiently structured nor disclosed to a sufficient number of stakeholders to qualify for a supportive assessment. Recent history, however, does not provide any evidence of unexpected, aggressive financial transactions and we believe event risk is moderate.

Likely outcome: Neutral financial policy impact, including an assessment of neutral for financial discipline. Although the company's financial framework does not support long-term visibility, historical evidence and stability of management suggest that event risk is not significant. The unsupportive financial framework assessment, however, prevents the company from qualifying for an overall positive financial policy assessment, should the conditions for positive financial discipline be met.

271. Example 3: A company (not owned by financial sponsors) has stated leverage targets equivalent to a significant financial risk profile assessment. The company continues to make debt-financed acquisitions yet remains within its leverage targets, albeit at the weaker end of these. Our forecasts are essentially built on expectations that excess cash flow will be fully used to fund M&A or, possibly pay share repurchases, but that management will overall remain within its leverage targets.

Likely outcome: Neutral financial policy impact. Although management is fairly aggressive, the company consistently stays within its financial policy targets. We think our forecasts provide a realistic view of the evolution of the company's credit metrics over the next two years. No event risk adjustment is needed.

272. Example 4: A company (not owned by a financial sponsor) has just made a sizable acquisition (consistent with its long-term business strategy) that has brought its credit ratios out of line. Management expressed its commitment to rapidly improve credit ratios back to its long-term ratio targets--representing an acceptable range for the SACP--through asset disposals or a rights issue. We see their disposal plan (or rights issue) as realistic but precise value and timing are uncertain. At the same time, management has a supportive financial policy framework, a positive track record of five years, and assets are viewed as fairly easily tradable.

Likely outcome: Positive financial policy impact. Although forecast credit ratios will remain temporarily depressed, as we cannot fully factor in asset disposals (or rights issue) due to uncertainty on timing/value, or without leaking confidential information, the company's credit risk should benefit from management's positive track record and a supportive financial policy framework. The anchor will be better by one notch if management and governance is at least satisfactory and liquidity is at least adequate.

273. Example 5: A company (not owned by a financial sponsor) has very solid financial ratios, providing it with meaningful flexibility for M&A when compared with management's long-term stated financial policy. Also, its stock price performance is somewhat below that of its closest industry peers. Although we have no recent evidence of any aggressive financial policy steps, we fundamentally believe that, over the long-term term, the company will end up using its financial flexibility for the right M&A opportunity, or alternatively return cash to shareholders.

Likely outcome: Negative financial policy impact. Long-term event risk derived from M&A cannot be built into forecasts nor shareholder returns (share buybacks or one-off dividends) be built into forecasts to attempt aligning projected ratios with stated long-term financial policy levels. This is because our forecasts are based on realistic and reasonably predictable assumptions for the medium term. The anchor will be adjusted down, by one notch or more, because of the negative financial policy assessment.

# F. Corporate Criteria Glossary

Anchor: The combination of an issuer's business risk profile assessment and its financial risk profile assessment determine the anchor. Additional rating factors can then modify the anchor to determine the final rating or SACP.

Asset profile: A descriptive way to look at the types and quality of assets that comprise a company (examples can include tangible versus intangible assets, those assets that require large and continuing maintenance, upkeep, or reinvestment, etc.).

Business risk profile: This measure comprises the risk and return potential for a company in the market in which it participates, the country risks within those markets, the competitive climate, and the competitive advantages and disadvantages the company has. The criteria combine the assessments for Corporate Industry and Country Risk Assessment (CICRA), and competitive position to determine a company's business risk profile assessment.

Capital-intensive company: A company exhibiting large ongoing capital spending to sales, or a large amount of depreciation to sales. Examples of capital-intensive sectors include oil production and refining, telecommunications, and transportation sectors such as railways and airlines.

Cash available for debt repayment: Forecast cash available for debt repayment is defined as the net change in cash for the period before debt borrowings and debt repayments. This includes forecast discretionary cash flow adjusted for our expectations of any share issuance and M&A. Discretionary cash flow is defined in our Ratios And Adjustments criteria and guidance.

Competitive position: Our assessment of a company's: 1) competitive advantage; 2) operating efficiency; 3) scale, scope, and diversity; and 4) profitability.

- Competitive advantage--The strategic positioning and attractiveness to customers of the company's products or services, and the fragility or sustainability of its business model.
- Operating efficiency--The quality and flexibility of the company's asset base and its cost management and structure.
- Scale, scope, and diversity--The concentration or diversification of business activities.
- Profitability--Our assessment of both the company's level of profitability and volatility of profitability.

Competitive Position Group Profile (CPGP): Used to determine the weights to be assigned to the three components of competitive position other than profitability. While industries are assigned to one of the six profiles, individual companies and industry subsectors can be classified into another CPGP because of unique characteristics. Similarly, national industry risk factors can affect the weighing. The six CPGPs are:

- Services and product focus,
- Product focus/scale driven,
- Capital or asset focus,
- Commodity focus/cost driven,
- Commodity focus/scale driven, and
- National industry and utilities.
- Conglomerate: Companies that have at least three distinct business segments, each contributing between 10%-50% of EBITDA or FOCF. Such companies may benefit from the diversification/portfolio effect.

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Controlling shareholders: Equity owners who are able to affect decisions of varying effect on operations, leverage, and shareholder reward without necessarily being a majority of shareholders.

Corporate Industry and Country Risk Assessment (CICRA): The result of the combination of an issuer's country risk assessment and industry risk assessment.

Debt co-insurance: The view that the joining-together of two or more firms whose earnings streams are less-than-perfectly correlated reduces the risk of default of the merged firms (i.e., the co-insurance effect) and thereby increases the "debt capacity" or "borrowing ability" of the combined enterprise. These financing alternatives became more valuable during the global financial crisis of 2007-2009.

Financial headroom: Measure of deviation tolerated in financial metrics without moving outside or above a pre-designated band or limit typically found in loan covenants (as in a debt to EBITDA multiple that places a constraint on leverage). Significant headroom would allow for larger deviations.

Financial risk profile: The outcome of decisions that management makes in the context of its business risk profile and its financial risk tolerances. This includes decisions about the manner in which management seeks funding for the company and how it constructs its balance sheet. It also reflects the relationship of the cash flows the organization can achieve, given its business risk profile, to its financial obligations. The criteria use cash flow/leverage analysis to determine a corporate issuer's financial risk profile assessment.

Financial sponsor: An entity that follows an aggressive financial strategy in using debt and debt-like instruments to maximize shareholder returns. Typically, these sponsors dispose of assets within a short to intermediate time frame. Financial sponsors include private equity firms, but not infrastructure and asset-management funds, which maintain longer investment horizons.

Profitability ratio: Commonly measured using return on capital and EBITDA margins but can be measured using sector-specific ratios. Generally calculated based on a five-year average, consisting of two years of historical data, and our projections for the current year and the next two financial years.

Shareholder remuneration policies: Management's stated shareholder reward plans (such as a buyback or dividend amount, or targeted payout ratios).

Stand-alone credit profile (SACP): S&P Global Ratings' opinion of an issue's or issuer's creditworthiness, in the absence of extraordinary intervention or support from its parent, affiliate, or related government or from a third-party entity such as an insurer.

Transfer and convertibility assessment: S&P Global Ratings' view of the likelihood of a sovereign restricting nonsovereign access to foreign exchange needed to satisfy the nonsovereign's debt service obligations.

Unconsolidated equity affiliates: Companies in which an issuer has an investment, but which are not consolidated in an issuer's financial statements. Therefore, the earnings and cash flows of the investees are not included in our primary metrics unless dividends are received from the investees.

Upstream/midstream/downstream: Referring to exploration and production, transport and storage, and refining and distributing, respectively, of natural resources and commodities (such as metals, oil, gas, etc.).

Volatility of profitability/SER: We base the volatility of profitability on the standard error of the regression (SER) for a company's historical EBITDA. The SER is a statistical measure that is an estimate of the deviation around a 'best fit' trend line. We combine it with the profitability ratio to determine the final profitability assessment. We only calculate SER when companies have at least seven years of historical annual data, to ensure that the results are meaningful.

Working-capital-intensive companies: Generally a company with large levels of working capital in relation to its sales in order to meet seasonal swings in working capital. Examples of working-capital-intensive sectors include retail, auto manufacturing, and capital goods.

# G. Sector-Specific Criteria

# 1) Asset managers

Asset managers are companies that derive a majority of their revenues from management and performance fees for managing third-party money or assets on behalf of retail or institutional investors.

# a) Capital structure

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We assess asset managers' capital structure according to the same methodology we use for other corporate entities, with the exception of one additional subfactor--diversity of the capital structure, which we consider a tier one risk subfactor. A very positive assessment (1) is not used for asset managers.

In analyzing the diversity of the capital structure, we review the combination of debt and equity that forms an asset manager's capital and the degree of diversity within each of these two components. In analyzing diversity within debt, we review the number of different debt sources the company has, its access to different bank lines, and the number of banks providing those lines. In the analysis of equity, we consider whether the company is publicly traded and whether it has the ability to raise funds in public markets. We also look at the composition of equity (whether it includes common equity or any hybrid security, such as preferred equity).

We believe that diversity of capital structure is especially important for asset managers because the somewhat higher confidence sensitivity of these firms relative to nonfinancial corporate entities may rapidly reduce funding flexibility in adverse market or economic conditions. It is favorable, in our view, for an asset manager not to rely on one or a few financial institutions to raise debt and to have access to public equity markets. We view diversity of capital structure negatively if a company is reliant on a single source (for example, one bank) to raise debt and is privately owned with limited access to additional equity.

The initial capital structure assessment is based on the first four subfactors: diversity of the capital structure, currency risk associated with debt, debt maturity profile (or schedule), and interest rate risk associated with debt (see table 28). We may then adjust the initial assessment based on the fifth subfactor--investments--as per table 22. (The investments assessment cannot exceed positive.)

Table 28

### Assessing Capital Structure

PRELIMINARY CAPITAL STRUCTURE ASSESSMENT

SUBFACTOR ASSESSMENT

Neutral	No tier one subfactor is negative.		
Negative	One tier one subfactor is negative and the tier two subfactor is neutral.		
Very negative	Two or more tier one subfactors are negative; or only one tier one subfactor is negative but the tier two subfactor is also negative.		

As we analyze the investment portfolio of an asset manager, we also assess the market risk associated with those investments. Our assessment of market risk includes the manager's exposure to movements in interest rates, credit spreads, foreign exchange rates, commodity and equity prices, and any other market movements that could impair its earnings and ability to service debt. Investment portfolio market risk that produces a mismatch in cash flows, hinders profitability, or could cause a track record of losses precludes a positive assessment for investments. If the exposures are not large or hedges are in place, a positive assessment of investments is still possible despite the presence of market risk.

### 2) Financial market infrastructure companies


Financial market infrastructure companies (FMIs) are principally exchanges, clearinghouses, central security depositories (CSDs), and payment networks that process and clear credit or debit card transactions and cash payments.

### a) Clearing and settlement risk

For FMIs, including exchanges, clearinghouses, CSDs, and payment networks, the analysis combines the FMI's business risk profile assessment and its financial risk profile assessment to determine the preliminary anchor. We then incorporate our view of clearing and settlement (C&S) risk to determine the anchor. The C&S risk assessment, as a component of the anchor, is the key difference between the FMI rating framework and the corporate methodology. This is because a clearinghouse's most important function is to reduce credit risk among its members by acting as guarantor or CCP to trades executed in its

market. In our opinion, the risk of a member default is the single largest risk that a clearinghouse faces. Similarly, a CSD acts to reduce settlement risk among its members by completing trades on a deliveryversus-payment (DVP) basis and by following other well-established risk management procedures.

Our C&S risk assessment considers the diversity and creditworthiness of membership and an institution's risk management policies and procedures per international standards. The outcome of our C&S risk assessment could raise (by one notch), lower (by one to eight notches), or leave unchanged the preliminary anchor to determine the anchor.



### b) Capital structure

For the most part, we follow the corporate methodology for assessing capital structure, which focuses on two Tier 1 risk subfactors (currency risk associated with debt and the debt maturity profile) and one Tier 2 subfactor (interest rate risk associated with debt).

In a limited number of cases, our assessment of capital structure for an FMI differs from the corporate methodology when the FMI is prudentially regulated by the national banking regulators and conducts some (limited) banking operations, such as deposit-taking and/or granting of credit facilities, linked to its

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core FMI business (e.g., European-based international CSDs). For these FMI companies, we calculate the risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio. (For details, see "<u>Risk-Adjusted Capital Framework Methodology</u>.")

For those few FMI companies for which we calculate a RAC ratio and assign potential modifiers, as per table 29, we apply the same five-point scale from very positive (1) to very negative (5), employing similar gradation of RAC ratios as in "<u>Financial Institutions Rating Methodology</u>."

There are two important exceptions. If an FMI has an anchor of 'aa-' or higher, it is not eligible to receive any notches of uplift. This is because we expect FMI companies exhibiting strong business and financial risk profiles to have strong capitalization. Likewise, if an FMI has an anchor within the 'a' category, it may receive a maximum uplift of one notch.

Table 29

# Capital Structure--RAC Ratio

	DESCRIPTOR	<b>RAC RATIO %</b>	NOTCHES
1	Very positive	>15	2
2	Positive	10-15	1
3	Neutral	7.0-9.9	0
4	Negative	5.0-6.9	(1)
5	Very negative	<5	(2) or more

In our view, there is no optimal structure of the financial safeguard package or default waterfall. Some clearinghouses may rely more on individual member margin requirements, while others may rely more on the mutualized guarantee fund. For this reason, the overall protection afforded by the financial safeguard package (i.e., the sum of the parts) is more important than the individual components of the financial safeguard package. For example, very strong guarantee fund contributions can offset weakness in the margin calculation.

### 2) Financial services finance companies

Financial services finance companies (FSFCs) are finance companies for which the greatest risks relate more to their ability to generate cash flow than to the amount of capital they may need to withstand credit losses. These include consumer finance companies, originators and servicers, auto fleet services companies, real estate services, and money transaction processors, among others.

### a) Competitive position

In assessing the competitive position group profile (CPGP) for FSFCs, we review the following factors:

- Competitive advantage;
- Scale, scope, and diversity;
- Operating efficiency;
- Profitability; and
- Regulatory and legislative risks.

We assess a company's exposure to regulatory or legislative risks as either (1) adequate, (2) weak, or (3) vulnerable. If the regulatory and legislative risk assessment is (3) vulnerable, a company's competitive position is capped at (6) vulnerable. If the regulatory and legislative risk is assessment is (2) weak, the competitive position assessment is capped at (5) weak. If the regulatory and legislative risk assessment is (1) adequate, there are no caps on the competitive position assessment.

Regulatory and legislative risks. Regulatory and legislative risks are prominent factors for FSFCs. When assessing regulatory and legislative risks, we consider the credit implications on the FSFC and don't opine on the larger policy issue. From this perspective, regulators may introduce new legislation or change existing policy that could have significant financial consequences related to both the revenue and costs for individual FSFCs or FSFC subsectors. For example, regulators could impose new regulatory reporting standards, which would increase costs, or regulators could impose limits on the maximum rates at which an individual FSFC or FSFC subsector can lend, which would reduce revenue. Our assessment balances how regulation may constrain profitability while at the same time enhancing profit stability.

Depending on the operating environment, new rules could incrementally constrain the profitability of business activities---for example, by limiting the interest rates permissible to be charged to clients or by limiting the range of clients that a finance company could help finance. Regulatory or legislative changes could also result in higher compliance costs.

We do not view regulatory and legislative risks as a potential positive to competitive advantage. We recognize that regulation could help stabilize volatility for FSFCs, but that would be reflected in the financial risk profile if it were to occur. Given their typically negative impact on competitive ability, regulatory and legislative risks cannot be assessed above adequate. An FSFC with an adequate assessment is not exposed to regulatory policies--existing or prospective--that meaningfully constrain profitability. When regulation reduces competition, we do reflect these benefits directly in the specific company's competitive advantage, as opposed to the overall sector.

An FSFC with a weak regulatory and legislative risk assessment is typically characterized by two or more of the following that is particularly significant:

- -- Subject to regulatory scrutiny, sometimes in a loosely regulated industry, and profitability could be constrained if new policies were implemented
- Exposed to regulatory and legislative changes, but in some cases, diversification by product or geography partially mitigates these risks
- Has a track record of government policy and regulation that constrain profitability or alter the standards for business conduct

An FSFC with a vulnerable regulatory and legislative risk assessment typically has two or more of the following, or one of the following that is particularly significant:

- Subject to ongoing regulatory scrutiny, and profitability will likely be constrained if new policies were implemented
- Exposed to regulatory and legislative changes, with limited diversification by product or geography
- Has a track record of government policy and regulation that significantly constrain profitability or alter the standards for business conduct

### b) Capital structure

We consider a company's dependence on revolving, and generally short-term, asset-specific funding as an additional Tier 1 risk subfactor in our analysis of capital structure for FSFCs.

We assess asset-specific funding as either: (1) neutral, (2) negative, or (3) very negative. We then replace table 21 ("Preliminary Capital Structure Assessment") with table 30 here to determine the preliminary capital structure assessment.

When debt, such as warehouse facilities, or other asset-specific funding is used to finance assets and we net the debt with the assets, we assess the asset-specific Tier 1 subfactor as negative.

Typically, asset-specific funding includes secured and unsecured warehouse lending facilities, repurchase agreements, asset-backed security (ABS) securitizations, and residential mortgage-backed security (RMBS) securitizations.

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Table 30

# Assessing Capital Structure

PRELIMINARY CAPITAL STRUCTURE SUBFACTOR ASSESSMENT ASSESSMENT

EXHIBIT EL-3 PAGE 134 OF 144

Neutral	No Tier 1 subfactor is negative.
Negative	One Tier 1 subfactor is negative, and the Tier 2 subfactor is neutral.
Very negative	Two or more Tier 1 subfactors are negative; or one Tier 1 subfactor is negative and the Tier 2 subfactor is negative; or asset-specific funding is very negative.

We consider asset-specific funding a key driver of creditworthiness when a company is dependent on this form of funding to facilitate origination volume, primarily because the company could be susceptible to disruptions in adverse economic environments. Specifically, how an FSFC funds its business and the confidence sensitivity of its assets directly affect its ability to maintain business volumes and meet obligations in the event that asset-specific funding options become unavailable at different points in the business cycle. However, finance companies with large confidence-sensitive funding exposures are more susceptible to changes in asset credit quality and tangible capital, and we rate these entities under "Financial Institutions Rating Methodology."

We assess asset-specific funding by considering stability during times of stress, the diversity of counterparties, the type of collateral being pledged, and the maturity of asset-specific funding sources.

An FSFC with a neutral asset-specific funding assessment generally has a limited amount of, or no reliance on, asset-specific funding sources for ongoing business operations.

An FSFC with a negative asset-specific funding assessment is typically characterized by one or more of the following:

- The company is reliant on asset-specific funding sources for ongoing business operations.
- A large proportion of maturities are less than one year, or there is a maturity concentration in the same quarter.
- The company is reliant on a concentrated group of financial counterparties.

An FSFC with a very negative asset-specific funding assessment is characterized by both of the following:

- A company exhibits all of the characteristics of a negative asset-specific funding assessment as per the previous paragraph.
- One or more facilities are subject to substantial margin call exposure.

# FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

## A. Volatility of cash flows

# If a company exhibits volatile cash flow metrics, does S&P Global Ratings capture this in the cash flow volatility adjustment or in the financial policy assessment?

We capture this in either analytic factor, as appropriate. As per paragraph 125, the volatility adjustment is the mechanism by which we factor a "cushion" of medium-term variance to current financial performance not otherwise captured in either the near-term base-case forecast or the long-term business risk assessment. We make this adjustment based on the following:

- The expectation of any potential cash flow/leverage ratio movement is both prospective and dependent on the current business or economic conditions.
- Stress scenarios include, but are not limited to, a recession, technology or competitive shifts, loss or renegotiation of major contracts or customers, and key product or input price movements, as typically defined in the company's industry risk profile and competitive position assessment.
- The volatility adjustment is not static and is company-specific. At the bottom of an economic cycle or during periods of stressed business conditions, already reflected in the general industry risk or specific competitive risk profile, the prospect of weakening ratios is far less than at the peak of an economic cycle or business conditions.
- The expectation of prospective ratio changes may be formed by observed historical performance over an economic, business, or product cycle by the company or by peers.

 The assessment of which classification to use when evaluating the prospective number of scoring category moves will be guided by how close the current ratios are to the transition point (i.e. "buffer" in the current scoring category) and the corresponding amount of EBITDA movement at each scoring transition.

As per paragraph 157, financial policy refines our view of a company's risks beyond the conclusions arising from the standard assumptions in the cash flow/leverage assessment. Those assumptions do not always reflect or entirely capture the short-to-medium term event risks or the longer-term risks stemming from a company's financial policy. To the extent movements in one of these factors cannot be confidently predicted within our forward-looking evaluation of cash flow/leverage, we capture that risk in our evaluation of financial policy.

# What constitutes a period of stress when assessing whether a company has a volatile or highly volatile level of cash flow/leverage?

As guidance, our global default studies demonstrate significant correlation of defaults with weak points in business cycles and banking crises. The 1991 peak default rate occurred after a mild recession in the U.S., a severe but short recession in the U.K., and the Nordic banking crisis. Other developed-market speculative-grade default peaks were the U.S., at 10.6% in 2001 (the U.S. recession) and 11.4% in 2009 (the global banking crisis and recession); and Europe, at 12.3% in 2002 (due in part to the bursting of the technology/Internet bubble and failures of a large number of telecom start-ups). (Sources: "2012 Annual Global Corporate Default Study," published March 18, 2013, and "Understanding Standard & Poor's Rating Definitions.")

Additional guidance can be found in "<u>Methodology: Industry Risk</u>," Appendix 1 where we considered sensitivity to economic cycles, as measured by the historical cyclical peak-to-trough decline in profitability and revenues for major recessions ('BBB' and 'BB' stress) mapped to specific industry sectors.

# B. Profitability

If a company operates in a region or in a country where local inflation is high, and you believe that this affects the comparability of its profitability measures with industry peers', how do you incorporate this in your assessment?

When analyzing level of profitability, we use, where available, the numeric guidance developed by considering the distribution of profitability measures within an industry or subsector. These thresholds apply globally irrespective of the underlying level of inflation, although we also consider trends in the profitability ratio to determine the level of profitability assessment. However, high inflation environments are often associated with exposure to countries with a high country risk, in which case as per paragraph 87 we may adjust the volatility of profitability assessment to account for this exposure. Finally, to the extent not captured elsewhere in the analysis, we may incorporate this factor as part of the comparable ratings analysis.

# **REVISIONS AND UPDATES**

This article was originally published on Nov. 19, 2013. These criteria became effective on the date of publication.

Changes introduced after original publication:

- Following our periodic review completed on Oct. 16, 2015, we deleted paragraphs 9 and 10, which were related to the initial publication of our criteria and no longer relevant. We also made some adjustments to language. These adjustments have no impact on our ratings or the effective date of the criteria.
- Following our periodic review completed on Oct. 14, 2016, we updated criteria references, the contact list, and the definitions of financial sponsor-owned companies and financial sponsors to be consistent with those in the article "<u>The Treatment Of Non-Common Equity</u> <u>Financing In Nonfinancial Corporate Entities</u>," published April 29, 2014.
- On Feb. 8, 2017, we republished the article to correct an error in the regional grouping for the countries of Bhutan, Grenada, and Eritrea introduced after the periodic criteria review closed on Oct. 14, 2016.
- -- Following our periodic review completed on Oct. 11, 2017, we updated criteria references.
- On April 23, 2018, we updated the definition of a financial sponsor-owned company in table
   23. We also updated the contact information.

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- On Dec. 7, 2018, we republished this criteria article to make nonmaterial changes. We updated table 26, which supplements paragraph 46, by removing the GDP weightings of each country making up each defined region. The GDP weightings were removed because they were outdated and because a static table does not reflect the fact that GDP data change dynamically. Consistent with the criteria (see paragraph 46), we calculate regional risk assessments as the average of the unadjusted country risk assessments, weighted by the GDP of each country in a defined region. These GDP weights were published in the criteria at the time of initial publication for reference only. Since the GDP data change, we use current GDP data each time we recalculate the regional risk assessments. We also updated the contact information and a criteria reference.
- On April 1, 2019, we changed the definition of discretionary cash flow in the Corporate Criteria Glossary section because it was superseded by "<u>Corporate Methodology: Ratios And</u> <u>Adjustments</u>," published on April 1, 2019 (Ratios and Adjustments). We also aligned the FFO to cash interest coverage ratio in paragraphs 103 and 105 with Ratios and Adjustments. We also made a nonmaterial change to paragraph 81 and the Frequently Asked Questions to provide additional transparency on how we assess profitability. Finally, we updated criteria references.
- On July 1, 2019, we republished this criteria article to make nonmaterial changes. We removed tables 28, 29, and 30 that contained industry-specific SER parameters. These parameters are not key rating factors and may change over time. We will update these tables and republish them in "<u>Guidance: Corporate Methodology</u>." We also amended the reference to these tables in paragraph 85 and updated the related research.
- On Dec. 4, 2019, we republished this article to make nonmaterial changes. Specifically, we
  deleted a sentence in paragraph seven that contained an example that is not criteria text,
  we clarified language in paragraph 124, we updated the title of table 26, and we updated
  criteria references.
- On April 30, 2020, we republished this criteria article to make nonmaterial changes: 1) We clarified language in paragraphs 7, 64, 71, 83, 103, 123, and 124 to reflect the fact that some previous content from archived KCFs has subsequently been included in "<u>Guidance:</u> <u>Corporate Methodology</u>"; 2) in paragraph 123, we reformatted and clarified our language as to the use of the standard and medial volatility tables; 3) we added Appendix G, "Sector-Specific Criteria", through which we have consolidated sector-specific criteria for financial

market infrastructure companies (FMIs) and financial service finance companies (FSFCs) (the criteria in Appendix G previously appeared in separate Key Credit Factors articles for FMIs and for FSFCs, both of which have since been archived); 4) in table 27 of Appendix B, we updated the list of subsectors under the media and entertainment industry--specifically, we eliminated trade show, directories, and internet search engines as subsectors, since they are not materially represented in our current rated universe, and we combined several similar subsectors within media and entertainment to simplify the sector-specific guidance; and 5) we updated the "Related Publications" section to include criteria articles referenced by Appendix G.

- On March 31, 2021, we republished this criteria article to correct a publication error in Appendix G. Specifically, we included sector-specific criteria for asset managers that were inadvertently omitted when we consolidated sector-specific criteria that previously appeared in a separate "Key Credit Factors" article for asset managers, which has since been archived.
- On May 27, 2021, we republished this article to make nonmaterial changes. Specifically, we deleted paragraph 192, and moved the list of CRA application examples to "<u>Guidance:</u> <u>Corporate Methodology</u>".
- On Oct. 11, 2021, we republished this criteria article to make nonmaterial changes. We updated paragraphs 61, 82, 89, 112, 117, 125, 185, 220, and 245 to include examples describing how we incorporate environmental, social, and governance credit factors in our criteria framework. We also updated the "Related Publications" section.
- On Dec. 15, 2021, we republished this criteria article to make nonmaterial changes to update criteria references.

Sectors that fall in the scope of these criteria since the original publication include:

- Agricultural cooperatives following publication of "<u>Key Credit Factors For Agricultural</u> <u>Cooperatives</u>" on March 17, 2015;
- Entities engaged in commodities trading activities that generate less than 70% of expected earnings from commodities trading following publication of "<u>Commodities Trading Industry</u> <u>Methodology</u>," published Jan. 19, 2017;

- Master limited partnerships and general partnerships of master limited partnerships trading following publication of "<u>Methodology: Master Limited Partnerships And General</u> <u>Partnerships</u>" on Sept. 22, 2014; and
- Transportation equipment leasing and car rental companies following publication of "<u>Key</u>
   <u>Credit Factors For The Operating Leasing Industry</u>," published on Dec. 14, 2016.

# **RELATED PUBLICATIONS**

## **Superseded Criteria**

- Companies Owned By Financial Sponsors: Rating Methodology, March 21, 2013
- Methodology: Business Risk/Financial Risk Matrix Expanded, Sept. 18, 2012
- How Stock Prices Can Affect An Issuer's Credit Rating, Sept. 26, 2008
- 2008 Corporate Criteria: Analytical Methodology, April 15, 2008
- Credit FAQ: Knowing The Investors In A Company's Debt And Equity, April 4, 2006

### **Related Criteria**

- Financial Institutions Rating Methodology, Dec. 9, 2021
- Environmental, Social, And Governance Principles In Credit Ratings, Oct. 10, 2021
- --- Group Rating Methodology, July 1, 2019
- Corporate Methodology: Ratios And Adjustments, April 1, 2019
- Reflecting Subordination Risk In Corporate Issue Ratings, March 28, 2018
- Risk-Adjusted Capital Framework Methodology, July 20, 2017
- -- Recovery Rating Criteria For Speculative-Grade Corporate Issuers, Dec. 7, 2016
- Rating Government-Related Entities: Methodology And Assumptions, March 25, 2015
- Methodology And Assumptions: Liquidity Descriptors For Global Corporate Issuers, Dec. 16, 2014

- The Treatment Of Non-Common Equity Financing In Nonfinancial Corporate Entities, April 29, 2014
- Country Risk Assessment Methodology And Assumptions, Nov. 19, 2013
- -- Methodology: Industry Risk, Nov. 19, 2013
- <u>Ratings Above The Sovereign--Corporate And Government Ratings: Methodology And</u>
   <u>Assumptions</u>, Nov. 19, 2013
- Methodology: Management And Governance Credit Factors For Corporate Entities, Nov. 13, 2012
- Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC' Ratings, Oct. 1, 2012
- Principles Of Credit Ratings, Feb. 16, 2011
- Stand-Alone Credit Profiles: One Component Of A Rating, Oct. 1, 2010

### **Related Guidance**

- Guidance: Corporate Methodology, July 1, 2019
- Guidance: Corporate Methodology: Ratios And Adjustments, April 1, 2019

This article is a Criteria article. Criteria are the published analytic framework for determining Credit Ratings. Criteria include fundamental factors, analytical principles, methodologies, and /or key assumptions that we use in the ratings process to produce our Credit Ratings. Criteria, like our Credit Ratings, are forward-looking in nature. Criteria are intended to help users of our Credit Ratings understand how S&P Global Ratings analysts generally approach the analysis of Issuers or Issues in a given sector. Criteria include those material methodological elements identified by S&P Global Ratings as being relevant to credit analysis. However, S&P Global Ratings recognizes that there are many unique factors / facts and circumstances that may potentially apply to the analysis of a given Issuer or Issue. Accordingly, S&P Global Ratings Criteria is not designed to provide an exhaustive list of all factors applied in our rating analyses. Analysts exercise analytic judgement in the application of Criteria through the Rating Committee process to arrive at rating determinations.

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### S&P Global Ratings

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# **Contact the analysts:**

. . . . . .

EXHIBIT EL-3 PAGE 144 OF 144

### Peter Kernan

Criteria Contacts, London

- P. (44) 20-7176-3618
- E. <u>peter.kernan@spgloba</u> <u>l.com</u>

### Andrew D Palmer

Criteria Contacts, Melbourne

- P. (61) 3-9631-2052
- E. andrew.palmer@spglo bal.com

### Marta Castelli

Criteria Contacts, Buenos Aires

- P. (54) 114-891-2128
- E. <u>marta.castelli@spglob</u> <u>al.com</u>

### Gregg Lemos-Stein, CFA

Analytical Contacts, New York

- P. (1) 212-438-1809
- E. gregg.lemos-stein@sp global.com
- Michael P Altberg

Analytical Contacts, New York

- P. (1) 212-438-3950
- E. <u>michael.altberg@spglo</u> <u>bal.com</u>

### Luciano D Gremone

Analytical Contacts, Buenos Aires

- P. (54) 114-891-2143
- E. luciano.gremone@spgl obal.com

### Barbara Castellano

Analytical Contacts, Milan

### P. + 390272111253

E. <u>barbara.castellano@spgl</u> <u>obal.com</u>

# MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE

### RATING METHODOLOGY

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#### Analyst Contacts:

NEW YORK	- 1 210 55° 1653
Michael G. Hegenny Norse - Le compositor	
Asian hagi mujadays	
is an and inclose that er	
	+ 212 553 7943
Managing Tirrector - Globy F Infrastructury - inance - alter winyow (crinoodys cor	
Jettrey Cassella lice resident Senic Ana Jefries ansettakum-oodys co	+1 212 573 1665
Natividad Martel lice Fresher Senior Analy	+1 212 559 4500 N

na ividao mu .-La woody: com

# Regulated Electric and Gas Utilities

This rating methodology replaces "Regulated Electric and Gas Utilities" last revised on December 23, 2013. We have updated some outdated links and removed certain issuer-specific information.

### Summary

This rating methodology explains our approach to assessing credit risk for regulated electric and gas utilities globally. This document does not include an exhaustive treatment of all factors that are reflected in our ratings but should enable the reader to understand the qualitative considerations and financial information and ratios that are usually most important for ratings in this sector.<sup>1</sup>

This report includes a detailed scorecard which is a reference tool that can be used to approximate credit profiles within the regulated electric and gas utility sector in most cases. The scorecard provides summarized guidance for the factors that are generally most important in assigning ratings to companies in the regulated electric and gas utility industry. However, the scorecard is a summary that does not include every rating consideration. The weights shown for each factor in the scorecard represent an approximation of their importance for rating decisions but actual importance may vary substantially. In addition, the scorecard uses historical results while ratings are based on our forward-looking expectations. As a result, the scorecard-indicated outcome is not expected to match the actual rating of each company.

THIS METHODOLOGY WAS UPDATED ON THE DATUS LISTLD AS NOTEE: ON SEPTEMBER 10, 2020 WE REMOVED POINT IN-TIME REFERENCES AND ALSO MADE MINOR FORMATTING CHANGES, ON NOVEMBER 4, 2019 WE UPDATED SOME OUTDATED REFERENCES AND ALSO MADE MINOR FORMATTING CHANGES, ON FEBRUARY 22, 2019 WE AMEMDED A REFERENCE TO A METHODOLOG VIN APPENDIX E 4VD REMOVED OUTDATED TEXT, ON AUGUST 2, 2016 WE M/ DE MINOR FORMATTING CHANGES THROUGHOUT THE METHODOLOGY ON FEBRUARY 15, 2016. WE M/ DE MINOR FORMATTING OF THE FACTOR 4, HINANCHAI STRENCTH TABLE ON PAGE 34, AND ON SEPTEMBER 27, 2017. WE REMOVED A DUF, ICATE FOOTNOTE THAT WAS PLACED IN THE MIDDLE OF THE TEXT ON PAGE

This update may not be effective in some jurisdictions until certain requirements are met.

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The scorecard contains four key factors that are important in our assessment for ratings in the regulated electric and gas utility sector

- 1. Regulatory Framework
- 2 Ability to Recover Costs and Earn Returns
- 3. Diversification
- 4 Financial Strength

Some of these factors also encompass a number of sub-factors. There is also a notching factor for holding company structural subordination.

This rating methodology is not intended to be an exhaustive discussion of all factors that our analysts consider in assigning ratings in this sector. We note that our analysis for ratings in this sector covers factors that are common across all industries such as ownership, management, liquidity, corporate legal structure, governance and country related risks which are not explained in detail in this document, as well as factors that can be meaningful on a company-specific basis. Our ratings consider these and other qualitative considerations that do not lend themselves to a transparent presentation in a scorecard format. The scorecard used for this methodology reflects a decision to favor a relatively simple and transparent presentation rather than a more complex scorecard that might map scorecard-indicated outcomes more closely to actual ratings.

Highlights of this report include:

- » An overview of the rated universe
- » A summary of the rating methodology
- » A discussion of the scorecard factors
- » Comments on the rating methodology assumptions and limitations, including a discussion of rating considerations that are not included in the scorecard

The Appendices show the full scorecard (Appendix A), our approach to ratings within a utility family (Appendix B), a description of the various types of companies rated under this methodology (Appendix C), regional and other considerations (Appendix D), and treatment of power purchase agreements (Appendix E).

This methodology describes the analytical framework used in determining credit ratings. In some instances, our analysis is also guided by additional publications which describe our approach for analytical considerations that are not specific to any single sector. Examples of such considerations include but are not limited to: the assignment of short-term ratings, the relative ranking of different classes of debt and hybrid securities, how sovereign credit quality affects non-sovereign issuers, and the assessment of credit support from other entities <sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> A link to an index of our sector and cross-sector methodologies can be found in the "Moody's Related Publications" section

RATING METHUDOLOGY RECULATED ELECTRIC / ND GAS UTILITIES

<sup>2</sup> JUNE 23 2017

### About the Rated Universe

This methodology applies to rate-regulated<sup>3</sup> electric and gas utilities that are not Networks<sup>4</sup>. Regulated electric and gas utilities are companies whose predominant<sup>5</sup> business is the sale of electricity and/or gas or related services under a rate-regulated framework, in most cases to retail customers. Also included under this methodology are rate-regulated utilities that own generating assets as any material part of their business, utilities whose charges or bills to customers include a meaningful component related to the electric or gas commodity, utilities whose rates are regulated at a sub-sovereign level (e.g. by provinces, states or municipalities), and companies providing an independent system operator function to an electric grid. Companies rated under this methodology are primarily rate-regulated monopolies or, in certain circumstances, companies that may not be outright monopolies but where government regulation effectively sets prices and limits competition.

This rating methodology covers regulated electric and gas utilities worldwide These companies are engaged in the production, transmission, coordination, distribution and/or sale of electricity and/or natural gas, and they are either investor owned companies, commercially oriented government owned companies or, in the case of independent system operators, not-for-profit or similar entities. As detailed in Appendix C, this methodology covers a wide variety of companies active in the sector, including vertically integrated utilities, transmission and distribution utilities with retail customers and/or sub-sovereign regulation, local gas distribution utility companies (LDCs), independent system operators, and regulated generation companies. These companies may be operating companies or holding companies.

An over-arching consideration for regulated utilities is the regulatory environment in which they operate. The nature of regulation can vary significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. While regulation is also a key consideration for networks, a utility's regulatory environment is in comparison often more dynamic and more subject to political intervention. The direct relationship that a regulated utility has with the retail customer, including billing for electric or gas supply that has substantial price volatility, can lead to a more politically charged rate-setting environment. Similarly, regulation at the sub-sovereign level is often more accessible for participation by interveners, including disaffected customers and the politicians who want their votes. Our views of regulatory environments evolve over time in accordance with our observations of regulatory, political, and judicial events that affect issuers in the sector

This methodology pertains to regulated electric and gas utilities and excludes the following types of issuers, which are covered by separate rating methodologies: regulated networks, unregulated utilities and power companies, public power utilities, municipal joint action agencies, electric cooperatives, regulated water companies and natural gas pipelines.<sup>6</sup>

3 JUNE 29 2017

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Companies in many industries are regulated. We use the term rate-regulated to distinguish companies whose rates (by which we also mean tariffs or revenues in general) are set by regulators.

<sup>4</sup> Regulated Electric and Gas Networks are companies whose predominant business is purely the transmission and/or distribution of electricity and/or natural gas without involvement in the procurement or sale of electricity and/or gas; whose charges to customers thus do not include a meaningful commodity cost component; which sell mainly (or in many cases exclusively) to non-retail customers; and which are rate-regulated under a national framework.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> We generally consider a company to be predominantly a regulated electric and gas utility when a majority of its cash flows, prospectively and on a sustained basis, are derived from regulated electric and gas utility businesses. Since cash flows can be volatile (such that a company might have a majority of utility cash flows simply due to a cyclical downturn in its non-utility businesses), we may also consider the breakdown of assets and/or debt of a company to determine which business is predominant

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> A link to an index of our sector and cross-sector methodologies can be found in the "Moody's Related Publications" section.

### About this Rating Methodology

This report explains the rating methodology for regulated electric and gas utilities in six sections, which are summarized as follows:

#### 1. Identification and Discussion of the Scorecard Factors

The scorecard in this rating methodology focuses on four factors. The four factors are comprised of subfactors that provide further detail.

Broad Scorecard Factors	Factor Weighting	Sub-Factor	Sub-Factor Weighting
Regulatory Framework	25%	Legislative and Judicial Underpinnings of the Regulatory Framework	12.5%
	Consistency and Predictability of Regulation	Consistency and Predictability of Regulation	12.5%
Ability to Recover Costs	25%	Timeliness of Recovery of Operating and Capital Costs	12.5%
and Earn Returns		Sufficiency of Rates and Returns	12.5%
Diversification	10%	Market Position	5%*
		Generation and Fuel Diversity	5%**
Financial Strength, Key Financial Metrics	40%		
		CFO pre-WC + Interest / Interest	7 5%
		CFO pre-WC / Debt	15.0%
	·····	CFO pre-WC – Dividends / Debt	10 0%
		Debt/Capitalization	7 5%
Total	100%		100%
Notching Adjustment			
Holding Company Struct	ural Subordination		0 to -3

### Factor / Sub-Factor Weighting - Regulated Utilities

\*10% weight for issuers that lack generation, \*\*0% weight for issuers that lack generation

### 2. Measurement or Estimation of Factors in the Scorecard

We explain our general approach for scoring each factor and show the weights used in the scorecard. We also provide a rationale for why each of these scorecard components is meaningful as a credit indicator. The information used in assessing the sub-factors is generally found in or calculated from information in company financial statements, derived from other observations or estimated by our analysts. All of the quantitative credit metrics incorporate Moody's standard adjustments to income statement, cash flow statement and balance sheet amounts for restructuring, impairment, off-balance sheet accounts, receivable securitization programs, under-funded pension obligations, and recurring operating leases.<sup>7</sup>

Our ratings are forward-looking and reflect our expectations for future financial and operating performance. However, historical results are helpful in understanding patterns and trends of a company's performance as well as for peer comparisons. We utilize historical data (in most cases, an average of the last three years of reported results) in the scorecard. However, the factors in the scorecard can be assessed using various time

<sup>7</sup> For more information, see our cross-sector methodology that describes our standard adjustments in the analysis of non-financial corporations. A link to an index of our sector and cross-sector methodologies can be found in the "Moody's Related Publications" section.

periods. For example, rating committees may find it analytically useful to examine both historic and expected future performance for periods of several years or more, or for individual twelve-month periods.

### 3. Mapping Scorecard Factors to the Rating Categories

After estimating or calculating each sub-factor, the outcomes for each of the sub-factors are mapped to a broad Moody's rating category (Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B, or Caa, also called alpha categories).

# 4. Assumptions Limitations and Rating Considerations Not Included in the Scorecard

This section discusses limitations in the use of the scorecard to map against actual ratings, some of the additional factors that are not included in the scorecard but can be important in determining ratings, and limitations and assumptions that pertain to the overall rating methodology

# 5. Determining the Overall Scorecard-Indicated Outcome<sup>8</sup>

To determine the overall scorecard-indicated outcome, we convert each of the sub-factor ratings into a numeric value based upon the scale below.

Aaa	Aa	A	Baa	Ba	В	Саа	Са
1	3	6	9	12	15	18	20

The numerical score for each sub-factor is multiplied by the weight for that sub-factor with the results then summed to produce a composite weighted-factor score. The composite weighted factor score is then mapped back to an alphanumeric rating based on the ranges in the table below.

Scorecard-Indicated	Outcome
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Scorecard-Indicated Outcome	Aggregate Weighted Total Factor Score
Ааа	x < 15
Aa1	1.5 ≤ x < 2 5
Aa2	2 5 ≤ x < 3.5
Aa3	3.5 ≤ x < 4.5
A1	4 5 ≤ x < 5.5
A2	5.5 ≤ x < 6.5
A3	6 5 ≤ x < 7.5
Baa1	75≤x<85
Baa2	8.5 ≤ x < 9.5
Baa3	9.5 ≤ x < 10.5
Ba1	10.5 ≤ x < 11.5
Ba2	11.5 ≤ x < 12 5
Ba3	12 5 ≤ x < 13.5
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In general, the scorecard-indicated outcome is oriented to the Corporate Family Rating (CFR) for speculative-grade issuers and the senior unsecured rating for investment-grade issuers. For issuers that benefit from ratings uplift due to parental support, government ownership or other institutional support, the scorecardindicated outcome is oriented to the baseline credit assessment. For more information, see our cross-sector methodology that describes our general approach for assessing government-related issuers. Individual debt instrument ratings also factor in decisions on notching for seniority level and collateral. For more information, see our cross-sector methodology that describes principles related to loss given default for speculative grade non-financial companies and also our cross-sector methodology that describes the alignment of corporate instrument ratings based on differences in security and priority of claim. A link to an index of our sector and cross-sector methodologies can be found in the "Moody's Related Publications" section.

ard-Indicated Outcome	
Scorecard-Indicated Outcome	Aggregate Weighted Total Factor Score
B1	13.5 ≤ x < 14.5
BZ	14 5 ≤ x < 15 5
ВЗ	15 5 ≤ x < 16.5
Caal	16.5 ≤ x < 17 5
Caa2	17.5 ≤ x < 18.5
Caa3	18.5 ≤ x < 19.5
Са	x ≥ 19 5

For example, an issuer with a composite weighted factor score of 117 would have a Ba2 scorecard-indicated outcome.

# 6. Appendices

The Appendices present a full scorecard and provide additional commentary and insights on our view of credit risks in this industry

# **Discussion of the Scorecard Factors**

Our analysis of electric and gas utilities focuses on four broad factors

- » Regulatory Framework
- » Ability to Recover Costs and Earn Returns
- » Diversification
- » Financial Strength

There is also a notching factor for holding company structural subordination

# Factor 1: Regulatory Framework (25%)

## Why It Matters

For rate-regulated utilities, which typically operate as a monopoly, the regulatory environment and how the utility adapts to that environment are the most important credit considerations. The regulatory environment is comprised of two factors - the Regulatory Framework and its corollary factor, the Ability to Recover Costs and Earn Returns. Broadly speaking, the Regulatory Framework is the foundation for how all the decisions that affect utilities are made (including the setting of rates), as well as the predictability and consistency of decision-making provided by that foundation. The Ability to Recover Costs and Earn Returns relates more directly to the actual decisions, including their timeliness and the rate-setting outcomes

Utility rates<sup>9</sup> are set in a political/regulatory process rather than a competitive or free-market process; thus, the Regulatory Framework is a key determinant of the success of utility. The Regulatory Framework has many components: the governing body and the utility legislation or decrees it enacts, the manner in which regulators are appointed or elected, the rules and procedures promulgated by those regulators, the judiciary

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> In jurisdictions where utility revenues include material government subsidy payments, we consider utility rates to be inclusive of these payments, and we thus evaluate sub-factors 1a, 1b, 2a and 2b in light of both rates and material subsidy payments. For example, we would consider the legal and judicial underpinnings and consistency and predictability of subsidies as well as rates.

RATING METHODOLOGY, REGULATED LECTRIC / ND GAS UTILITIES

that interprets the laws and rules and that arbitrates disagreements, and the manner in which the utility manages the political and regulatory process. In many cases, utilities have experienced credit stress or default primarily or at least secondarily because of a break-down or obstacle in the Regulatory Framework – for instance, laws that prohibited regulators from including investments in uncompleted power plants or plants not deemed "used and useful" in rates, or a disagreement about rate-making that could not be resolved until after the utility had defaulted on its debts.

How We Assess Legislative and Judicial Underpinnings of the Regulatory Framework for the Scorecard For this sub-factor, we consider the scope, clarity, transparency, supportiveness and granularity of utility legislation, decrees, and rules as they apply to the issuer. We also consider the strength of the regulator's authority over rate-making and other regulatory issues affecting the utility, the effectiveness of the judiciary or other independent body in arbitrating disputes in a disinterested manner, and whether the utility's monopoly has meaningful or growing carve-outs. In addition, we look at how well developed the framework is – both how fully fleshed out the rules and regulations are and how well tested it is – the extent to which regulatory or judicial decisions have created a body of precedent that will help determine future ratemaking. Since the focus of our scoring is on each issuer, we consider how effective the utility is in navigating the regulatory framework – both the utility's ability to shape the framework and adapt to it.

A utility operating in a regulatory framework that is characterized by legislation that is credit supportive of utilities and eliminates doubt by prescribing many of the procedures that the regulators will use in determining fair rates (which legislation may show evidence of being responsive to the needs of the utility in general or specific ways), a long history of transparent rate-setting, and a judiciary that has provided ample precedent by impartially adjudicating disagreements in a manner that addresses ambiguities in the laws and rules will receive higher scores in the Legislative and Judicial Underpinnings sub-factor. A utility operating in a regulatory framework that, by statute or practice, allows the regulator to arbitrarily prevent the utility from recovering its costs or earning a reasonable return on prudently incurred investments, or where regulatory decisions may be reversed by politicians seeking to enhance their populist appeal will receive a much lower score

In general, we view national utility regulation as being less liable to political intervention than regulation by state, provincial or municipal entities, so the very highest scoring in this sub-factor is reserved for this category. However, we acknowledge that states and provinces in some countries may be larger than small nations, such that their regulators may be equally "above-the-fray" in terms of impartial and technically-oriented rate setting, and very high scoring may be appropriate

The relevant judicial system can be a major factor in the regulatory framework. This is particularly true in litigious societies like the United States, where disagreements between the utility and its state or municipal regulator may eventually be adjudicated in federal district courts or even by the US Supreme Court. In addition, bankruptcy proceedings in the US take place in federal courts, which have at times been able to impose rate settlement agreements on state or municipal regulators. As a result, the range of decisions available to state regulators may be effectively circumscribed by court precedent at the state or federal level, which we generally view as favorable for the credit- supportiveness of the regulatory framework.

Electric and gas utilities are generally presumed to have a strong monopoly that will continue into the foreseeable future, and this expectation has allowed these companies to have greater leverage than companies in other sectors with similar ratings. Thus, the existence of a monopoly in itself is unlikely to be a driver of strong scoring in this sub-factor. On the other hand, a strong challenge to the monopoly could cause lower scoring, because the utility can only recover its costs and investments and service its debt if customers purchase its services. There have been some instances of incursions into utilities' monopoly, including municipalization, self-generation, distributed generation with net metering, or unauthorized use

RATING METHODOLOGY, REGULATED ELECTRIC AND GAS UDUITIES.

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(beyond the level for which the utility receives compensation in rates). Incursions that are growing significantly or having a meaningful impact on rates for customers that remain with the utility could have a negative impact on scoring of this sub-factor and on factor 2 - Ability to Recover Costs and Earn Returns.

The scoring of this sub-factor may not be the same for every utility in a particular jurisdiction. We have observed that some utilities appear to have greater sway over the relevant utility legislation and promulgation of rules than other utilities – even those in the same jurisdiction. The content and tone of publicly filed documents and regulatory decisions sometimes indicates that the management team at one utility has better responsiveness to and credibility with its regulators or legislators than the management at another utility.

While the underpinnings to the regulatory framework tend to change relatively slowly, they do evolve, and our factor scoring will seek to reflect that evolution. For instance, a new framework will typically become tested over time as regulatory decisions are issued, or perhaps litigated, thereby setting a body of precedent. Utilities may seek changes to laws in order to permit them to securitize certain costs or collect interim rates, or a jurisdiction in which rates were previously recovered primarily in base rate proceedings may institute riders and trackers. These changes would likely impact scoring of sub-factor 2b - Timeliness of Recovery of Operating and Capital Costs, but they may also be sufficiently significant to indicate a change in the regulatory underpinnings. On the negative side, a judiciary that had formerly been independent may start to issue decisions that indicate it is conforming its decisions to the expectations of an executive branch that wants to mandate lower rates

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Factor 1a: Legislative and Judicial Unde	erpinnings of the Regulatory Framework (12 Aa	5%)	Baa
Utility regulation occurs under a fully developed framework that is national in scope based on legislation that provides the utility a nearly absolute monopoly (see note 1) within its service territory, an unquestioned assurance that rates will be set in a manner that will permit the utility to make and recover all necessary investments, an extremely high degree of clarity as to the manner in which utilities will be regulated and prescriptive methods and procedures for setting rates. Existing utility law is comprehensive and supportive such that changes in legislation are not expected tobe necessary, or any changes that have occurred havebeen strongly supportive of utilities credit quality ingeneral and sufficiently forward-looking so as to address problems before they occurred. There is an independent judiciary that can arbitrate disagreements between the regulator and the utility	Utility regulation occurs under a fully developed national, state or provincial framework based on legislation that provides the utility an extremely strong monopoly (see note 1) within its service territory, a strong assurance, subject to limited review, that rates will be set in a manner that will permit the utility to make and recover all necessary investments, a very high degree of clarity as to the manner in which utilities will be regulated and reasonably prescriptive methods and procedures for setting rates. If there have been changes in utility legislation, they have been timely and clearly credit supportive of the issuer in a manner that shows the utility has had a strong voice in the process. There is an independent judiciary that can arbitrate disagreements between the regulator and the utility, should they occur including access to national courts, strong judicial precedent in the interpretation of utility laws, and a strong rule of law. We expect these conditions to continue	Utility regulation occurs under a well-developed national, state or provincial framework based on legislation that provides the utility a very strong monopoly (see note 1) within its service territory, an assurance, subject to reasonable prudency requirements, that rates will be set in a manner that will permit the utility to make and recover all necessary investments, a high degree of clarity as to the manner in which utilities will be regulated, and overall guidance for methods and procedures for setting rates if there have been changes in utility legislation, they have been mostly timely and on the whole credit supportive for the issuer, and the utility has had a clear voice in the legislative process. There is an independent judiciary that can arbitrate disagreements between the regulator and the utility, should they occur, including access to national courts,	Utility regulation occurs (i) under a national, state, provincial o municipal framework based on legislation that provides the utility a strong monopoly within its service territory that may have some exceptions such as greater self-generation (see note 1), a general assurance that, subject to prudency requirements that are mostly reasonable, rates will be set will be set in a manner that will permt the utility to make and recover all

clear judicial precedent in the interpretation of precedent in the interpretation of utility laws, and a generally utility law, and a strong rule of law. We expect strong rule of law; or (ii) regulation has been applied (under a well-developed framework) in a manner such that redress to an independent arbiter has not been required. We expect these conditions to continue.

ung m recov degr pro com legis ch sup s 6 disagreements between the regulator and the utility should they occur, including access to national courts, very strong judicial precedent in the interpretation of utility laws, and a strong rule of law We expect these conditions to continue.

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Utility regulation occurs (i) under a national, state,

provincial or municipal framework based on

legislation or government decree that provides the

generally strong but may have a greater level of

requirements which may be stringent, provides a

general assurance (with somewhat less certainty)

permit the utility to make and recover necessary

investments, or (ii) under a new framework where

judiciary that can arbitrate disagreements between

the regulator and the utility may not have clear

authority or may not be fully independent of the

regulator or other political pressure, but there is a

applied in a manner such redress has not been

required We expect these conditions to continue.

# Caa

Utility regulation occurs (i) under a national, state, provincial or municipal framework based on legislation or government decree that provides the utility monopoly within its service territory that is reasonably strong but may utility a monopoly within its service territory that is have important exceptions, and that, subject to prudency requirements which may be stringent or at times arbitrary, exceptions (see note 1), and that, subject to prudency provides more limited or less certain assurance that rates will be set in a manner that will permit the utility to make and recover necessary investments, or (ii) under a new that rates will be set will be set in a manner that will framework where we would expect less independent and transparent regulation, based either on the regulator's history in other sectors or other factors. The judiciary that the jurisdiction has a history of less independent and can arbitrate disagreements between the regulator and the transparent regulation in other sectors Either: (i) the utility may not have clear authority or may not befully independent of the regulator or other political pressure, but there is a reasonably strong rule of law. Alternately, where there is no independent arbiter, the regulation has been applied in a manner that often requires some redress adding reasonably strong rule of law, or (11) where there is no more uncertainty to the regulatory framework. There may independent arbiter, the regulation has mostly been be a periodic risk of creditor-unfriendly government

В

intervention in utility markets or rate-setting

Utility regulation occurs (i) under a national, state, provincial or municipal framework based on legislation or government decree that

these conditions to continue

provides the utility a monopoly within its service territory, but with little assurance that rates will be set in a manner that will permit the utility to make and recover necessary investments, or (ii) under a new framework where we would expect unpredictable or adverse regulation, based either on the jurisdiction's history of in other sectors or

other factors The judiciary that can arbitrate disagreements between the regulator and the utility may not have clear authority or is viewed as not being fully independent of the regulator or other political pressure Alternately, there may be no redress to an effective independent arbiter The ability of the utility to enforce its monopoly or prevent uncompensated usage of its system may be limited There may be a risk of creditorunfriendly nationalization or other significant intervention in utility markets or rate-setting.

Note 1: The strength of the monopoly refers to the legal, regulatory and practical obstacles for customers in the utility's territory to obtain service from another provider. Examples of a weakening of the monopoly would include the ability of a city or large user to leave the utility system to set up their own system, the extent to which self-generation is permitted (e g cogeneration) and/or encouraged (e g, net metering, DSM generation). At the lower end of the ratings spectrum, the utility's monopoly may be challenged by pervasive theft and unauthorized use. Since utilities are generally presumed to be monopolies, a strong monopoly position in itself is not sufficient for a strong score in this subfactor, but a weakening of the monopoly can lower the score

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How We Assess Consistency and Predictability of Regulation for the Scorecard For the Consistency and Predictability sub-factor, we consider the track record of regulatory decisions in terms of consistency, predictability and supportiveness. We evaluate the utility's interactions in the regulatory process as well as the overall stance of the regulator toward the utility.

In most jurisdictions, the laws and rules seek to make rate-setting a primarily technical process that examines costs the utility incurs and the returns on investments the utility needs to earn so it can make investments that are required to build and maintain the utility infrastructure - power plants, electric transmission and distribution systems, and/or natural gas distribution systems. When the process remains technical and transparent such that regulators can support the financial health of the utility while balancing their public duty to assure that reliable service is provided at a reasonable cost, and when the utility is able to align itself with the policy initiatives of the governing jurisdiction, the utility will receive higher scores in this sub-factor. When the process includes substantial political intervention, which could take the form of legislators or other government officials publicly second-guessing regulators, dismissing regulators who have approved unpopular rate increases, or preventing the implementation of rate increases, or when regulators ignore the laws/rules to deliver an outcome that appears more politically motivated, the utility will receive lower scores in this sub-factor

As with the prior sub-factor, we may score different utilities in the same jurisdiction differently, based on outcomes that are more or less supportive of credit quality over a period of time. We have observed that some utilities are better able to meet the expectations of their customers and regulators, whether through better service, greater reliability, more stable rates or simply more effective regulatory outreach and communication. These utilities typically receive more consistent and credit supportive outcomes, so they will score higher in this sub-factor. Conversely, if a utility has multiple rapid rate increases, chooses to submit major rate increase requests during a sensitive election cycle or a severe economic downturn, has chronic customer service issues, is viewed as frequently providing incomplete information to regulators, or is tone deaf to the priorities of regulators and politicians, it may receive less consistent and supportive outcomes and thus score lower in this sub-factor.

In scoring this sub-factor, we will primarily evaluate the actions of regulators, politicians and jurists rather than their words Nonetheless, words matter when they are an indication of future action. We seek to differentiate between political rhetoric that is perhaps oriented toward gaining attention for the viewpoint of the speaker and rhetoric that is indicative of future actions and trends in decision-making. MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE

INFRASTRUCTURE

Ааа	Aa	Α	Ваа
The issuer's interaction with the regulator has led to a strong, lengthy track record of predictable, consistent and favorable decisions. The regulator is highly credit supportive of the issuer and utilities in general We expect these conditions to continue.	The issuer's interaction with the regulator has a led to a considerable track record of predominantly predictable and consistent decisions The regulator is mostly credit supportive of utilities in general and in almost all instances has been highly credit supportive of the issuer We expect these conditions to continue	The issuer's interaction with the regulator has led to a track record of largely predictable and consistent decisions. The regulator may be somewhat less credit supportive of utilities in general, but has been quite credit supportive of the issuer in most circumstances. We expect these conditions to continue	The issuer's interaction with the regulator has led to an adequate track record. The regulator is generally consistent and predictable, but there may some evidence of inconsistency or unpredictability from time to time, or decisions may at times be politically charged. However, instances of less credit supportive decisions are based on reasonable application of existing rules and statutes and are not overly punitive. We expect these conditions to continue.
Ba	В	Саа	_
We expect that regulatory decisions will demonstrate considerable inconsistency or unpredictability or that decisions will be politically charged, based either on the issuer's track record of interaction with regulators or other governing bodies, or our view that decisions will move in this direction. The regulator may have a history of less credit supportive regulatory decisions with respect to the issuer, but we expect that the issuer will be able to obtain support when it encounters financial stress, with some potentially material delays. The regulator's authority may be eroded at times by legislative or political action. The regulator may not follow the framework for some material decisions.	We expect that regulatory decisions will be largely unpredictable or even somewhat arbitrary, based either on the issuer's track record of interaction with regulators or other governing bodies, or our view that decisions will move in this direction. However, we expect that the issuer will ultimately be able to obtain support when it encounters financial stress, albeit with material or more extended delays. Alternately, the regulator is untested, lacks a consistent track record, or is undergoing substantial change. The regulator's authority may be eroded on frequent occasions by legislative or political action. The regulator may more frequently ignore the framework in a manner detrimental to the issuer.	We expect that regulatory decisions will be highly unpredictable and frequently adverse, based either on the issuer's track record of interaction with regulators or other governing bodies, or our view that decisions will move in this direction Alternately, decisions may have credit supportive aspects, but may often be unenforceable The regulator's authority may have been seriously eroded by legislative or political action. The regulator may consistently ignore the framework to the detriment of the issuer.	

# Factor 2: Ability to Recover Costs and Earn Returns (25%)

#### Why It Matters

This scorecard factor examines the ability of a utility to recover its costs and earn a return over a period of time, including during differing market and economic conditions. While the Regulatory Framework looks at the transparency and predictability of the rules that govern the decision-making process with respect to utilities, the Ability to Recover Costs and Earn Returns evaluates the regulatory elements that directly impact the ability of the utility to generate cash flow and service its debt over time. The ability to recover prudently incurred costs on a timely basis and to attract debt and equity capital are crucial credit considerations. The inability to recover costs, for instance if fuel or purchased power costs ballooned during a rate freeze period, has been one of the greatest drivers of financial stress in this sector, as well as the cause of some utility defaults. In a sector that is typically free cash flow negative (due to large capital expenditures and dividends) and that routinely needs to refinance very large maturities of long-term debt, investor concerns about a lack of timely cost recovery or the sufficiency of rates can, in an extreme scenario, strain access to capital markets and potentially lead to insolvency of the utility. While our scoring for the Ability to Recover Costs and Earn Returns may primarily be influenced by our assessment of the regulatory relationship, it can also be highly impacted by the management and business decisions of the utility.

#### How We Assess Ability to Recover Costs and Earn Returns

The timeliness and sufficiency of rates are scored as separate sub-factors; however, they are interrelated Timeliness can have an impact on our view of what constitutes sufficient returns, because a strong assurance of timely cost recovery reduces risk. Conversely, utilities may have a strong assurance that they will earn a full return on certain deferred costs until they are able to collect them, or their generally strong returns may allow them to weather some rate lag on recovery of construction-related capital expenditures. The timeliness of cost recovery is particularly important in a period of rapidly rising costs. Utilities have benefitted from low interest rates and generally decreasing fuel costs and purchased power costs, but these market conditions could easily reverse. For example, fuel is a large component of total costs for vertically integrated utilities and for natural gas utilities, and fuel prices are highly volatile, so the timeliness of fuel and purchased power cost recovery is especially important.

While Factors 1 and 2 are closely inter-related, scoring of these factors will not necessarily be the same. We have observed jurisdictions where the Regulatory Framework caused considerable credit concerns – perhaps it was untested or going through a transition to de-regulation, but where the track record of rate case outcomes was quite positive, leading to a higher score in the Ability to Recover Costs and Earn Returns. Conversely, there have been instances of strong Legislative and Judicial Underpinnings of the Regulatory Framework where the commission has ignored the framework (which would affect Consistency and Predictability of Regulation as well as Ability to Recover Costs and Earn Returns) or has used extraordinary measures to prevent or defer an increase that might have been justifiable from a cost perspective but would have caused rate shock

One might surmise that Factors 2 and 4 should be strongly correlated, since a good Ability to Recover Costs and Earn Returns would normally lead to good financial metrics. However, the scoring for the Ability to Recover Costs and Earn Returns sub-factor places more emphasis on our expectation of timeliness and sufficiency of rates over time, whereas financial metrics may be impacted by one-time events, market conditions or construction cycles - trends that we believe could normalize or even reverse

How We Assess Timeliness of Recovery of Operating and Capital Costs for the Scorecard The criteria we consider include provisions and cost recovery mechanisms for operating costs, mechanisms that allow actual operating and/or capital expenditures to be trued-up periodically into rates without having to file a rate case (this may include formula rates, rider and trackers, or the ability to periodically adjust rates

RATING METHODOLOGY, REGULATED LIFCTRIC INDICAS UTILITIES

for construction work in progress) as well as the process and timeframe of general tariff/base rate cases – those that are fully reviewed by the regulator, generally in a public format that includes testimony of the utility and other stakeholders and interest groups. We also look at the track record of the utility and regulator for timeliness. For instance, having a formula rate plan is positive, but if the actual process has included reviews that are delayed for long periods, it may dampen the benefit to the utility. In addition, we seek to estimate the lag between the time that a utility incurs a major construction expenditures and the time that the utility will start to recover and/or earn a return on that expenditure

# How We Assess Sufficiency of Rates and Returns for the Scorecard

The criteria we consider include statutory protections that assure full cost recovery and a reasonable return for the utility on its investments, the regulatory mechanisms used to determine what a reasonable return should be, and the track record of the utility in actually recovering costs and earning returns. We examine outcomes of rate cases/tariff reviews and compare them to the request submitted by the utility, to prior rate cases/tariff reviews for the same utility and to recent rate/tariff decisions for a peer group of comparable utilities in this context, comparable utilities are typically utilities in the same or similar jurisdiction. In cases where the utility is unique or nearly unique in its jurisdiction, comparison will be made to other peers with an adjustment for local differences, including prevailing rates of interest and returns on capital, as well as the timeliness of rate-setting. We look at regulatory disallowances of costs or investments, with a focus on their financial severity and also on the reasons given by the regulator, in order to assess the likelihood that such disallowances will be repeated in the future

# Factor 2a: Timeliness of Recovery of Operating and Capital Costs (12.5%)

Aaa	<u>Aa</u>	A	Baa
Tariff formulas and automatic cost recovery mechanisms provide full and highly timely recovery of all operating costs and essentially contemporaneous return on all incremental capital investments, with statutory provisions in place to preclude the possibility of challenges to rate increases or cost recovery mechanisms. By statute and by practice, general rate cases are efficient, focused on an impartial review, quick, and permit inclusion of fully forward-looking costs.	Tariff formulas and automatic cost recovery mechanisms provide full and highly timely recovery of all operating costs and essentially contemporaneous or near-contemporaneous return on most incremental capital investments, with minimal challenges by regulators to companies' cost assumptions By statute and by practice, general rate cases are efficient, focused on an impartial review, of a very reasonable duration before non-appealable interim rates can be collected, and primarily permit inclusion of forward-looking costs.	Automatic cost recovery mechanisms provide full and reasonably timely recovery of fuel, purchased power and all other highly variable operating expenses. Material capital investments may be made under tariff formulas or other rate-making permitting reasonably contemporaneous returns, or may be submitted under other types of filings that provide recovery of cost of capital with minimal delays Instances of regulatory challenges that delay rate increases or cost recovery are generally related to large, unexpected increases in sizeable construction projects. By statute or by practice, general rate cases are reasonably efficient, primarily focused on an impartial review, of a reasonable duration before rates (either permanent or non-refundable interim rates) can be collected, and permit inclusion of important forward-looking costs.	Fuel, purchased power and all other highly variable expenses are generally recovered through mechanisms incorporating delays of less than one year, although some rapid increases in costs may be delayed longer where such deferrals do not place financial stress on the utility. Incremental capital investments may be recovered primarily through general rate cases with moderate lag, with some through tariff formulas. Alternately, there may be formula rates that are untested or unclear. Potentially greater tendency for delays due to regulatory intervention, although this will generally be limited to rates related to large capital projects or rapid increases in operating costs.
Ba	В	Саа	
There is an expectation that fuel, purchased power or other highly variable expenses will eventually be recovered with delays that will not place material financial stress on the utility, but there may be some evidence of an unwillingness by regulators to make timely rate changes to address volatility in fuel, or purchased power, or other market-sensitive expenses Recovery of costs related to capital investments may be subject to delays that are somewhat lengthy, but not so pervasive as to be expected to discourage important investments.	The expectation that fuel, purchased power or other highly variable expenses will be recovered may be subject to material delays due to second- guessing of spending decisions by regulators or due to political intervention Recovery of costs related to capital investments may be subject to delays that are material to the issuer, or may be likely to discourage some important investment.	The expectation that fuel, purchased power or other highly variable expenses will be recovered may be subject to extensive delays due to second- guessing of spending decisions by regulators or due to political intervention. Recovery of costs related to capital investments may be uncertain, subject to delays that are extensive, or that may be likely to discourage even necessary investment.	

Note Tariff formulas include formula rate plans as well as trackers and riders related to capital investment

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Factor 2b: Sufficiency of Rates and Return Aaa	Aa Aa	۵	Ваа
Sufficiency of rates to cover costs and attract capital is (and will continue to be) unquestioned.	Rates are (and we expect will continue to be) set at a level that permits full cost recovery and a fair return on all investments, with minimal challenges by regulators to companies' cost assumptions This will translate to returns (measured in relation to equity, total assets, rate base or regulatory asset value, as applicable) that are strong relative to global peers.	Rates are (and we expect will continue to be) set at a level that generally provides full cost recovery and a fair return on investments, with limited instances of regulatory challenges and disallowances. In general, this will translate to returns (measured in relation to equity, total assets, rate base or regulatory asset value, as applicable) that are generally above average relative to global peers, but may at times be average.	Rates are (and we expect will continue to be) set at a level that generally provides full operating cost recovery and a mostly fair return on investments, but there may be somewhat more instances of regulatory challenges and disallowances, although ultimate rate outcomes are sufficient to attract capital without difficulty. In general, this will translate to returns (measured in relation to equity, total assets, rate base or regulatory asset value, as applicable) that are average relative to global peers, but may at times be somewhat below average
Ba	В	Саа	
Rates are (and we expect will continue to be) set at a level that generally provides recovery of most operating costs but return on investments may be less predictable, and there may be decidedly more instances of regulatory challenges and disallowances, but ultimate rate outcomes are generally sufficient to attract capital. Ingeneral, this will translate to returns (measured in relation to equity, total assets, rate base or regulatory asset value, as applicable) that are generally below average relative to global peers, or where allowed returns are average but difficult to earn Alternately, the tariff formula may not take into account all cost components and/or remuneration of investments may be unclear or at times unfavorable.	We expect rates will be set at a level that at times fails to provide recovery of costs other than cash costs, and regulators may engage in somewhat arbitrary second-guessing of spending decisions or deny rate increases related to funding ongoing operations based much more on politics than on prudency reviews Return on investments maybe set at levels that discourage investment. We expect that rate outcomes may be difficult or uncertain, negatively affecting continued access to capital Alternately, the tariff formula may fail to take into account significant cost components other than cash costs, and/or remuneration of investments may be generally unfavorable	We expect rates will be set at a level that often fails to provide recovery of material costs, and recovery of cash costs may also be at risk Regulators may engage in more arbitrary second- guessing of spending decisions or deny rate increases related to funding ongoing operations based primarily on politics. Return on investments may be set at levels that discourage necessary maintenance investment We expect that rate outcomes may often be puntive or highly uncertain, with a markedly negative impact on access to capital Alternately, the tariff formula may fail to take into account significant cash cost components, and/or remuneration of investments may be primarily unfavorable	

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# Factor 3: Diversification (10%)

#### Why It Matters

Diversification of overall business operations helps to mitigate the risk that economic cycles, material changes in a single regulatory regime or commodity price movements will have a severe impact on cash flow and credit quality of a utility. While utilities' sales volumes have lower exposure to economic recessions than many non-financial corporate issuers, some sales components, including industrial sales, are directly affected by economic trends that cause lower production and/or plant closures. In addition, economic activity plays a role in the rate of customer growth in the service territory and (absent energy efficiency and conservation) can often impact usage per customer. The economic strength or weakness of the service territory can affect the political and regulatory environment for rate increase requests by the utility. For utilities in areas prone to severe storms and other natural disasters, the utility's geographic diversity or concentration can be a key determinant for creditworthiness.

Diversity among regulatory regimes can mitigate the impact of a single unfavorable decision affecting one part of the utility's footprint

For utilities with electric generation, fuel source diversity can mitigate the impact (to the utility and to its rate-payers) of changes in commodity prices, hydrology and water flow, and environmental or other regulations affecting plant operations and economics. We have observed that utilities' regulatory environments are most likely to become unfavorable during periods of rapid rate increases (which are more important than absolute rate levels) and that fuel diversity leads to more stable rates over time

For that reason, fuel diversity can be important even if fuel and purchased power expenses are an automatic pass-through to the utility's ratepayers. Changes in environmental, safety and other regulations have caused vulnerabilities for certain technologies and fuel sources. These vulnerabilities have varied widely in different countries and have changed over time.

## How We Assess Market Position for the Scorecard

Market position is comprised primarily of the economic diversity of the utility's service territory and the diversity of its regulatory regimes. We also consider the diversity of utility operations (e.g., regulated electric, gas, water, steam) when there are material operations in more than one area

Economic diversity is a typically a function of the population, size and breadth of the territory and the businesses that drive its GDP and employment. For the size of the territory, we typically consider the number of customers and the volumes of generation and/or throughput. For breadth, we consider the number of sizeable metropolitan areas served, the economic diversity and vitality in those metropolitan areas, and any concentration in a particular area or industry. In our assessment, we may consider various information sources.<sup>10</sup> We also look at the mix of the utility's sales volumes among customer types, as well as the track record of volume sales and any notable payment patterns during economic cycles. For diversity of regulatory regimes, we typically look at the number of regulators and the percentages of revenues and utility assets that are under the purview of each. While the highest scores in the Market Position sub-factor are reserved for issuers regulated in multiple jurisdictions, when there is only one regulator, we make a differentiation of regimes perceived as having lower or higher volatility.

Issuers with multiple supportive regulatory jurisdictions, a balanced sales mix among residential, commercial, industrial and governmental customers in a large service territory with a robust and diverse economy will generally score higher in this sub-factor. An issuer with a small service territory economy that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> For example, in the US, information sources on the diversity and vitality of economies of individual states and metropolitan areas may include Moody's Economy.com

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has a high dependence on one or two sectors, especially highly cyclical industries, will generally score lower in this sub-factor, as will issuers with meaningful exposure to economic dislocations caused by natural disasters.

For issuers that are vertically integrated utilities having a meaningful amount of generation, this sub-factor has a weighting of 5% For electric transmission and distribution utilities without meaningful generation and for natural gas local distribution companies, this sub-factor has a weighting of 10%.

## How We Assess Generation and Fuel Diversity for the Scorecard

Criteria include the fuel type of the issuer's generation and important power purchase agreements, the ability of the issuer economically to shift its generation and power purchases when there are changes in fuel prices, the degree to which the utility and its rate-payers are exposed to or insulated from changes in commodity prices, and exposure to Challenged Source and Threatened Sources (see the explanations for how we generally characterize these generation sources in the table below) A regulated utility's capacity mix may not in itself be an indication of fuel diversity or the ability to shift fuels, since utilities may keep old and inefficient plants (e.g., natural gas boilers) to serve peak load. For this reason, we do not incorporate set percentages reflecting an "ideal" or "sub-par" mix for capacity or even generation. In addition to looking at a utility's generation mix to evaluate fuel diversity, we consider the efficiency of the utility's plants, their placement on the regional dispatch curve, and the demonstrated ability/inability of the utility to shift its generation mix in accordance with changing commodity prices.

Issuers having a balanced mix of hydro, coal, natural gas, nuclear and renewable energy as well as low exposure to challenged and threatened sources of generation will score more highly in this sub-factor. Issuers that have concentration in one or two sources of generation, especially if they are threatened or challenged sources, will incur lower scores

In evaluating an issuer's degree of exposure to challenged and threatened sources, we will consider not only the existence of those plants in the utility's portfolio, but also the relevant factors that will determine the impact on the utility and on its rate-payers. For instance, an issuer that has a fairly high percentage of its generation from challenged sources could be evaluated very differently if its peer utilities face the same magnitude of those issues than if its peers have no exposure to challenged or threatened sources. In evaluating threatened sources, we consider the utility's progress in its plan to replace those sources, its reserve margin, the availability of purchased power capacity in the region, and the overall impact of the replacement plan on the issuer's rates relative to its peer group. Especially if there are no peers in the same jurisdiction, we also examine the extent to which the utility's generation resources plan is aligned with the relevant government's fuel/energy policy.

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	F	actor 3: Diversification (10%)			·····
Weighting 10%	Sub-Factor Weighting	Ааа	Aa	A	Baa
Market Position	5.00% *	A very high degree of multinational and regional diversity in terms of regulatory regimes and/or service territory economies.	Material operations in three or more nations or substantial geographic regions providing very good diversity of regulatory regimes and/or service territory economies	Material operations in two to three nations, states, provinces or regions that provide good diversity of regulatory regimes and service territory economies. Alternately, operates within a single regulatory regime with low volatility, and the service territory economy is robust, has a very high degree of diversity and has demonstrated resilience in economic cycles.	May operate under a single regulatory regime viewed as having low volatility, or where multiple regulatory regimes are not viewed as providing much diversity. The service territory economy may have some concentration and cyclicality, but is sufficiently resilient that it can absorb reasonably foreseeable increases in utility rates.
Generation and Fuel Diversity	5 00% **	A high degree of diversity in terms of generation and/or fuel sources such that the utility and rate-payers are well insulated from commodity price changes, no generation concentration, and very low exposures to Challenged or Threatened Sources (see definitions below).	Very good diversification in terms of generation and/or fuel sources such that the utility and rate-payers are affected only minimally by commodity price changes, little generation concentration, and low exposures to Challenged or Threatened Sources.	Good diversification in terms of generation and/or fuel sources such that the utility and rate-payers have only modest exposure to commodity price changes; however, may have some concentration in a source that is neither Challenged nor Threatened. Exposure to Threatened Sources is low While there may be some exposure to Challenged Sources, it is not a cause for concern	Adequate diversification in terms of generation and/or fuel sources such that the utility and rate-payers have moderate exposure to commodity price changes, however, may have some concentration in a source that is Challenged. Exposure to Threatened Sources is moderate, while exposure to Challenged Sources is manageable
	Sub-Factor Weighting	Ba	В	Caa	Definitions
Market Position	5 00% *	Operates in a market area with somewhat greater concentration and- cyclicality in the service territory economy and/or exposure to storms and other natural disasters, and thus less resilience to absorbing reasonably foreseeable increases in utility rates May show somewhat greater volatility in the regulatory regime(s).	Operates in a limited market area with material concentration and more severe cyclicality in service territory economy such that cycles are of materially longer duration or reasonably foreseeable increases in utility rates could present a material challenge to the economy. Service territory may have geographic concentration that limits its resilience to storms and other natural disasters, or may be an emerging market. May show decided volatility in the regulatory regime(s)	Operates in a concentrated economic service territory with pronounced concentration, macroeconomic risk factors, and/or exposure to natural disasters.	Challenged Sources are generation plants that face higher but not insurmountable economic hurdles resulting from penalties or taxes on their operation, or from environmental upgrades that are required or likely to be required. Some examples are carbon-emitting plants that incur carbon taxes, plants that must buy emissions credits to operate, and plants that must install environmental equipment to continue to operate, in each where the taxes/credits/upgrades are sufficient to have a material impact on those plants' competitiveness relative to other generation types or on the utility's rates, but where the impact is not so severe as to be likely require plant closure.

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Generation and Fuel Diversity	5 00% **	Modest diversification in generation and/or fuel sources such that the utility or rate-payers have greater exposure to commodity price changes. Exposure to Challenged and Threatened Sources may be more pronounced, but the utility will be able to access alternative sources without undue financial stress.	Operates with little diversification in generation and/or fuel sources such that the utility or rate-payers have high exposure to commodity price changes. Exposure to Challenged and Threatened Sources may be high, and accessing alternate sources may be challenging and cause more financial stress, but ultimately feasible	Operates with high concentration in generation and/or fuel sources such that the utility or rate-payers have exposure to commodity price shocks Exposure to Challenged and Threatened Sources may be very high, and accessing alternate sources may be highly uncertain.	Threatened Sources are generation plants that are not currently able to operate due to major unplanned outages or issues with licensing or other regulatory compliance, and plants that are highly likely to be required to de-activate, whether due to the effectiveness of currently existing or expected rules and regulations or due to economic challenges.
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\* 10% weight for issuers that lack generation \*\*0% weight for issuers that lack generation

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# Factor 4: Financial Strength (40%)

#### Why It Matters

Electric and gas utilities are regulated, asset-based businesses characterized by large investments in longlived property, plant and equipment. Financial strength, including the ability to service debt and provide a return to shareholders, is necessary for a utility to attract capital at a reasonable cost in order to invest in its generation, transmission and distribution assets, so that the utility can fulfill its service obligations at a reasonable cost to rate-payers

## How We Assess It for the Scorecard

In comparison to companies in other non-financial corporate sectors, the financial statements of regulated electric and gas utilities have certain unique aspects that impact financial analysis, which is further complicated by disparate treatment of certain elements under US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) versus International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Regulatory accounting may permit utilities to defer certain costs (thereby creating regulatory assets) that a non-utility corporate entity would have to expense. For instance, a regulated utility may be able to defer a substantial portion of costs related to recovery from a storm based on the general regulatory framework for those expenses, even if the utility does not have a specific order to collect the expenses from ratepayers over a set period of time. A regulated utility may be able to accrue and defer a return on equity (in addition to capitalizing interest) for construction-work-in-progress for an approved project based on the assumption that it will be able to collect that deferred equity return once the asset comes into service. For this reason, we focus more on a utility's cash flow than on its reported net income.

Conversely, utilities may collect certain costs in rates well ahead of the time they must be paid (for instance, pension costs), thereby creating regulatory liabilities Many of our metrics focus on Cash Flow from Operations Before Changes in Working Capital (CFO Pre-WC) because, unlike Funds from Operations (FFO), it captures the changes in long-term regulatory assets and liabilities

However, under IFRS the two measures are essentially the same. In general, we view changes in working capital as less important in utility financial analysis because they are often either seasonal (for example, power demand is generally greatest in the summer) or caused by changes in fuel prices that are typically a relatively automatic pass-through to the customer. We will nonetheless examine the impact of working capital changes in analyzing a utility's liquidity (see "Other Rating Considerations" – Liquidity)

Given the long-term nature of utility assets and the often lumpy nature of their capital expenditures, it is important to analyze both a utility's historical financial performance as well as its prospective future performance, which may be different from backward-looking measures. Scores under this factor may be higher or lower than what might be expected from historical results, depending on our view of expected future performance. Multi-year periods are usually more representative of credit quality because utilities can experience swings in cash flows from one-time events, including such items as rate refunds, storm cost deferrals that create a regulatory asset, or securitization proceeds that reduce a regulatory asset. Nonetheless, we also look at trends in metrics for individual periods, which may influence our view of future performance and ratings.

For this scoring grid, we have identified four key ratios that we consider the most consistently useful in the analysis of regulated electric and gas utilities. However, no single financial ratio can adequately convey the relative credit strength of these highly diverse companies. Our ratings consider the overall financial strength of a company, and in individual cases other financial indicators may also play an important role.

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### CFO Pre-Working Capital Plus Interest/Interest or Cash Flow Interest Coverage

The cash flow interest coverage ratio is an indicator for a utility's ability to cover the cost of its borrowed capital. The numerator in the ratio calculation is the sum of CFO Pre-WC and interest expense, and the denominator is interest expense.

#### CFO Pre-Working Capital / Debt

This important metric is an indicator for the cash generating ability of a utility compared to its total debt. The numerator in the ratio calculation is CFO Pre-WC, and the denominator is total debt.

#### CFO Pre-Working Capital Minus Dividends / Debt

This ratio is an indicator for financial leverage as well as an indicator of the strength of a utility's cash flow after dividend payments are made. Dividend obligations of utilities are often substantial, quasi- permanent outflows that can affect the ability of a utility to cover its debt obligations, and this ratio can also provide insight into the financial policies of a utility or utility holding company. The higher the level of retained cash flow relative to a utility's debt, the more cash the utility has to support its capital expenditure program. The numerator of this ratio is CFO Pre-WC minus dividends, and the denominator is total debt

#### Debt/Capitalization

This ratio is a traditional measure of balance sheet leverage. The numerator is total debt and the denominator is total capitalization. All of our ratios are calculated in accordance with our standard adjustments<sup>11</sup>, but we note that our definition of total capitalization includes deferred taxes in addition to total debt, preferred stock, other hybrid securities, and common equity. Since the presence or absence of deferred taxes is a function of national tax policy, comparing utilities using this ratio may be more meaningful among utilities in the same country or in countries with similar tax policies. High debt levels in comparison to capitalization can indicate higher interest obligations, can limit the ability of a utility to raise additional financing if needed, and can lead to leverage covenant violations in bank credit facilities or other financing agreements<sup>12</sup>. A high ratio may result from a regulatory framework that does not permit a robust cushion of equity in the capital structure, or from a material write-off of an asset, which may not have impacted current period cash flows but could affect future period cash flows relative to debt.

There are two sets of thresholds for three of these ratios based on the level of the issuer's business risk – the Standard Grid and the Lower Business Risk (LBR) Grid In our view, the different types of utility entities covered under this methodology (as described in Appendix C) have different levels of business risk

Generation utilities and vertically integrated utilities generally have a higher level of business risk because they are engaged in power generation, so we apply the Standard Grid We view power generation as the highest-risk component of the electric utility business, as generation plants are typically the most expensive part of a utility's infrastructure (representing asset concentration risk) and are subject to the greatest risks in both construction and operation, including the risk that incurred costs will either not be recovered in rates or recovered with material delays.

Other types of utilities may have lower business risk, such that we believe that they are most appropriately assessed using the LBR Grid, due to factors that could include a generally greater transfer of risk to customers, very strong insulation from exposure to commodity price movements, good protection from volumetric risks, fairly limited capex needs and low exposure to storms, major accidents and natural

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> In certain circumstances, analysts may also apply specific adjustments.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> We also examine debt/capitalization ratios as defined in applicable covenants (which typically exclude deferred taxes from capitalization) relative to the covenant threshold level

disasters. For instance, we tend to view many US natural gas local distribution companies (LDCs) and certain US electric transmission and distribution companies (T&Ds, which lack generation but generally retain some procurement responsibilities for customers), as typically having a lower business risk profile than their vertically integrated peers. In cases of T&Ds that we do not view as having materially lower risk than their vertically integrated peers, we will apply the Standard grid. This could result from a regulatory framework that exposes them to energy supply risk, large capital expenditures for required maintenance or upgrades, a heightened degree of exposure to catastrophic storm damage, or increased regulatory scrutiny due to poor reliability, or other considerations. The Standard Grid will also apply to LDCs that in our view do not have materially lower risk; for instance, due to their ownership of high pressure pipes or older systems requiring extensive gas main replacements, where gas commodity costs are not fully recovered in a reasonably contemporaneous manner, or where the LDC is not well insulated from declining volumes

The four key ratios, their weighting in the grid, and the Standard and LBR scoring thresholds are detailed in the following table.

Weighting 40%	Sub- Factor Weighting		Aaa	Aa	A	Baa	Ba	В	Caa
CFO pre-WC + Interest / Interest	7.50%		≥ 8 0x	6.0x - 8.0x	4.5x - 6 0x	3 0x - 4.5x	2 0x - 3.0x	1.0x - 2.0x	< 1.0x
CFO pre-WC / Debt	15 00%	Standard Grid	≥ 40%	30% - 40%	22% - 30%	13% - 22%	5% - 13%	1% - 5%	< 1%
		Low Business Risk Grid	≥ 38%	27% - 38%	19% - 27%	11% - 19%	5% - 11%	1% - 5%	< 1%
CFO pre-WC - Dividends / Debt	10.00%	Standard Grid	≥ 35%	25% - 35%	17% - 25%	9% - 17%	0% - 9%	(5%) - 0%	< (5%)
		Low Business Risk Grid	≥34%	23% - 34%	15% - 23%	7% - 15%	0% - 7%	(5%) - 0%	< (5%)
Debt / Capitalization	7 50%	Standard Grid	< 25%	25% - 35%	35% - 45%	45% - 55%	55% - 65%	65% - 75%	≥ 75%
		Low Business Risk Grid	< 29%	29% - 40%	40% - 50%	50% - 59%	59% - 67%	67% - 75%	≥ 75%

## Factor 4: Financial Strength

Notching for Structural Subordination of Holding Companies

Why It Matters

A typical utility company structure consists of a holding company ("HoldCo") that owns one or more operating subsidiaries (each an "OpCo"). OpCos may be regulated utilities or non-utility companies. A HoldCo typically has no operations – its assets are mostly limited to its equity interests in subsidiaries, and potentially other investments in subsidiaries that are structured as advances, debt, or even hybrid securities

Most HoldCos present their financial statements on a consolidated basis that blurs legal considerations about priority of creditors based on the legal structure of the family, and scorecard scoring is thus based on consolidated ratios. However, HoldCo creditors typically have a secondary claim on the group's cash flows and assets after OpCo creditors. We refer to this as structural subordination, because it is the corporate legal structure, rather than specific subordination provisions, that causes creditors at each of the utility and non-utility subsidiaries to have a more direct claim on the cash flows and assets of their respective OpCo obligors. By contrast, the debt of the HoldCo is typically serviced primarily by dividends that are upstreamed by the OpCos<sup>13</sup> Under normal circumstances, these dividends are made from net income, after payment of the OpCo's interest and preferred dividends. In most non-financial corporate sectors where cash often moves freely between the entities in a single issuer family, this distinction may have less of an impact. However, in the regulated utility sector, barriers to movement of cash among companies in the corporate family can be much more restrictive, depending on the regulatory framework. These barriers can lead to significantly different probabilities of default for HoldCos and OpCos. Structural subordination also affects loss given default. Under most default<sup>14</sup> scenarios, an OpCo's creditors will be satisfied from the value residing at that OpCo before any of the OpCo's assets can be used to satisfy claims of the HoldCo's creditors. The prevalence of debt issuance at the OpCo level is another reason that structural subordination is usually a more serious concern in the utility sector than for investment grade issuers in other non-financial corporate sectors.

The grids for factors 1-4 are primarily oriented to OpCos (and to some degree for HoldCos with minimal current structural subordination, for example, there is no current structural subordination to debt at the operating company if all of the utility family's debt and preferred stock is issued at the HoldCo level, although there is structural subordination to other liabilities at the OpCo level). The additional risk from structural subordination is addressed via a notching adjustment to bring scorecard-indicated outcomes (on average) closer to the actual ratings of HoldCos

#### How We Assess It

Scorecard-indicated outcomes of holding companies may be notched down based on structural subordination. The risk factors and mitigants that impact structural subordination are varied and can be present in different combinations, such that a formulaic approach is not practical and case-by-case analyst judgment of the interaction of all pertinent factors that may increase or decrease its importance to the credit risk of an issuer are essential

Some of the potentially pertinent factors that could increase the degree and/or impact of structural subordination include the following

- » Regulatory or other barriers to cash movement from OpCos to HoldCo
- » Specific ring-fencing provisions
- » Strict financial covenants at the OpCo level
- » Higher leverage at the OpCo level
- » Higher leverage at the HoldCo level<sup>15</sup>
- » Significant dividend limitations or potential limitations at an important OpCo
- » HoldCo exposure to subsidiaries with high business risk or volatile cash flows
- » Strained liquidity at the HoldCo level
- » The group's investment program is primarily in businesses that are higher risk or new to the group

Some of the potentially mitigating factors that could decrease the degree and/or impact of structural subordination include the following:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> The HoldCo and OpCo may also have intercompany agreements, including tax sharing agreements, that can be another source of cash to the HoldCo.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Actual priority in a default scenario will be determined by many factors, including the corporate and bankruptcy laws of the jurisdiction, the asset value of each OpCo, specific financing terms, inter-relationships among members of the family, etc.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> While higher leverage at the HoldCo does not increase structural subordination per se, it exacerbates the impact of any structural subordination that exists

- » Substantial diversity in cash flows from a variety of utility OpCos
- » Meaningful dividends to HoldCo from unlevered utility OpCos
- » Dependable, meaningful dividends to HoldCo from non-utility OpCos
- » The group's investment program is primarily in strong utility businesses
- » Inter-company guarantees however, in many jurisdictions the value of an upstream guarantee may be limited by certain factors, including by the value that the OpCo received in exchange for granting the guarantee

Notching for structural subordination within the scorecard may range from 0 to negative 3 notches. Instances of extreme structural subordination are relatively rare, so the scorecard convention does not accommodate wider differences, although in the instances where we believe it is present, actual ratings do reflect the full impact of structural subordination.

A related issue is the relationship of ratings within a utility family with multiple operating companies, and sometimes intermediate holding companies. Some of the key issues are the same, such as the relative amounts of debt at the holding company level compared to the operating company level (or at one OpCo relative to another), and the degree to which operating companies have credit insulation due to regulation or other protective factors. Appendix B has additional insights on ratings within a utility family.

#### Assumptions, Limitations and Other Rating Considerations

The scorecard in this rating methodology represents a decision to favor simplicity that enhances transparency and to avoid greater complexity that might enable the scorecard to map more closely to actual ratings Accordingly, the four factors and the notching factor in the scorecard do not constitute an exhaustive treatment of all of the considerations that are important for ratings of companies in the regulated electric and gas utility sector. In addition, our ratings incorporate expectations for future performance, while the financial information that is used in the scorecard is mainly historical. In some cases, our expectations for future performance may be informed by confidential information that we cannot disclose. In other cases, we estimate future results based upon past performance, industry trends, competitor actions or other factors. In either case, predicting the future is subject to the risk of substantial inaccuracy.

Assumptions that may cause our forward-looking expectations to be incorrect include unanticipated changes in any of the following factors: the macroeconomic environment and general financial market conditions, industry competition, disruptive technology, regulatory and legal actions

Key rating assumptions that apply in this sector include our view that sovereign credit risk is strongly correlated with that of other domestic issuers, that legal priority of claim affects average recovery on different classes of debt, sufficiently to generally warrant differences in ratings for different debt classes of the same issuer, and the assumption that lack of access to liquidity is a strong driver of credit risk

In choosing metrics for this rating methodology scorecard, we did not explicitly include certain important factors that are common to all companies in any industry such as the quality and experience of management, assessments of corporate governance and the quality of financial reporting and information disclosure. Therefore, ranking these factors by rating category in a scorecard would in some cases suggest too much precision in the relative ranking of particular issuers against all other issuers that are rated in various industry sectors.

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Ratings may include additional factors that are difficult to quantify or that have a meaningful effect in differentiating credit quality only in some cases, but not all. Such factors include financial controls, exposure to uncertain licensing regimes and possible government interference in some countries.

Regulatory, litigation, liquidity, technology and reputational risk as well as changes to consumer and business spending patterns, competitor strategies and macroeconomic trends also affect ratings While these are important considerations, it is not possible precisely to express these in the rating methodology scorecard without making the scorecard excessively complex and significantly less transparent.

Ratings may also reflect circumstances in which the weighting of a particular factor will be substantially different from the weighting suggested by the scorecard

This variation in weighting rating considerations can also apply to factors that we choose not to represent in the scorecard. For example, liquidity is a consideration frequently critical to ratings and which may not, in other circumstances, have a substantial impact in discriminating between two issuers with a similar credit profile. As an example of the limitations, ratings can be heavily affected by extremely weak liquidity that magnifies default risk. However, two identical companies might be rated the same if their only differentiating feature is that one has a good liquidity position while the other has an extremely good liquidity position.

# **Other Rating Considerations**

We consider other factors in addition to those discussed in this report, but in most cases understanding the considerations discussed herein should enable a good approximation of our view on the credit quality of companies in the regulated electric and gas utilities sector. Ratings consider our assessment of the quality of management, corporate governance, financial controls, liquidity management, event risk and seasonality The analysis of these factors remains an integral part of our rating process

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# Liquidity and Access to Capital Markets

Liquidity analysis is a key element in the financial analysis of electric and gas utilities, and it encompasses a company's ability to generate cash from internal sources as well as the availability of external sources of financing to supplement these internal sources. Liquidity and access to financing are of particular importance in this sector. Utility assets can often have a very long useful life- 30, 40 or even 60 years is not uncommon, as well as high price tags. Partly as a result of construction cycles, the utility sector has experienced prolonged periods of negative free cash flow – essentially, the sum of its dividends and its capital expenditures for maintenance and growth of its infrastructure frequently exceeds cash from operations, such that a portion of capital expenditures must routinely be debt financed. Utilities are among the largest debt issuers in the corporate universe and typically require consistent access to the capital markets to assure adequate sources of funding and to maintain financial flexibility. Substantial portions of capex are non-discretionary (for example, maintenance, adding customers to the network, or meeting environmental mandates); however, utilities have been swift to cut or defer discretionary spending during recessions. Dividends represent a quasi-permanent outlay, since utilities typically only rarely will cut their dividend. Liquidity is also important to meet maturing obligations, which often occur in large chunks, and to meet collateral calls under any hedging agreements.

Due to the importance of liquidity, incorporating it as a factor with a fixed weighting in the scorecard would suggest an importance level that is often far different from the actual weight in the rating In normal circumstances, most companies in the sector have good access to liquidity. The industry generally requires, and for the most part has, large, syndicated, multi-year committed credit facilities. In addition, utilities have

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demonstrated strong access to capital markets, even under difficult conditions. As a result, liquidity generally has not been an issue for most utilities and a utility with very strong liquidity may not warrant a rating distinction compared to a utility with strong liquidity. However, when there is weakness in liquidity or liquidity management, it can be the dominant consideration for ratings

Our assessment of liquidity for regulated utilities involves an analysis of total sources and uses of cash over the next 12 months or more, as is done for all corporates. Using our financial projections of the utility and our analysis of its available sources of liquidity (including an assessment of the quality and reliability of alternate liquidity such as committed credit facilities), we evaluate how its projected sources of cash (cash from operations, cash on hand and existing committed multi-year credit facilities) compare to its projected uses (including all or most capital expenditures, dividends, maturities of short and long-term debt, our projection of potential liquidity calls on financial hedges, and important issuer-specific items such as special tax payments) We assume no access to capital markets or additional liquidity sources, no renewal of existing credit facilities, and no cut to dividends We examine a company's liquidity profile under this scenario, its ability to make adjustments to improve its liquidity position, and any dependence on liquidity sources with lower quality and reliability.

## Management Quality and Financial Policy

The quality of management is an important factor supporting the credit strength of a regulated utility or utility holding company Assessing the execution of business plans over time can be helpful in assessing management's business strategies, policies, and philosophies and in evaluating management performance relative to performance of competitors and our projections. A record of consistency provides us with insight into management's likely future performance in stressed situations and can be an indicator of management's tendency to depart significantly from its stated plans and guidelines

We also assess financial policy (including dividend policy and planned capital expenditures) and how management balances the potentially competing interests of shareholders, fixed income investors and other stakeholders. Dividends and discretionary capital expenditures are the two primary components over which management has the greatest control in the short term. For holding companies, we consider the extent to which management is willing to stretch its payout ratio (through aggressive increases or delays in needed decreases) in order to satisfy common shareholders. For a utility that is a subsidiary of a parent company with several utility subsidiaries, dividends to the parent may be more volatile depending on the cash generation and cash needs of that utility, because parents typically want to assure that each utility maintains the regulatory debt/equity ratio on which its rates have been set. The effect we have observed is that utility subsidiaries often pay higher dividends when they have lower capital needs and lower dividends when they have higher capital expenditures or other cash needs. Any dividend policy that cuts into the regulatory debt/equity ratio is a material credit negative.

# Size - Natural Disasters, Customer Concentration and Construction Risks

The size and scale of a regulated utility has generally not been a major determinant of its credit strength in the same way that it has been for most other industrial sectors. While size brings certain economies of scale that can somewhat affect the utility's cost structure and competitiveness, rates are more heavily impacted by costs related to fuel and fixed assets. Smaller utilities have sometimes been better able to focus their attention on meeting the expectations of a single regulator than their multi-state peers

However, size can be a very important factor in our assessment of certain risks that impact ratings, including exposure to natural disasters, customer concentration (primarily to industrial customers in a single sector) and construction risks associated with large projects. While the scorecard attempts to incorporate the first

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two of these into Factor 3, for some issuers these considerations may be sufficiently important that the rating reflects a greater weight for these risks While construction projects always carry the risk of cost overruns and delays, these risks are materially heightened for projects that are very large relative to the size of the utility.

# Interaction of Utility Ratings with Government Policies and Sovereign Ratings

Compared to most industrial sectors, regulated utilities are more likely to be impacted by government actions. Credit impacts can occur directly through rate regulation, and indirectly through energy, environmental and tax policies. Government actions affect fuel prices, the mix of generating plants, the certainty and timing of revenues and costs, and the likelihood that regulated utilities will experience financial stress. While our evolving view of the impact of such policies and the general economic and financial climate is reflected in ratings for each utility, some considerations do not lend themselves to incorporation in a simple scorecard.<sup>16</sup>

# Diversified Operations at the Utility

A small number of regulated utilities have diversified operations that are segments within the utility company, as opposed to the more common practice of housing such operations in one or more separate affiliates. In general, we will seek to evaluate the other businesses that are material in accordance with the appropriate methodology and the rating will reflect considerations from such methodologies. There may be analytical limitations in evaluating the utility and non-utility businesses when segment financial results are not fully broken out and these may be addressed through estimation based on available information. Since regulated utilities are a relatively low risk business compared to other corporate sectors, in most cases diversified non-utility operations increase the business risk profile of a utility. Reflecting this tendency, we note that assigned ratings are typically lower than scorecard-indicated outcomes for such companies.

## Event Risk

We also recognize the possibility that an unexpected event could cause a sudden and sharp decline in an issuer's fundamental creditworthiness. Typical special events include mergers and acquisitions, asset sales, spin-offs, capital restructuring programs, litigation and shareholder distributions

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## Corporate Governance

Among the areas of focus in corporate governance are audit committee financial expertise, the incentives created by executive compensation packages, related party transactions, interactions with outside auditors, and ownership structure

#### Investment and Acquisition Strategy

In our credit assessment, we take into consideration management's investment strategy. Investment strategy is benchmarked with that of the other companies in the rated universe to further verify its consistency Acquisitions can strengthen a company's business. Our assessment of a company's tolerance for acquisitions at a given rating level takes into consideration (1) management's risk appetite, including the likelihood of further acquisitions over the medium term, (2) share buy-back activity; (3) the company's commitment to specific leverage targets; and (4) the volatility of the underlying businesses, as well as that of the business acquired. Ratings can often hold after acquisitions even if leverage temporarily climbs above normally acceptable ranges. However, this depends on (1) the strategic fit; (2) pro-forma

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> For more information, see our cross-sector methodology that discusses general principles related to how sovereign credit quality can impact other ratings. A link to an index of our sector and cross-sector methodologies can be found in the "Moody's Related Publications" section

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capitalization/leverage following an acquisition; and (3) our confidence that credit metrics will be restored in a relatively short timeframe.

## **Financial Controls**

We rely on the accuracy of audited financial statements to assign and monitor ratings in this sector. Such accuracy is only possible when companies have sufficient internal controls, including centralized operations, the proper tone at the top and consistency in accounting policies and procedures.

Weaknesses in the overall financial reporting processes, financial statement restatements or delays in regulatory filings can be indications of a potential breakdown in internal controls.

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# Appendix A: Regulated Electric and Gas Utilities Methodology Factor Scorecard

#### Factor 1a: Legislative and Judicial Underpinnings of the Regulatory Framework (12.5%)

Ааа	Аа	A	Ваа
that is national in scope based onlegislation that provides the utility a nearly absolute monopoly (see note 1) within its service territory, an unquestioned assurance that rates will be set in a manner that will permit the utility to make and recover all necessary investments, an extremely high degree of clarity as to the manner in which utilities will be regulated and prescriptive methods and procedures for setting rates Existing utility law is comprehensive and supportive such that changes in legislation are not expected to be necessary, or any changes that have occurred have been strongly supportive of utilities credit quality in general and sufficiently forward-looking so as to address problems before they occurred. There is an independent judiciary that can arbitrate	service territory, a strong assurance, subject to limited review, that rates will be set in a manner that will permit the utility to make and recover all necessary investments, a very high degree of clarity as to the manner in which utilities will be regulated and reasonably prescriptive methods and procedures for setting rates. If there have been changes in utility legislation, they have been timely and clearly credit supportive of the issuer in a manner that shows the utility has had a strong voice in the process. There is an independent judiciary that can arbitrate disagreements between the regulator and the utility, should they occur including access to national courts, strong judicial precedent in the interpretation of utility laws, and a strong rule of law. We expect these conditions to continue	permit the utility to make and recover all necessary investments, a high degree of clanity as to the manner in which utilities will be regulated, and overall guidance for methods and procedures for setting rates. If there have been changes in utility legislation, they have been mostly timely and on the whole credit supportive for the issuer, and the utility has had a clear voice in the legislative process. There is an independent judiciary	Utility regulation occurs (i) under a national, state, provincial or municipal framework based on legislation that provides the utility a strong monopoly within its service territory that may have some exceptions such as greater self-generation (see note 1), a general assurance that, subject to prudency requirements that are mostly reasonable, rates will be set will be set in a manner that will permit the utility to make and recover all necessary investments, reasonable clarity as to the manner in which utilities will be regulated and overall guidance for methods and procedures for setting rates; or (ii) under a new framework where independent and transparent regulation exists in other sectors I fi there have been changes in utility legislation, they have been credit supportive or at least balanced for the issuer but potentially less timely, and the utility indu a voice in the legislative process. There is either (i) an independent judical precedent in the interpretation of urbitly laws, and a generally strong rule of law, or (ii) regulation has been applied (under a well-developed framework) in a manner such that redress to an independent arbitre has not been required. We expect these conditions to continue
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Caa Ba Utility regulation occurs (i) under a national, state, Utility regulation occurs (i) under a national, state, provincial Utility regulation occurs (i) under a national, state, provincial or provincial or municipal framework based on legislation municipal framework based on legislation or government or municipal framework based on legislation or government decree that provides the utility monopoly within its service or government decree that provides the utility a decree that provides the utility a monopoly within its service monopoly within its service territory, but with little territory that is reasonably strong but may have important territory that is generally strong but may have a greater level exceptions, and that, subject to prudency requirements which assurance that rates will be set in a manner that will of exceptions (see note 1), and that, subject to prudency permit the utility to make and recover necessary requirements which may be stringent, provides a general may be stringent or at times arbitrary, provides more limited or investments, or (ii) under a new framework where we less certain assurance that rates will be set in a manner that assurance (with somewhat less certainty) that rates will be would expect unpredictable or adverse regulation, will permit the utility to make and recover necessary set will be set in a manner that will permit the utility to based either on the jurisdiction's history of in other investments, or (ii) under a new framework where we would make and recover necessary investments, or (ii) under a new sectors or other factors. The judiciary that can arbitrate expect less independent and transparent regulation, based framework where the jurisdiction has a history of less either on the regulator's history in other sectors or other disagreements between the regulator and the utility independent and transparent regulation in other sectors may not have clear authority or is viewed as not being Either (i) the judiciary that can arbitrate disagreements factors The judiciary that can arbitrate disagreements between fully independent of the regulator or other political the regulator and the utility may not have clear authority or between the regulator and the utility may not have clear may not be fully independent of the regulator or other political pressure. Alternately, there may be no redress to an authority or may not be fully independent of the regulator or effective independent arbiter. The ability of the utility pressure, but there is a reasonably strong rule of law other political pressure, but there is a reasonably strong rule to enforce its monopoly or prevent uncompensated Alternately, where there is no independent arbiter, the of law, or (ii) where there is no independent arbiter, the usage of its system may be limited There may be a risk regulation has mostly been applied in a manner such redress regulation has been applied in a manner that often requires of creditor- unfriendly nationalization or other some redress adding more uncertainty to the regulatory has not been required. We expect these conditions to significant intervention in utility markets or rate-setting framework. continue There may be a periodic risk of creditor-unfriendly government

intervention in utility markets or rate-setting

Note 1. The strength of the monopoly refers to the legal, regulatory and practical obstacles for customers in the utility's territory to obtain service from another provider. Examples of a weakening of the monopoly would include the ability of a city or large user to leave the utility system to set up their own system, the extent to which self-generation is permitted (e.g. cogeneration) and/or encouraged (e.g., net metering, DSM generation). At the lower end of the ratings spectrum, the utility's monopoly may be challenged by pervasive theft and unauthorized use. Since utilities are generally presumed to be monopolies, a strong monopoly position in itself is not sufficient for a strong score in this sub-

\* 10% weight for issuers that lack generation \*\*0% weight for issuers that lack generation

factor, but a weakening of the monopoly can lower the score

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Factor 1b: Consistency and Predictability of Regulation (12.5%)				
Ааа	Aa	Α	Baa	
The issuer's interaction with the regulator has led to a strong, lengthy track record of predictable, consistent and favorable decisions. The regulator is highly credit supportive of the issuer and utilities in general We expect these conditions to continue.	The issuer's interaction with the regulator has a led to a considerable track record of predominantly predictable and consistent decisions. The regulator is mostly credit supportive of utilities in general and in almost all instances has been highly credit supportive of the issuer. We expect these conditions to continue.	The issuer's interaction with the regulator has led to a track record of largely predictable and consistent decisions. The regulator may be somewhat less credit supportive of utilities in general, but has been quite credit supportive of the issuer in most circumstances. We expect these conditions to continue.	The issuer's interaction with the regulator has led to an adequate track record. The regulator is generally consistent and predictable, but there may some evidence of inconsistency or unpredictability from time to time, or decisions may at times be politically charged. However, instances of less credit supportive decisions are based on reasonable application of existing rules and statutes and are not overly punitive. We expect these conditions to continue to continue to the conditions of existing rules and statutes and are not overly punitive.	
Ва	В	Саа		
We expect that regulatory decisions will demonstrate considerable inconsistency or unpredictability or that decisions will be politically charged, based either on the issuer's track record of interaction with regulators or other governing bodies, or our view that decisions will move in this direction. The regulator may have a history of less credit supportive regulatory decisions with respect to the issuer, but we expect that the issuer will be able to obtain support when it encounters financial stress, with some potentially material delays. The regulator's authority may be eroded at times by legislative or political action. The regulator may not follow the framework for some material decisions	view that decisions will move in this direction However, we expect that the issuer will ultimately be able to obtain support when it encounters financial stress, albeit with material or more extended delays Alternately, the regulator is untested, lacks a consistent track record, or is undergoing	We expect that regulatory decisions will be highly unpredictable and frequently adverse, based either on the issuer's track record of interaction with regulators or other governing bodies, or our view that decisions will move in this direction Alternately, decisions may have credit supportive aspects, but may often be unenforceable. The regulator's authority may have been seriously eroded by legislative or political action The regulator may consistently ignore the framework to the detriment of the issuer		

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Ааа	Aa	A	Baa
Tariff formulas and automatic cost recovery mechanisms provide full and highly timely recovery of all operating costs and essentially contemporaneous return on all incremental capital investments, with statutory provisions in place to preclude the possibility of challenges to rate increases or cost recovery mechanisms. By statute and by practice, general rate cases are efficient, focused on an impartial review, quick, and permit inclusion of fully forward-looking costs	Tariff formulas and automatic cost recovery mechanisms provide full and highly timely recovery of all operating costs and essentially contemporaneous or near-contemporaneous return on most incremental capital investments, with minimal challenges by regulators to companies' cost assumptions By statute and by practice, general rate cases are efficient, focused on an impartial review, of a very reasonable duration before non-appealable interim rates can be collected, and primarily permit inclusion of forward-looking costs	Automatic cost recovery mechanisms provide full and reasonably timely recovery of fuel, purchased power and all other highly variable operating expenses Material capital investments may be made under tariff formulas or other rate-making permitting reasonably contemporaneous returns, or may be submitted under other types of filings that provide recovery of cost of capital with minimal delays. Instances of regulatory challenges that delay rate increases or cost recovery are generally related to large, unexpected increases in sizeable construction projects By statute or by practice, general rate cases are reasonably efficient, primarily focused on an impartial review, of a reasonable duration before rates (either permanent or non-refundable interim rates) can be collected, and permit inclusion of important forward-looking costs	Fuel, purchased power and all other highly variable expenses are generally recovered through mechanisms incorporating delays of less than one year, although some rapid increases in costs may be delayed longer where such deferrals do not place financial stress on the utility. Incremental capital investments may be recovered primarily through general rate cases with moderate lag, with some through tariff formulas. Alternately, there may be formula rates that are untested or unclear. Potentially greater tendency for delays due to regulatory intervention, although this will generally be limited to rates related to large capital projects or rapid increases in operating costs.
Ba	В	Саа	
There is an expectation that fuel, purchased power or other highly variable expenses will eventually be recovered with delays that will not place material financial stress on the utility, but there may be some evidence of an unwillingness by regulators to make timely rate changes to address volatility in fuel, or purchased power, or other market-sensitive expenses. Recovery of costs related to capital investments may be subject to delays that are somewhat lengthy, but not so pervasive as to be expected to discourage important investments	The expectation that fuel, purchased power or other highly variable expenses will be recovered may be subject to material delays due to second- guessing of spending decisions by regulators or due to political intervention. Recovery of costs related to capital investments may be subject to delays that are material to the issuer, or may be likely to discourage some important investment	The expectation that fuel, purchased power or other highly variable expenses will be recovered may be subject to extensive delays due to second- guessing of spending decisions by regulators or due to political intervention Recovery of costs related to capital investments may be uncertain, subject to delays that are extensive, or that may be likely to discourage even necessary investment	

Note Tariff formulas include formula rate plans as well as trackers and riders related to capital investment

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# MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE

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Ааа	Aa	Α	Baa
Sufficiency of rates to cover costs and attract capital is (and will continue to be) unquestioned	Rates are (and we expect will continue to be) set at a level that permits full cost recovery and a fair return on all investments, with minimal challenges by regulators to companies' cost assumptions This will translate to returns (measured in relation to equity, total assets, rate base or regulatory asset value, as applicable) that are strong relative to global peers	Rates are (and we expect will continue to be) set at a level that generally provides full cost recovery and a fair return on investments, with limited instances of regulatory challenges and disallowances. In general, this will translate to returns (measured in relation to equity, total assets, rate base or regulatory asset value, as applicable) that are generally above average relative to global peers, but may at times be average	Rates are (and we expect will continue to be) set at a level that generally provides full operating cost recovery and a mostly fair return on investments, but there may be somewhat more instances of regulatory challenges and disallowances, although ultimate rate outcomes are sufficient to attract capital without difficulty in general, this will translate to returns (measured in relation to equity total assets, rate base or regulatory asset value, as applicable) that are average relative to global peers, but may at times be somewhat below average.
Ba	В	Саа	-
Rates are (and we expect will continue to be) set at a level that generally provides recovery of most operating costs but return on investments may be less predictable, and there may be decidedly more instances of regulatory challenges and disallowances, but ultimate rate outcomes are generally sufficient to attract capital. In general, this will translate to returns (measured in relation to equity, total assets, rate base or regulatory asset value, as applicable) that are generally below average relative to global peers, or where allowed returns are average but difficult to earn. Alternately, the tariff formula may not take into account all cost components and/or remuneration of investments may be unclear or at times unfavorable	We expect rates will be set at a level that at times fails to provide recovery of costs other than cash costs, and regulators may engage in somewhat arbitrary second-guessing of spending decisions or deny rate increases related to funding ongoing operations based much more on politics than on prudency reviews Return on investments maybe set at levels that discourage investment. We expect that rate outcomes may be difficult or uncertain, negatively affecting continued access to capital Alternately, the tariff formula may fail to take into account significant cost components other than cash costs, and/or remuneration of investments may be generally unfavorable.	We expect rates will be set at a level that often fails to provide recovery of material costs, and recovery of cash costs may also be at risk Regulators may engage in more arbitrary second-guessing of spending decisions or deny rate increases related to funding ongoing operations based primarily on politics Return on investments may be set at levels that discourage necessary maintenance investment We expect that rate outcomes may often be punitive or highly uncertain, with a markedly negative impact on access to capital Alternately, the tariff formula may fail to take into account significant cash cost components, and/or remuneration of investments may be primarily unfavorable.	·