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1. See Board of Governors (2018) and Clarida (2019). Return to text

2. The revised Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy is available on the Board's website at https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20200827a.htm. Return to text

3. Consumer price inflation, which was running below 2 percent in the early 1960s, had risen into the double digits by the late 1970s and was slightly above 12 percent when the Committee gathered for an unscheduled meeting in the Eccles Building in Washington, D.C., on a Saturday in October 1979—before the days when transparency was the hallmark of institutional accountability—and decided to change the conduct of monetary policy. See Volcker and Gyohten (1992); also see Volcker (2008), pp. 73–74. Return to text

4. See Powell (2019). Return to text

5. For a readable explanation of inflation targeting, see Bernanke and Mishkin (1997); also see Bernanke and others (1999). Return to text

6. For the formalization and development of the concept of flexible inflation targeting, see Svensson (1999) and, more recently, Svensson (2020). Return to text

7. As measured by the annual change in the price index for personal consumption expenditures. Return to text

8. See Board of Governors (2012), p. 43. Return to text

9. On the benefits of holding a review, see Fuhrer and others (2018). Return to text

10. Between 1995 and 2003, business-sector output per hour increased at an annual rate of 3.4 percent, and it has risen only 1.4 percent since then. Fernald (2015) suggests 2003 as a break point for the beginning of the productivity slowdown. See also Fernald (2018), Gordon (2017), and Powell (2018). Return to text

11. Estimates of r-star have fallen between 2 and 3 percentage points over the past two decades. For evidence on the secular decline in interest rates in the United States and abroad see, for instance, Holston, Laubach, and Williams (2017) and Lunsford and West (2019). See also the recent evidence in Lopez-Salido and others (2020). Return to text

12. Both the experience following the Global Financial Crisis and the current situation drive this point home. After the Global Financial Crisis, the Fed held the federal funds rate at the lower bound for seven years. Thereafter, as the economy strengthened, the federal funds rate reached a peak just above 2 percent. By comparison, the federal funds rate averaged a little more than 5 percent in the 1990s. And, at the onset of the COVID pandemic, we quickly cut rates to the effective lower bound. But since the federal funds rate was only about 1-1/2 percent before the pandemic—because that is what the economy required at that time—our scope to reduce the federal funds rate was far less than in earlier recessions. Return to text

13. The labor force participation rate for prime-age individuals (those between 25 and 54 years old), which is much less sensitive to the effects of population aging, has been rising over the past few years and continued to increase in 2019. For a longer-run perspective, see the analysis presented in Aaronson and others (2014). Return to text

14. The decline in the unemployment rate for African Americans has been particularly sizable, and its average rate in the second half of October 2019 was the lowest recorded since the data began to be reported in 1972; see Board of Governors (2020a). See also Daly (2020) and Aaronson and others (2019). Return to text

15. Information on the *Fed Listens* events is available on the Board's website at https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/review-of-monetary-policy-strategy-tools-and-communications-fed-listens-events.htm. Return to text

16. A discussion of various concepts of unemployment rate benchmarks that are frequently used by policymakers for assessing the current state of the economy is presented in Crump and others (2020). Return to text

17. See, for instance, Blanchard, Cerutti, and Summers (2015). Return to text

18. The success of monetary policy in taming high and variable inflation in the 1980s and 1990s was instrumental in anchoring inflation expectations at low levels. See, for instance, Goodfriend (2007). Return to text

19. See the report *Fed Listens: Perspectives from the Public (Board of Governors, 2020b)*, which summarizes the 14 *Fed Listens* events hosted by the Board and the Federal Reserve Banks during 2019, as well as an additional event in May 2020 to follow up with participants about the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on their communities. Information on the individual *Fed Listens* events is available on the Board's website at https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/review-of-monetary-policy-strategy-tools-and-communications-fed-listens-events.htm. Return to text

20. The Federal Reserve System's "Conference on Monetary Policy Strategy, Tools, and Communication Practices (A *Fed Listens* Event)" was hosted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago in June 2019. See https://www.federalreserve.gov/conferences/conference-monetary-policy-strategy-tools-communications-20190605.htm for the conference program, links to the conference papers and presentations, and links to session videos. A special issue of the *International Journal of Central Banking* (February 2020) included five

of the seven papers presented at the conference (see https://www.ijcb.org/journal/ijcb2002.htm). Return to text

21. See the overview presented in Altig and others (2020). Return to text

22. See Caldara and others (2020). Return to text

23. The analysis of how alternative strategies that succeed in reducing the frequency and/or severity of ELB recessions can induce longer run beneficial effects on economic inequality is presented in Feiveson and others (2020). Return to text

24. Italics added for emphasis. The 2012 statement noted that the Committee would mitigate "deviations" of employment from the Committee's assessments of its maximum level, suggesting that the Committee would actively seek to lower employment if it assessed that employment was above the Committee's estimate of its maximum level. In practice, the Committee has not conducted policy in this way, but rather has supported continued gains in the labor market. Return to text

25. In addition, because real-time estimates are highly uncertain, we no longer refer to estimates of the natural rate of unemployment from the SEP in our consensus statement. Another reason for dropping this reference is that the unemployment rate does not adequately capture the full range of experience in the labor market. The SEP will continue to report FOMC participants' estimates of the longer-run level of the unemployment rate, as such information remains a useful, albeit highly incomplete, input into our policy deliberations. Return to text

26. This strategy embodies some key lessons from the general class of makeup strategies that have been analyzed extensively in the economics literature. The literature has emphasized that the proximity of interest rates to the effective lower bound poses an asymmetric challenge for monetary policy, increasing the likelihood that inflation and employment will tend to be too low. An extensive discussion about how these issues affect the design of monetary policy, as well as the relevant related literature, can be found in Duarte and others (2020), Arias and others (2020), and Hebden and others (2020). Return to text

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Using Analysts' Growth Forecasts to Estimate Shareholder Required Rates of Return

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I. Introduction

Shareholder required rates of return play key roles in establishing economic criteria for resource allocation in many corporate and regulatory decisions. Theory dictates that such returns should be forward-looking return requirements that take into account the risk of the specific equity investment.

Estimation of such returns, however, presents numerous and difficult problems. Although theory clearly calls for a forward-looking required return, investigators, lacking a superior alternative, often resort to averages of historical realizations. One primary example is the determination of equity required return as a "least risk" rate plus a risk premium where an equity risk premium is calculated as an average of past differences between equity returns and returns on debt instruments. The historical studies of Ibbotson *et al.* [9] have been used frequently to implement this approach.[1] Use of such historical risk premia assumes that past realizations are a good surrogate for future expectations and that risk premia are roughly constant over time. Additionally, the choice of a time period over which to average data under such a procedure is essentially arbitrary. Carleton and Lakonishok [3] demonstrate empirically some of the problems with such historical premia when they are disaggregated for different time periods or groups of firms.

Recently Brigham, Shome, and Vinson [2] surveyed work on developing *ex ante* equity risk premia with particular emphasis on regulated utilities. They presented their own risk premia estimates, which make use of financial analysts' forecasts as surrogates for investor expectations.

The current paper follows an approach similar to Brigham *et al.* and derives equity required returns and risk premia using publicly available expectational

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[1]Many leading texts in financial management use such historical risk premia to estimate a market return. See for example, Brealey and Myers [1]. Often a market risk premium is adjusted for the observed relative risk of a stock.

data. The estimation makes use of dividend growth models but incorporates expected rather than historical growth rates. A consensus forecast of financial analysts is used as a proxy for investor expectations. While Brigham *et al.* focus on utility securities, this paper also provides estimates of risk premia for a broad market index. Equity risk premia for both the market and for utilities are shown to vary over time with changes in the perceived riskiness of corporate activity relative to U.S. government bonds. In addition, the estimated risk premia at any given time are shown to vary across groups of stocks. The paper also provides results using the dispersion of analysts' forecasts as an *ex ante* proxy for equity risk.

Section II discusses related literature on financial analysts' forecasts (FAF) and the estimation of required returns using such forecasts. In Section III models and data are discussed. Following a comparison of the results to those of earlier studies (including historical risk premia), the estimates are subjected to economic tests of both their time-series and their cross-sectional characteristics in Section V. Finally, conclusions are offered.

II. Background and Literature Review

In finance, it is often convenient to use the notion of a shareholder's required rate of return. Such a rate (k) is the minimum level of expected return necessary to compensate the investor for bearing risks and receiving dollars in the future rather than in the present. In general, k will depend on returns available on alternative investments (*e.g.*, bonds or other equities) and the riskiness of the stock. To isolate the effects of risk it is often useful (both theoretically and empirically) to work in terms of a risk premium (rp), defined as

$$rp = k - i, \qquad (1)$$

where i = required return for a zero risk investment. Theoretically, i is a risk free rate, though empirically its proxy (*e.g.*, yield to maturity on a government bond) is only a "least risk" alternative that is itself subject to risk.[2] While models such as the capital asset pricing model offer explicit methods for varying risk premia across securities, they provide little practical advice on establishing some benchmark market risk premium. Other models, such as the dividend growth model (hereafter referred to as the discounted cash flow, or DCF, model), can be used to provide direct estimates of k, and hence implied values of rp, but are silent on how rp ought to vary across firms. In this paper DCF models are used to establish risk premia both for the market and for utility stocks. Since the DCF analysis uses a consensus measure of FAF of earnings as a proxy for investor expectations, a brief review of research on FAF is appropriate.

A. Literature on FAF

Much of the burgeoning literature on properties of FAF is surveyed by Givoly and Lakonishok [8]. Of primary importance for this work is the relationship between FAF and investor expectations that determine stock prices. Such forecast data are readily available. That they are used by investors is evidenced by the commercial viability of services that provide such forecasts and by the results of studies of investors' behavior (Touche, Ross and Company [16], Stanley, Lewellen and Schlarbaum [15]). Moreover, a growing body of knowledge shows that analysts' earnings forecasts are indeed reflected in stock prices. Such studies typically employ a consensus measure of FAF calculated as a simple average[3] of forecasts by individual analysts. Elton, Gruber, and Gultekin [5] show that stock prices react more to changes in analysts' forecasts of earnings than they do to changes in earnings themselves, suggesting the usefulness of FAF as a surrogate for market expectations. In an extensive NBER study using analysts' earnings forecasts, Cragg and Malkiel [4, p. 165] conclude "the expectations formed by Wall Street professionals get quickly and thoroughly impounded into the prices of securities. Implicitly, we have found that the evaluations of companies that analysts make are the sorts of ones on which market valuation is based." Updating Cragg and Malkiel's work, Vander Weide and Carleton [17] recently compare consensus FAF of earnings growth to 41 different historical growth measures.[4] They con-

[2]In this development the effects of tax codes and inflation on required returns are ignored.

[3]Mayshar [14] discusses the problems of explaining equilibrium prices of securities when there is divergence of opinion among investors. One issue is whether it is the expectation of the marginal investor or the average investor that determines security prices. Mayshar shows that, in general given divergence of opinion and trading costs, not all investors trade in all assets and that equilibrium prices and the identity of investors trading in each asset are jointly determined. In this sense, equilibrium prices can be considered as "determined simultaneously by the average and marginal investors."

[4]Both Cragg and Malkiel [4] and Vander Weide and Carleton [17] show that an average measure of analysts' forecasts of growth in earnings is powerful in explaining cross-sectional variation in price earnings ratios of stocks.

clude that "there is overwhelming evidence that the consensus analysts' forecast of future growth is superior to historically-oriented growth measures in predicting the firm's stock price . . . consistent with the hypothesis that investors use analysts' forecasts, rather than historically-oriented growth calculations, in making stock buy and sell decisions." [17, p. 15].

B. Use of FAF to Estimate Equity Required Returns

Given the demonstrated relationship of FAF to equity prices and the direct theoretical appeal of expectational data, it is no surprise that FAF have been used in conjunction with DCF models to estimate equity return requirements. Typically such approaches have estimated an *ex ante* risk premium (rp) calculated as the difference between required return and a least risk rate as shown in Equation (1).

Malkiel [13] estimated such risk premia for the Dow Jones Industrial Index using a nonconstant growth version of the DCF model. Initial years of growth were based on Value Line's five-year earnings growth forecasts with subsequent growth approaching a long-run real national growth rate of 4%. More recently, Brigham, Vinson, and Shome [2] used a two stage DCF growth model to estimate *ex ante* risk premia for electric utilities and the Dow Jones Industrial Index. For the period 1966–1984, they report annual risk premia for both Dow Jones Industrial and Electric Indices using Value Line's forecasts. Beginning in 1980 they report monthly risk premia for electric utilities with the source of FAF varying over time; starting with Value Line, adding Merrill Lynch and Salomon Brothers in 1981 and finally, in mid-1983, adding IBES data. IBES (Institutional Broker's Estimate System) is a collection of analysts' forecasts and is discussed in the next section. The resultant risk premia vary over time. In addition, Brigham *et al.* present evidence that their estimated risk premia vary cross-sectionally with a stock's risk (as proxied by bond rating) and over time with the level of interest rates. FAF also have been used in conjunction with DCF models by a number of expert witnesses in rate of return determination for regulated utilities. Recently, the Federal Communications Commission [6] tentatively endorsed the use of consensus FAF in DCF determinations of required return on equity.[5]

This paper adds to earlier work in a number of important respects. First, while Malkiel and Brigham *et al.* focus on electric utilities or the Dow Jones Industrial Index, this paper estimates risk premia for a broadly defined market index — the Standard and Poor's 500. Thus, the results are directly comparable to historical "market" risk premia typically estimated on a similar sample of stocks. Second, the study uses a large sample of FAF (beginning in 1982 when the necessary data first became available). This provides the ability to use a consensus measure of expectations as would be suggested by financial theory. Third, the results show that the derived risk premia change over time and that these changes are related to proxies for risk, which would be expected to be associated with equity risk premia. Although such changes have been noted by earlier studies (*e.g.*, Brigham *et al.*), there is little work explaining the patterns of change. Finally, the paper shows the usefulness of the dispersion of FAF as a proxy for risk. Such a measure is a direct expectational measure of risk and does not rely on assumptions of risk stability over time as do most operational methods of deriving risk surrogates.

III. Models and Data

A. Model for Estimation

The DCF model states that the current market price is the present value of expected future cash flows from ownership. The simplest and most commonly used version estimates shareholders' required rate of return, k, as the sum of dividend yield and expected growth in dividends, or

$$k = (D_1/P_0) + g, \qquad (2)$$

where D_1 = dividend per share expected to be received at time one, P_0 = current price per share (time 0), and g = expected growth rate in dividends per share. The limitations of this model are well known, and it is straightforward to derive expressions for k based on more general specifications of the DCF model.[6] The primary difficulty in using the DCF model is obtaining an estimate of g, since it should reflect market expecta-

[5]In response to the FCC's *Notice of Proposed Rulemaking* [6] to determine authorized rates of return, AT&T used an approach driven by FAF growth estimates from IBES. Also see, for example, W.T. Carleton, *Testimony before the Vermont Public Service Board*, Docket No. 4865 (January 1984) and R.S. Harris, *Testimony filed with the Delaware Public Service Commission*, Docket 84–33 (November 1984). In its *Supplemental Notice* [6], the FCC tentatively endorsed substantial reliance on FAF for use in DCF determination of cost of equity.

[6]As stated, Equation (2) requires expectations of either an infinite horizon of dividend growth at rate g or a finite horizon of dividend growth at rate g and special assumptions about the price of the stock at the end of that horizon. Essentially, the assumption must ensure that the stock price grows at a compound rate of g over the finite horizon.

tions of future performance. Without a ready source for measuring such expectations, application of the DCF model is fraught with difficulties even if the simple version shown in Equation (2) fits the equity investment in question. This paper uses published FAF of long-run growth in earnings as a proxy for g.

B. Data

Many analysts publish forecasts of corporate earnings. Such forecasts are widely disseminated and are the subject of considerable interest both to investors and researchers (see Givoly and Lakonishok [8]). In recent years, this interest has led to a viable market for services that collect and disseminate such FAF. FAF for this research come from IBES (Institutional Broker's Estimate System), which is a product of Lynch, Jones, and Ryan, a major brokerage firm. Data in IBES represent a compilation of earnings per share (EPS) estimates of about 2000 individual analysts from 100 brokerage firms on over 2000 corporations. IBES data are provided to clients in a number of forms, including on-line data bases provided by vendors. The client base, which currently numbers more than 300, includes most large institutional investors such as pension funds, banks, and insurance companies. Representative of industry practice, IBES contains estimates of (i) EPS for the upcoming fiscal year, (ii) EPS for the subsequent year, and (iii) a projected five-year growth rate in EPS. Each item is available at monthly intervals.

IBES collection procedures are designed to obtain timely forecasts made on a consistent basis. IBES requests "normalized" five-year growth rates from analysts. Such normalization is designed to remove short-term distortions that might stem from using an unusually high or low earnings year as a base. These growth and other earnings forecasts are updated when analysts formally change their stated predictions. IBES does, however, verify prior forecasts monthly to make sure that analysts still hold to them. Despite these procedures, there remain potential difficulties in using IBES data to the extent that some analysts fail to normalize growth projections or fail to continually review and revise their earnings estimates. To control for some of these potential difficulties, this analysis uses averages of analysts' forecasts for a wide range of companies over an extended number of months.

In this research, the mean value of individual analyst's forecasts of five-year growth rate in EPS will be used as a proxy for g in the DCF model.[7] The five-year horizon is the longest horizon over which such forecasts are available from IBES and often is the longest horizon used by analysts. One could make alternate assumptions about growth after five years and use a more general version of a DCF model, but unfortunately, there is no source for obtaining market estimates of this expected growth. As a result, the current analysis applies the five-year growth rate as a proxy for g in Equation (2). Given no objective basis for predicting a change in growth (see Footnote 6), this avoids the introduction of *ad hoc* assumptions about future growth. Importantly, however, the approach is applied to portfolios of stocks rather than to individual securities, since future growth patterns may be expected to have drastic changes for some specific securities. Stock prices were obtained from Chase Econometrics and dividend and other firm-specific information from COMPUSTAT. Interest rates (both government and corporate) were gathered from Federal Reserve Bulletins and from Moody's Bond Record. Exhibit 1 describes key variables used in the study. Data collected cover all dividend paying stocks in the Standard and Poor's 500 stock (SP500) index plus approximately

Exhibit 1. Variable Definitions

k	=	equity required rate of return
P_0	=	average daily price per share*
D_1	=	expected dividend per share measured as current indicated annual dividend from COMPUSTAT multiplied by $(1+g)$†
g	=	average financial analysts' forecasts of five-year growth rate in earnings per share (from IBES)
σ_g	=	cross-sectional standard deviation of analysts' forecasts of growth in earnings per share (from IBES)
N_g	=	number of analysts' forecasts of g (from IBES)
i_{20}	=	yield to maturity on 20-year U.S. government obligations. Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin, constant maturity series
i_c	=	yield to maturity on long-term corporate bonds: Moody's average
i_u	=	yield to maturity on long-term public utility bonds: Moody's average
rp	=	equity risk premium calculated as $rp = k - i_{20}$

*In results reported P_0 is the average daily price for a stock from the beginning of the month up to and including the date of publication of monthly IBES data (typically half a month). Almost identical results were found using the average price for the entire month.
†See Footnote 8 at the end of the paper for a discussion of the $(1+g)$ adjustment.

[7]While the model calls for expected growth in dividends, no source of data on such projections is readily available. In addition, in the long run, dividend growth is sustainable only via growth in earnings. As long as payout ratios are not expected to change, the two growth rates will be the same. Vander Weide and Carleton [17] also use the IBES growth rate in earnings per share.

150 additional stocks of regulated companies. Since five-year growth rates were first available from IBES in January 1982, the analysis covers the 36-month period 1982–1984. On average, each company in SP500 had approximately nine individual forecasts of g per month, with some companies having 20 or more forecasts of g. As a result, well over 100,000 FAF (company-months) were employed in the analysis.

IV. Construction of Risk Premia and Required Rates of Return

For each month, a "market" required rate of return was calculated using each dividend paying stock in the SP500 index for which data were available. The DCF model in Equation (2) was applied to each stock and the results weighted by market value of equity to produce the market required return.[8] The return was converted to a risk premium by subtracting i_{20}, the yield to maturity on 20-year U.S. government bonds.[9] The procedure was repeated for the Standard and Poor's Utility Index (SPUT) of 40 stocks. Exhibit 2 reports the results by quarter.

Exhibit 2. Required Rates of Return and Risk Premia

		SP500		SPUT	
	Bond Yield*	Required† Return	Risk‡ Premium	Required† Return	Risk‡ Premium
1982					
Quarter 1	14.27	20.81	6.54	18.83	4.56
Quarter 2	13.74	20.68	6.94	18.51	4.77
Quarter 3	12.94	20.23	7.29	18.55	5.61
Quarter 4	10.72	18.58	7.86	17.20	6.48
Average	12.92	20.08	7.16	18.28	5.36
1983					
Quarter 1	10.87	18.07	7.20	16.71	5.84
Quarter 2	10.80	17.76	6.96	16.52	5.72
Quarter 3	11.79	17.90	6.11	16.39	4.60
Quarter 4	11.90	17.81	5.91	16.00	4.10
Average	11.34	17.88	6.54	16.41	5.07
1984					
Quarter 1	12.09	17.22	5.13	16.48	4.39
Quarter 2	13.21	17.42	4.21	16.99	3.78
Quarter 3	12.83	17.34	4.51	16.62	3.79
Quarter 4	11.78	17.05	5.27	15.18	4.04
Average	12.48	17.26	4.78	16.48	4.00
Average 1982–1984	12.25	18.41	6.16	17.06	4.81

*i_{20} = Yield on U.S. Treasury obligation, 20 year constant maturity.
†Monthly required return (k) calculated as value weighted average. Quarterly values are simple averages of monthly figures.
‡Risk premium calculated as $k - i_{20}$.

The results appear quite plausible. The estimated risk premia are positive, consistent with equity owners demanding a risk premium over and above returns available on debt securities. Also, as would be expected for less risky stocks, the utility risk premia consistently fall below those estimated for stocks in general. Exhibit 2 shows that estimated risk premia change over time, suggesting changes in the market's perception of the incremental risk of investing in equity rather than debt securities. Such changes will be examined in a subsequent section.

For comparative purposes, Exhibit 3 provides results of related studies. The long-run differential return between stocks and long-term government bonds (Panel A) has been about 6.4% per year (on a geometric basis). It is comforting to note that this is very close to the 6.16% average annual risk premia estimated in Exhibit 2. Note, however, that such risk premia appear to change over time. Panels B and C show some of Brigham *et al.*'s risk premium estimates. Unfortunate-

[8]The construction of D_1 is controversial since dividends are paid quarterly and may be expected to change during the year; whereas, Equation (2), as is typical, is being applied to annual data. Both the quarterly payment of dividends (due to investors' reinvestment income before year's end, see Linke, and Zumwalt [11]) and any growth during the year require an upward adjustment of the current annual rate of dividends to construct D_1. If quarterly dividends grew at a constant rate, both factors could be accommodated straightforwardly by applying Equation (2) to quarterly data (with a quarterly growth rate) and then annualizing the estimated quarterly required return. Unfortunately, with lumpy changes in dividends, the precise nature of the adjustment depends, on both an individual company's pattern of growth during the calendar year and an individual company's required return (and hence reinvestment income in that risk class).

In this work, D_1 is calculated as $D_0(1 + g)$. The full g adjustment is a crude approximation to adjust for both growth and reinvestment income. For example, if one expected dividends to have been raised, on average, six months ago, a "½ g" adjustment would allow for growth, the remaining "½ g" would be justified on the basis of reinvestment income. Any precise accounting for both reinvestment income and growth would require tracking each company's dividend change history and making explicit judgments about the quarter of the next change. Since no organized "market" forecasts of such a detailed nature exist, such a procedure is not possible. To get a feel for the magnitudes involved, the average dividend yield (D_1/P_0) and growth (market value weighted 1982–1984) for the SP500 were 5.8% and 12.5%. Comparable figures for the SP utility index were 10.4% and 6.7%. As a result, a "full g" adjustment on average increases the required return by 60–70 basis points (relative to no g adjustment) for both indices.

[9]Brigham, Shome, and Vinson [2] also use this interest rate to create equity risk premia. The results were robust to changes in weighting. For the SP500, equal weighting (rather than value weighting) increased the 1982–1984 risk premium by two basis points while for the SPUT equal weighting resulted in a 21 basis point increase. As a further test, the SP500 stocks were ranked on g and the upper and lower deciles deleted. The resulting risk premium (1982–84 average) was 5.94%. A similar procedure used to rank dividend yield produced an SP500 risk premium of 6.18%.

Exhibit 3. Results of Related Studies: Historical Returns and Estimated Risk Premia

		Geometric		Arithmetic
A. Historical Return Realizations (1926–1980)*				
Common Stocks		9.4%		11.7%
Long-Term Government Bonds		3.0%		3.1%
U.S. Treasury Bills		2.8%		2.8%

	Dow Jones Industrials Average	Dow Jones Industrials Range	Dow Jones Electrics Average	Dow Jones Electrics Range
B. DCF risk premia using one analyst†				
1966–1970	5.45	4.97–6.81	3.91	3.46–4.13
1971–1975	5.51	4.95–6.92	5.95	4.52–8.72
1976–1980	6.23	5.09–6.88	5.82	5.55–6.21
1981	5.38		5.62	
1982	5.30		3.70	
1983	5.87		5.64	
1984	3.75		4.06	
Average 1982–1984	4.97		4.47	

	Electric Utilities
C. DCF risk premia using three analysts‡	
1981	3.73
1982	4.52
1983	5.17
1984 (through June)	5.01

*Ibbotson, Sinquefield, and Siegel [9].
†Analyst is Value Line. Data are annual estimates using two-stage growth DCF model. Source: Brigham, Shome, and Vinson [2].
‡Analysts are Value Line, Merrill Lynch and Salomon Brothers. Data are averages of monthly values from Brigham, Shome, and Vinson [2].

ly, their work does not include a broad market index directly comparable to the SP500. Rather, they use the Dow Jones Industrial Index based on 30 large industrial concerns. Though the SPUT includes a broader set of utilities than the electrics covered by Brigham *et al.*, their average risk premium estimates are also in the 4 to 5% range for the early 1980s.

While the estimates in Exhibit 2 are quite plausible, the question still remains as to whether they satisfy economic criteria one would expect of risk premia. In the following section, the estimated risk premia are subjected to a series of tests to see if they vary both cross-sectionally and over time with changes in risk. The tests are ultimately joint tests of the estimates as useful risk premia, the measured proxies for risk and the validity of the economic hypothesis. Nonetheless, if the tests using the risk premia have results conforming to theoretical expectation, the comfort level in using them is increased accordingly.

Exhibit 4. Risk Premia by Moody's Bond Ratings*

Electric Utilities: SIC's 4911 and 4931	Aaa	Aa	A	Baa
Risk Premia				
Risk Premium (Expectational g)	3.60	4.33	4.81	4.90
Risk Premium (Historical g†)	6.10	3.28	3.09	5.24
Financial Data				
Debt Ratio‡	0.46	0.48	0.50	0.51
Beta§	0.58	0.61	0.62	0.61
Variability¶				
Operating Cash Flow	0.009	0.016	0.022	0.059
Equity Cash Flow	0.006	0.013	0.019	0.024
Standard Deviation** of Analysts' Forecasts	1.00	1.26	1.33	1.79

*Moody's ratings as of January 1984 from *Moody's Bond Record*, February 1984. The number of companies by rating is Aaa (2), Aa (22), A (32), Baa (22). Risk premia are averages of monthly values, January 1982–September 1983.
†Historical Growth is past five-year earnings growth, based on 20 quarters of past data. Source: IBES.
‡Debt Ratio = Long-Term Debt ÷ Total Capital, average 1978–1982 from COMPUSTAT.
§Beta from *Value Line*, January 29, 1982.
¶Measure of variability around trend growth: variance of residuals of regressions on quarterly COMPUSTAT data (1978–1982). Regressions are log of variable regressed on time and seasonal dummies.
**This is the average value of the standard deviation around the mean long-term growth forecast. Such standard deviations are reported for each company in each month. Note it is *not* the cross-sectional standard deviation of growth rates among companies.

V. Characteristics of Risk Premia

A. Cross-Sectional Tests

Brigham *et al.* show that risk premia (IBES estimates for first half of 1984) for electric utilities are lower the higher the bond rating of the company, confirming the expected tradeoff between risk and return. A similar experiment for electrics, using the current data stretching back to January 1982, confirmed this relationship for a longer time period. Exhibit 4 reports selected results of that analysis. As a contrast, Exhibit 4 also shows the results of using historical growth rates (rather than FAF) in a DCF model. Risk premia derived from historical growth are actually higher for companies with very safe debt, suggesting the clear inferiority of historical to expectational growth rates. With the exception of beta, which is roughly constant across groups, other measures of risk noted in Exhibit 4 confirm the risk differentials associated with bond rating groups.

A further test of the cross-sectional variation in risk premia was performed by dividing the universe of

Exhibit 5. Equity Risk Premia: Deciles Based on Standard Deviation of Financial Analysts Forecasts* (Companies with at least three analysts)



*Risk premia were calculated as equally weighted averages for each decile (10 = highest dispersion) for each of three months: January 1982, December 1982, and September 1983 (approximately 50 companies per decile). These premia were then averaged across deciles. A similar downward pattern was evident in each month.

stocks (industrial plus utility) according to the dispersion of analysts' forecasts, σ_g. This cross-sectional measure of analysts' disagreement should be positively related to the uncertainty of future growth prospects and hence to the riskiness of equity investment. Elsewhere, Malkiel [12] has discussed the rationale and usefulness of such dispersion as an *ex ante* measure of risk. Malkiel argues that σ_g may be a proxy for systematic risk and shows that it bears a closer empirical relationship to expected return than does beta or other risk measures. Most of Malkiel's work is, however, based on data from the 1960s. Exhibit 5 reports risk premia by decile based on σ_g for companies having at least three analysts' forecasts. The three months were chosen as representative. The results show a consistent positive relationship between risk premia and dispersion of analysts' forecasts.

The results in Exhibits 4 and 5 show that the estimated risk premia conform to theoretical relationships between risk and required return that are expected when investors are risk averse. This strengthens the case for using such risk premia, and provides encouragement for further study of their structure.[10]

[10]Such *ex ante* required returns offer a useful alternative to *ex post* data typically used in tests of asset pricing models. See Friend, Westerfield, and Granito [7] for a test of the CAPM using survey data rather than *ex post* holding period returns.

B. Time Series Tests

A potential benefit of using *ex ante* risk premia is the estimation of changes in risk premia over time. Brigham *et al.* [2] note such changes for utility stocks and relate them to changes in interest rates. They conclude that prior to 1980 utility risk premia increased with the level of interest rates, but that this pattern reversed thereafter, resulting in an inverse correlation between risk premia and interest rates. They explain this turnaround as the outcome of changes in bond markets and adaptation of utilities and their regulators to an inflationary environment. Brigham *et al.* do not, however, analyze changing risk premia for stocks in general. Furthermore, they do not provide direct empirical proxies for changes in equity risks that would explain changes in equity risk premia over time.[11]

C. Changes in Risk Premia

One would expect changes in measured equity risk premia to be related to changes in perceived riskiness. First, with changes in the economy and financial markets, equity investments may be perceived to change in risk. Second, since government bonds are risky investments themselves, their perceived riskiness may change. For example, the large increase in interest rate volatility in the last decade has undoubtedly made fixed income investments more risky holdings than they were in a world of relatively stable rates. Measured equity risk premia (relative to government bonds) could thus be reduced due to increases in perceived riskiness of bonds, even if equities displayed no shifts in risk.

One measure of risk, the standard deviation of FAF, σ_g, was shown previously to be related to cross-sectional differences in risk premia. To test its usefulness as a time series measure of risk, the average value of σ_g was calculated each month for the SP500 index and the SPUT index. The results are graphed in Exhibit 6.[12]

[11]In addition, Brigham *et al.* do not report on their treatment of serial correlation in reported regression results, making it more difficult to interpret their findings. As an example, monthly data are used for the 1980–1984 period in a time series regression of a risk premium on the level of interest rates. Similar regressions using data in this paper (1982–1984 monthly data) showed significant positive autocorrelation with Durbin Watson Statistics well below 1.0.

[12]The average values of σ_g are the market value weighted averages of the σ_g for individual stocks. If one looked at a direct estimate of g made by individual analysts for the index, one would expect to find a lower amount of dispersion because some of the differences on individual securities would cancel out. Such data are not available. One would suspect, however, that the calculated average would move up and down in tandem with this unobservable measure of dispersion.

Exhibit 6. Equity Risk Premia, Interest Rates and Risk



Another possible time series proxy for equity risk is the set of yield spreads between corporate and government bonds. As the perceived riskiness of corporate activity increases, the difference between yields on corporate bonds and government bonds should increase. One would expect the sources of increased riskiness to corporate bonds to also increase risks to shareholders.[13] Exhibit 6 graphs two series of yield spreads. The first is the difference between the yield on Moody's corporate average series and the yield on 20-year U.S. Treasury obligations. This series includes debt of both industrial and utility companies and thus would be appropriate as a risk proxy for a broad market index such as the SP500. The second is the spread between the yields on Moody's public utility series and 20-year U.S. Treasury bonds. This series should reflect relative risks of utility stocks as proxied by SPUT.[14]

Exhibit 7 reports results of analyzing the relationship between risk premia, interest rates, and proxies for risk for both the SP500 and SPUT. All regressions are corrected for serial correlation.[15] For stocks in general, Panel A shows that risk premia are negatively related to the level of interest rates — as proxied by i_{20}. Such a negative relationship may result from increases in the perceived riskiness of investment in government debt at high levels of interest rates. A direct measure of uncertainty about investments in government bonds would be necessary to test this hypothesis directly.

The results also show the significant positive relationship between the two proxies for risk and the estimated risk premia. For example, regression 4 of Panel A shows that the equity premium on the SP500 increases with the dispersion of FAF (σ_g) and the yield spread between corporate and government bonds ($i_c - i_{20}$). Evidently, these two risk measures capture somewhat different dimensions of risk, both of which appear important in explaining risk premia on stocks in general. The simple correlation coefficient between the two risk measures is 0.19 and is insignificantly different from zero. The addition of the yield spread risk proxy also dramatically lowers the magnitude of the coefficient on government bond yields, as can be seen by comparing Equations 1 and 3 of Panel A. Apparently, a large part of the effect of changes in government bond rates on equity risk premia may be explained through the narrowing of the yield spread between corporate and government bonds. This suggests that such increases in government yields may often be associated with a reduction in the *difference* in risk between investment in government bonds and in corporate activity.

Panel B shows that utility risk premia are also inversely related to the level of interest rates as was found by Brigham *et al.* [2]. Unlike the results for stocks in general, however, changes in the dispersion of FAF over time are not significantly related to changes in these utility risk premia. This may be be-

[13] Of course, counterexamples could be constructed but one would expect an overall positive correlation across companies. Additionally, the cross-sectional relationship between bond ratings and equity risk premia reported earlier in the paper supports the link between corporate debt risks and risks on equity.

[14] Note that these two series reflect both changes in the ratings of corporate bonds as well as yield spreads for a given bond rating. The two series proved better in explaining equity risk premia than use of two comparable series for AA-rated debt.

[15] Ordinary least squares regressions showed severe positive autocorrelation in many cases with Durbin Watson Statistics typically below one. Estimation used the Prais-Winsten method. See Johnston [10], pp. 321–325.

Exhibit 7. Changes in Equity Risk Premia Over Time — Entries are Coefficient (t-value)

Regression	Intercept	i_{20}	σ_g	$i_c - i_{20}$	R^2
A. SP500: Dependent Variable is Equity Risk Premium*					
1.	0.140	−0.632			0.43
	(8.15)†	(−4.95)†			
2.	0.118	−0.660	0.754		0.58
	(7.10)†	(−5.93)†	(3.32)†		
3.	0.069	−0.235		1.448	0.57
	(3.44)†	(−1.76)		(4.18)†	
4.	0.030	−0.177	0.855	1.645	0.79
	(2.17)†	(−2.07)†	(4.68)†	(7.63)†	

Regression	Intercept	i_{20}	σ_g	$i_u - i_{20}$	R^2
B. SPUT: Dependent Variable is Equity Risk Premium*					
1.	0.110	−0.510			0.37
	(7.35)†	(−4.41)†			
2.	0.101	−0.543	0.805		0.41
	(6.28)†	(−4.68)†	(1.42)		
3.	0.051	−0.259		1.432	0.80
	(5.54)†	(−4.05)†		(8.87)†	
4.	0.049	−0.287	0.387	1.391	0.80
	(5.15)†	(−3.87)†	(0.75)	(8.14)†	

*All variables are defined in Exhibit 1 and graphed in Exhibit 6. Regressions were estimated for the 36 month period January 1982–December 1984 and were corrected for serial correlation using the Prais-Winsten method. For purposes of this regression variables are expressed in decimal form, *e.g.*, 14% = 0.14.

†Significantly different from zero at 0.05 level using two-tailed test.

cause of lower variability over time in the dispersion of FAF for utility stocks as compared to equities in general. The yield spread between utility and government bonds is significantly positively related to utility equity risk premia. And, as in the case of stocks in general, introduction of this spread substantially reduces the independent effect of interest rate levels on equity risk premia.

Given the short time series (36 months), tests for the stability of the relationships found in Exhibit 7 present difficulties. As a check, the relationships were reestimated dividing the data into two 18-month periods. For stocks in general (SP500), coefficients on σ_g and $(i_c - i_{20})$ were positive in all regressions and significantly so, except in the case of $(i_c - i_{20})$ for the second 18-month period. The coefficient of i_{20} was significantly negative in both periods. This confirms the general findings for the SP500 in Panel A of Exhibit 7. For utility stocks, results for the subperiods also matched the entire period results. The coefficients of $(i_u - i_{20})$ were significantly positive in both subperiods while those of σ_g were insignificantly different from zero. The level of interest rates (i_{20}) had a significant negative effect in both subperiods.

In summary, the estimated risk premia change over time and the patterns of such change are directly related to changes in proxies for the risks of equity investments. Risk premia for both stocks in general and utilities are inversely related to the level of government interest rates but positively related to the bond yield spreads which proxy for the incremental risk of investing in equities rather than government bonds. For stocks in general, risk premia also increase over time with increases in the general level of disagreement about future corporate performance.

VI. Conclusions

Notions of shareholder required rates of return and risk premia are based in theory on investors' expectations about the future. Research has demonstrated the usefulness of financial analysts' forecasts for such expectations. When such forecasts are used to derive equity risk premia, the results are quite encouraging. In addition to meeting the theoretical requirement of using expectational data, the procedure produces estimates of reasonable magnitude that behave as economic theory would predict. Both over time and across stocks, the risk premia vary directly with the perceived riskiness of equity investment.

The approach offers a straightforward and powerful aid in establishing required rates of return either for corporate investment decisions or in the regulatory arena. Since data are readily available on a wide range of equities, an investigator can analyze various proxy groups (*e.g.*, portfolios of utility stocks) appropriate for a particular decision. An additional advantage of the estimated risk premia is that they allow analysis of changes in equity return requirements over time. Tracking such changes is important for managers facing changing economic climates.

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THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION

Theory and Practice in the Transportation and Public Utility Industries

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for flotation and underpricing costs involved in the issuance of additional stock. An allowance of 10 percent is common and would result in an adjusted ratio of 8.3 percent—7.5 percent divided by 0.90.) This ratio implies that if the earnings-price ratio of a company has been running fairly consistently at 7.5 percent, then the stock will continue to sell at approximately its book value if future earnings per share amount to 8.3 percent of this book value.

Dividend-Price Ratio. If a stock has an average market value of $150 and the annual dividend is $9.00, the dividend-price ratio is 6 percent. This ratio thus represents the yield received by the investor at the average market price. Whereas the earnings-price ratio implies that investors are guided on the basis of earnings, the dividend-price ratio implies that investors are guided by dividend yields.[81]

For many years, it was thought that investors bought utility stocks largely on the basis of dividends.[82] More recently, however, studies indicate that the market is valuing utility stocks with reference to total per share earnings, so that the earnings-price ratio has assumed increased emphasis in rate cases.[83] Both ratios must be used with a great deal of caution because they may fail to indicate an adequate rate of return to attract capital. As stated by the California commission in a 1954 decision:

> Earnings-price ratios and dividend-price ratios merely reflect the prospective investors' appraisal of the market value of stock and as such are influenced by prevailing market and economic conditions and the individual requirements of the purchaser. While useful for comparative purposes and of value in presenting background information, they are not conclusive in themselves in the determination of the allowable fair return on investment in operative properties. It is one thing to say that these ratios indicate the terms under which a new investor might devote his money to the business; it is another thing to say that these terms represent or limit the return the applicant is entitled to receive on the capital committed to the service. It seems to us that reliance on ratios of this nature results in a restricted view of the subject of rate-of-return. Obviously, the price at which a security is bought on the market reflects anticipated earnings rather than past results of operations and it by no means follows that the rates at which present market sales prices are related to the past earnings represents the returns the purchasers at those prices are willing to accept in the future.

[81] Both earnings-price and dividend-price ratios "should cover representative periods of operation. Ratios used on a 'spot' basis, for a period of a month, or even a year, might produce very unsatisfactory results. Prices of utility stocks of the most stable type are influenced by short-run considerations–threats of war, tax legislation, changing governmental regulations, strikes, elections–all affect stock prices in one way or another. For dividend yields or earnings-price ratios to be really significant they must be considered over a sufficiently long period of time for the abnormal and unusual pressures to average out." Lionel W. Thatcher, "Cost-of-Capital Techniques Employed in Determining the Rate of Return for Public Utilities," 30 *Land Economics* 85, 92 (1954).

[82] See Eli W. Clemens, "Some Aspects of the Rate-of-Return Problem," 30 *Land Economics* 32, 34-35 (1954).

[83] See Fred P. Morrissey, "Current Aspects of the Cost of Capital to Utilities," 62 *Public Utilities Fortnightly* 217 (1958).

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* * *

EVALUATING COMMON STOCKS USING VALUE LINE'S PROJECTED CASH FLOWS AND IMPLIED GROWTH RATE

A well-known principle in finance is that the value of a firm must reflect its long-run growth opportunities. In an extensive study, Rappaport [1986] finds that over 60% of the firm's market value is attributable to earnings occurring beyond the immediate five-year horizon. When a firm does not meet analysts' expectations for a given quarter, its long-run potential is often discredited by the investment community. The basic reason for this overreaction is primarily that capital is scarce and, at least for the time being, the opportunity cost is higher somewhere else.

In practice, financial analysts evaluate a firm's growth opportunities by equating its P/E ratio to the growth rate of its earnings.(n1) Thus, the price of the firm's stock follows the volatility of its earnings.

If a firm's earnings are temporarily lower, whether due to seasonality in its business or some other transitory event, but the firm's long-run potential is not impaired, its stock may be called underpriced. This phenomenon is particularly common among semiconductor and other capital equipment companies, which demonstrate fairly frequent boom and bust cycles. In such cases, it is difficult to determine the true growth rate of the firm's earnings, or cash flows, by looking at its historical data.

A preferred way to estimate the firm's long-run growth rate is to deduce it from publicly available data that incorporate expectations concerning the firm's future cash flows. The most widely known source of such data is "Value Line's Investment Survey." Some empirical studies have shown that stock prices react swiftly to Value Line's recommendations.(n2)

The purpose of this article is to demonstrate how investors can use the information from Value Line to assess the long-term, or expected, value of a firm's equity. We follow a simple methodology that is well known in finance and is found in many, basic textbooks. Briefly, we apply the discounted cash flow (DCF) approach to the data supplied by Value Line and compute the price of the firm's common stock, using some reasonable assumptions.

In addition, the study solves for the long-term growth rate implied by the firm's equity cash flows. This rate may be contrasted to various subjective expected rates, or the growth rate for the entire industry, in the form of a sensitivity analysis. If the current price of the stock does not reflect the true long-run rate implied by the firm's cash flows, the stock may be underpriced. Conversely, if the implied rate is greater than the expected growth rate, the stock may be overpriced.

The strategy has several advantages over other security analysis and portfolio selection strategies. It considers forward-looking cash flows, rather than historical information, and concentrates on the firm's long-term rather than short-term performance.

The methodology is applied to the pricing of MCI's common stock as an example. The results of this simple application are intriguing and promising for investors and analysts, as well as academicians and students of corporate finance.

DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW APPROACH

The discounted cash flow approach (DCF) is the most familiar theoretical method of estimating the firm's value. According to this approach, the value of a firm is the present value of the firm's stream of future expected cash flows discounted at a rate that reflects the riskiness of these cash flows. This approach is widely used by security analysts and financial managers and is consistent with the maximization of shareholder wealth, which is the goal of the management of every corporation. In exploratory research, Copeland, Koller, and Murrin [1996] find a correlation between the market value (actual price per share) and the DCF-based value, using forecasts from the Value, of 0.97.

Although in practice there may be a variety of approaches to valuation of the firm's prospects, the discounted cash flow technique is the most commonly used practical approach to determining a company's value. It is used in capital budgeting decisions to evaluate investment projects or to price entire corporate entities that may be targets for acquisition.

The DCF is expressed as:

(1) [Multiple line equation(s) cannot be represented in ASCII text]

where PV is the present value, n is the number of periods, CF_t are the cash flows that occur in time period t, and r is the relevant discount rate.

If these cash flows were to grow at an annual rate of g%, beginning at year 6, expression (1) becomes:

(2) [Multiple line equation(s) cannot be represented in ASCII text]

The discount factor $1/(1 + r)^5$ is used to discount the collective value of the cash flows at year 6 back to year zero, the present time. The term [(1 + g)/(r - g)] is called the terminal value multiple. It expresses the ratio of the value of the cash flows beyond year 6 to the value of the cash flow of year 5. The price of the firm's stock, P, can then be found by dividing the value of its equity by the number of shares outstanding, N, or P = (PV/N). Of course, if PV represents the present value of the firm's equity and debt, then the value of the firm's debt is first subtracted, and the remaining value is divided by the number of common shares outstanding to obtain the price per share.

Assuming reliable estimates of the cash flows of the first five years and the discount rate, r, Equation (2) can be applied in conjunction with the firm's value of equity to solve for the implied average growth rate, g, in its distant equity cash flows. This implied growth rate can then be contrasted with various subjective expected rates in the form of a sensitivity analysis. A reasonable choice for the expected growth rate of a firm's equity cash flows would be the one implied by its industry peers, adjusted for opportunities unique to the firm.

In any event, if the implied growth rate is lower than what an investor would have expected, the stock may be underpriced. Conversely, if the implied rate is greater than the expected growth rate, the stock may be overpriced.

CASH FLOWS TO EQUITYHOLDERS

Shareholders' cash flows can be summarized by:

(3) CF_E = EBIT(1- t) - I(1- t) + NCE - Delta WC - CE

where CF_E is cash flow to equity; EBIT is earnings before interest and taxes; T is the corporate tax rate; NCE is non-cash expenses; Delta WC is changes in working capital; and CE is capital expenditures. The cash flows to the debtholders, I_{AT} = I(1- T), imply a tax shield to the common stockholders equal to the firm's marginal tax rate times the interest expense, since I(1- T)= I- IT. This tax shield reduces the firm's cost of debt capital that is used to discount the cash flows to debt in Equation (3). Thus, by discounting the firm's after-tax interest expense by the corresponding after-tax cost of debt, we obtain the value of the firm's debt.

Some authors, including Copeland, Koller, and Murrin [1996], find the present value of the free cash flows to both debt and equity using a weighted average cost of capital and subtract the firm's debt to obtain the market value of its equity. Since the book value of the firm's debt may not be equal to its market value, the preferred approach is to consider only the firm's cash flows to equityholders and discount them by the corresponding cost of equity capital.

Equation (3) can be further simplified as:

(4) CF_E = NI + NCE - Delta WC - CE

where:

(5) NI = EBIT(1- T) - I(1- T)

In order to completely define the variables used in Equation (3), a definition of earnings before interest and taxes is necessary. In general, earnings before interest and taxes is defined as total revenues minus costs and depreciation, or

(6) EBIT = (S + NOI) - (COGS + SGA + R&D) - (Depr)

where S are revenues from the firm's sales; NOI is non-operating income; COGS is cost of goods sold; SGA is selling, general, and administrative expenses; R&D is research and development expenses; and Depr is depreciation. Finally, by substituting Equation (6) into (5) and subsequently into (4) and adjusting for dividend payments to preferred shareholders, denoted by D_p, we obtain Equation (7):

(7) CF_C = (S + NOI - COGS - SGA - R & D - Depr) x (1- T) - I(1-T) + NCE - Delta WC - CE - D_P

where the subscript C denotes cash flows to common equityholders.

VALUE LINE CASH FLOWS

Because of its consistency and broad coverage of stocks, "Value Line Investment Survey" serves as a unique source of information and is widely used by both academicians and practitioners.(n3) This service follows 1,700 companies in over ninety-five industries that represent 94% of the trading volume on all U.S. stock exchanges. It provides subscribers with a detailed one-page overview of each company's past, current, and expected performance for the next four to five years.

In fact, Value Line is the only investment service that provides detailed information for a company's expected short-term performance. Each page offers financial data, trend line growth rates, graphical price history patterns, quarterly sales figures, earnings and dividends, some key financial ratios, and balance sheet information. Value Line also rates companies for timeliness and safety. Furthermore, investors learn, through a summarized text, about the general business and analyst expectations for each company. All data are updated every thirteen weeks on a weekly sequence.

Using the Value Line definition of variables, Equation (7) becomes:

(8) $CF_{C,\,t} = (S_t\, m_t - Depr_t - I)(1 - T_t) + Depr_t - \text{Delta } WC_t - CE_t - D_{p,\,t}$

where m_t is the operating margin as a percent of sales at year t. Equation 8 constitutes the basis for estimating the cash flows to common equity. Note that if a firm decides to either obtain additional debt or repay part or all of its existing debt, Equation (8) must be modified to reflect this change in leverage.

Exhibit 1 shows the variables in Equation (7) and the corresponding entries from Value Line expressed in (8).

Value Line's projections refer to the range of the three-year period following the year subsequent to the date of the survey. For example, if the survey's date is October 1997, the projections refer to the period 2000-2002, hence covering a five-year window. We assign the projections for the three-year range to the middle year, which is labeled as year 4. The figures for the years 2 and 3 are geometrically interpolated, while the figures for year 5 are extrapolated using the implied growth rate of the previous four years. For an October 1997 survey date, 1998 is the first year, and 2001, the midpoint of the range 2000-2002, represents the fourth year. The data for the fifth year, 2002, are extrapolated on the basis of the growth rate implied between the years 1998 and 2001. Following this practice, we are able to calculate successive cash flows for the ensuing five years.

Following Equation (2), we then assume that the cash flows for years 6 and beyond will grow at an average constant rate g. If we further assume that the firm's cost of equity capital is given by r, we can then solve for either the PV_0, if we know g, or vice versa.

THE COST OF EQUITY CAPITAL

The rate used to discount the firm's cash flows to its equityholders, also termed the cost of capital, is obtained from the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). According to this model, the expected rate of return for a common stock required by investors, $E(R_{C,i})$, equals the sum of two components: namely, the riskless rate of return, R_f, and a risk premium, $Beta_i[E(R_M) - R_f]$. This relationship is expressed by the equation:

(9) $E(R_{c,i}) = R_f + Beta_i\ [E(R_M) - R_f]$

where $Beta_i$ is the beta of company i, which reflects its operating and financial risks. Generally, companies in specific industries with cyclical demand, such as real property and electronics, are associated with higher betas. Companies in the utility industry, like telephone and energy, tend to be less sensitive to market movements, and consequently they exhibit lower betas.

The risk-free rate is approximated by the three-month U.S. Treasury bill rate, and the risk premium represents the reward for bearing risk. The term $E(R_M)$ is the expected return on the market portfolio. In theory, the market portfolio incorporates all risky assets. In practice, however, it is unobservable and it is usually represented by a well-diversified index, such as the Chicago Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) value-weighted index. Possible alternatives are the NYSE composite index or the Wilshire 5000 equity index.

A common practice in estimating the market risk premium [$E(R_M)$ -R_f], is to assume that it approximates the difference between the historical rate of return on stocks and Treasury bills. According to Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation, the difference is 8.6% (12.3%-3.7%). Thus, even if both equities and Treasury securities drift away from their historical levels, it is assumed that their difference remains constant through time, or at least reverts to its long-term historical average. Following this approach, a stock with a beta of 1.2 would command a cost of equity capital of approximately 14%.

EXAMPLE: VALUATION OF MCI

Beginning in November 1996, MCI has been considering different consolidation proposals from three competitors in the telecommunications industry: British Telecom, GTE, and WorldCom. The offer by WorldCom prevailed over the other two offers, and the shareholders of both firms have approved the proposed merger at an exchange ratio that amounts to $51.00 per MCI share. (n4) This represents a 60% to 100% premium over the 1996 range of prices for MCI shareholders.

The rationale for such a premium may be justified by the synergistic effect of the MCI/ WorldCom merger. In principle, such a synergistic premium exists for many companies, and shareholders need a simple technique to assess it. It is hoped that our methodology will provide such a means and enable investors to take full advantage of the information supplied by Value Line.(n5)

Application of the analysis to MCI is summarized in the four worksheets in Exhibits 2-5.(n6) Exhibit 2 presents the pertinent inputs for the other exhibits. The projected figures refer to a range of two to four years. Exhibit 3 assumes that these figures correspond to the mid-range year, i.e., 2001. The figures for the years 1999 and 2000 are found by interpolation, assuming a geometric growth between the first and the fourth years, i.e., 1998 and 2001. These growth rates are subsequently used to find the 2002 figures, by extrapolating the data of the year 2001. Following this approach we are able to obtain the estimated cash flows to equityholders for the subsequent five years.

Exhibit 4 shows the estimation of the firm's cost of equity capital, using the capital asset pricing model given by Equation (9). These estimates use two variations of the proxy for the risk-free rate: a historical estimate of 3.7%, as calculated by Ibbotson Associates, and the prevailing rate of interest on three-month T-bills. Exhibit 4 provides a series of estimated costs of capital corresponding to a sequence of betas, ranging from 30% below to 30% above the Value Line beta, in increments of 10.%. The worksheet allows the user to input an estimate for the continuing growth rate of the cash flows to equityholders and the increment for higher and lower growth rates.

Finally, Exhibit 5 presents the sensitivity analysis for various expected continuing growth rates and various costs of equity, corresponding to the series of betas considered in Exhibit 4. Assuming that the middle rates represent the investor's best estimates for continuing growth rate and cost of equity, the center cell of the price matrix represents the most likely price for the firm's stock. Given the market price of the stock, the worksheet in Exhibit 5 also calculates the implied continuing growth rate for the firm's cash flows and the "terminal value multiple." For a price of $60.50, the implied continuing growth rate for MCI's cash flows to equity is 5.4%, and the terminal value multiple is 16.

The $51.00 price offered by WorldCom implies a continuing growth rate of 4%. All in all, given that the MCI/WorldCom merger will result in substantial synergistic savings, the $51.00 offer for each MCI share by WorldCom appears to be fair.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

We have developed a simple yet practical methodology to evaluate common stocks by applying the DCF approach to the data supplied by Value Line to estimate the implied long-term growth rate of a firm's equity cash flows. Given the value of the firm's equity, its annual cash flows, and its cost of equity capital, one may solve for the implied long-term growth rate of the firm's cash flows. This rate can then be compared to various subjective expected rates using sensitivity analysis. If the implied growth rate is lower than investors' expectations, then the stock may be underpriced. Conversely, if the implied rate is greater than the expected growth rate, the stock may be overpriced.

The strategy has several advantages over current security analysis and portfolio selection strategies. It considers forward-looking cash flows, rather than historical information, and concentrates on a firm's long-term rather than short-term performance. It may thus be useful in assessing the equilibrium level of the overall market, especially when it is used in conjunction with other procedures for pinpointing value, such as the P/E ratio. An exploratory application of our methodology to MCI reveals encouraging results.

ENDNOTES

(n1) See Lynch [1989].

(n2) See, for example, Black [1973], Holloway [1981,1983], Copeland and Mayers [1982], Stickel [1985], Huberman and Kandel [1987,1990], Peterson [1987,1995], and Peterson and Peterson [1995]. Philbrick and Ricks [1991] have shown that in determining earnings surprise, Value Line is a better source for actual earnings per share data.

(n3) Lynch [1989] refers to "Value Line Investment Survey" as "the next best thing to having your own private securities analyst" (p. 165).

(n4) The exchange ratio is equal to the quotient of $51.00 divided by the average of the high and low market prices of WorldCom common stock on each of the twenty consecutive trading days ending with the third trading day immediately preceding the effective time of the MCI/ WorldCom merger.

(n5) According to the prospectus, the consultants and the management of the two companies believe that "the MCI/WorldCom merger will create a fully integrated communications company that will be well positioned to take advantage of growth opportunities in global communications."

(n6) The Excel workbook for this application is available from the first author upon request.

EXHIBIT 1 The Value Line Variables

```
Legend for Chart:

A - Parameter in Equation(7) Description
B - Represented by
C - Parameter in Value Line Description
D - Represented by

A                                              B
  C                                            D

Sales + Non-Operating Income -               S + NOI -
  Sales                                      St

Cost of Goods Sold -                         COGS -
  --

Selling, General, and Admin. Expenses -      SGA -

Research & Development Expenses -            R&D -
  Operating Expenses

Operating Income                             (S + NOI) -
                                             (COGS+
                                             SGA+
                                             R & D)
  Value Line expresses operating income      mt
  as a percent of sales, called operating    (as a %
```

margin	of Sales)
Depreciation	Depr
Depreciation	$Depr_t$
Corporate Tax Rate	T
Income Tax Rate	T_t
Interest	I
Long-Term Interest	I_t
Working Capial	WC
Working Capital	WC_t
Capital Expenditures	CE
Capital Spending per Share x Number of Shares Outstanding	Ce_t
Annual Preferred Dividends	D_p
Preferred Dividend x Number of Shares of Preferred Stock Outstanding	$D_{p,\ t}$

EXHIBIT 2 Value Line MCI Data Input

Recent Stock Price:	$60.50
P/E Ratio:	NMF
Dividend Yield:	0.1%
Beta of the Company:	0.95
First Projected Year:	1998
Projection for Total Annual Return	7%
Projection for Total Annual Return	-5%
Company's LT Interests (millions):	$230.00

Preferred Dividends (millions): $60.00

Legend for Chart:

B-Year 1997
C-Year 1998
D-Projected for Years 2000-2002

A	B	C E	D F
Capital Spending per Share			$3.50 $2.70
Common Shares Outstanding (millions)			710.00 740.00
Sales (millions)			$20,945 $28,885
Operating Margin(%)			18.0% 26.5%
Depreciation (millions)			$2,300 $2,850
Income Tax Rate(%)			37.0% 38.0%
Long-Term Debt		$3,300	$3,760 $6,200
Working Capital (millions	($2,600)	($2,000)	($500)

EXHIBIT 3 Near-Future MCI Free Cash Flows to Equity (1,000s)

Legend for Chart:

B - 1998
C - 1999
D - 2000

E - 2001
F - 2002

A	B	C E	D F
Sales	$20,945,000	$22,476,894 $25,885,000	$24,120,829 $27,778,200
--Operating Costs	$17,174,900	$17,874,329 $19,025,475	$18,501,985 $19,404,043
Operating Margin	$3,770,100	$4,602,564 $6,859,525	$5,618,844 $8,374,157
--Depreciation	$2,300,000	$2,470,397 $2,850,000	$2,653,419 $3,061,144
EBIT	$1,470,100	$2,132,167 $4,009,525	$2,965,425 $5,313,012
--Long-Term Interest	$230,000	$230,000 $230,000	$230,000 $230,000
Earnings Before Taxes	$1,240,100	$1,902,167 $3,779,525	$2,735,425 $5,083,012
--Income Taxes	$458,837	$722,823 $1,436,219	$1,039,461 $1,931,544
Net Income	$781,263	$1,179,343 $2,343 305	$1,695,963 $3,151,467
+ Depreciation	$2,300,000	$2,470,397 $2,850 000	$2,653,419 $3,061,144
--Change in WC	$600,000	$500,000 $500 000	$500,000 $500,000
Operating Cash Flow	$2,481,263	$3,149,741 $4,693 305	$3,849,382 $5,712,612
--Capital Expenditures	$2,485,000	$2,310,731	$2,148,683

		$1,998 000	$1,857,883
--Preferred Dividends	60,000	60,000	60,000
		$60 000	60,000
--Change in LT Debt	$460,000	$813,333	$813,333
		$813 333	0
CF (Equity)	$396,263	$1,592,343	$2,454,032
		$3,448,638	$3,794,728

EXHIBIT 4 Estimating the MCI Cost of Equity

Beta	0.95
Beta Interval:	10%
Historical Risk-free Rate (H):	3.7%
Current Risk-free Rate (C):	5.0%
Expected Return on the Market:	12.3%
Market Risk Premium:	8.6%

To use historical risk-free rate, input 1; otherwise input 2:

Legend for Chart:

A - Beta:
B - 0.67
C - 0.76
D - 0.86
E - 0.95
F - 1.05
G - 1.14
H - 1.24

A	B	C	D	E
	F	G	H	
Cost of Equity (H):	9.4%	10.2%	11.1%	11.9%
	12.7%	13.5%	14.3%	
Cost of Equity (C):	10.7%	11.5%	12.4%	13.2%
	14.0%	14.8%	15.6%	

Expected continuing growth rate

for cash flows to equity:
5.0%

Interval length for growth rates:
1.0%

EXHIBIT 5 MCI Sensitivity Analysis

Legend for Chart:

B - BETA:
C - 0.67
D - 0.76
E - 0.86
F - 0.95
G - 1.05
H - 1.14
I - 1.24

A	B	C F	D G	E H I
	Cost of Equity:	9.40% 11.90%	10.20% 12.70%	11.10% 13.50% 14.30%
	0.00%	$48.00 $36.61	$43.58 $33.81	$39.83 $31.37 $29.21
	1.00%	$52.70 $39.25	$47.41 $36.05	$42.99 $33.28 $30.85
	2.00%	$58.67 $42.44	$52.17 $38.70	$46.85 $35.51 $32.76
	3.00%	$66.50 $46.33	$58.24 $41.91	$51.67 $38.18 $35.00

Expected	4.00%	$77.22	$66.26	$57.86
		$51.22	$45.84	$41.40
				$37.68
continuing	5.00%	$92.79	$77.35	$66.09
		$57.53	$50.81	$45.39
				$40.93
growth rate	6.00%	$117.47	$93.66	$77.58
		$65.99	$57.26	$50.44
				$44.97
	7.00%	$162.55	$120.07	$94.74
		$77.93	$65.97	$57.03
				$50.10
	8.00%	$271.18	$170.09	$123.14
		$96.04	$78.41	$66.03
				$56.86
	9.00%	N/A	$301.05	$179.20
		$126.76	$97.59	$79.02
				$66.17
	10.00%	N/A	N/A	$341.75
		$190.35	$131.04	$99.42
				$79.78
Implied growth				Recent
rate:	5.40%			Price:
		$60.50		TVM:
				16

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7

Estimating Shareholder Risk Premia Using Analysts' Growth Forecasts

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■ One of the most widely used concepts in finance is that shareholders require a risk premium over bond yields to bear the additional risks of equity investments. While models such as the two-parameter capital asset pricing model (CAPM) or arbitrage pricing theory offer explicit methods for varying risk premia across securities, the models are invariably linked to some underlying market (or factor-specific) risk premium. Unfortunately, the theoretical models provide limited practical advice on establishing empirical estimates of such a benchmark market risk premium. As a result, the typical advice to practitioners is to estimate the market risk premium based on historical realizations of share and bond returns (see Brealey and Myers [3]).

In this paper, we present estimates of shareholder required rates of return and risk premia which are derived using forward-looking analysts' growth forecasts. We update, through 1991, earlier work which, due to data availability, was restricted to the period 1982-1984 (Harris [12]). Using stronger tests, we also reexamine the efficacy of using such an expectational approach as an alternative to the use of historical averages. Using the S&P 500 as a proxy for the market portfolio, we find an average market risk premium (1982-1991) of 6.47% above yields on long-term U.S. government bonds and 5.13% above yields on corporate bonds. We also find that required returns for individual stocks vary directly with their risk (as proxied by beta) and that the market risk premium varies over time. In particular, the equity market premium over government bond yields is higher in low interest rate environments and when there is a larger spread between corporate and government bond yields. These findings show that, in addition to fitting the theoretical requirement of being forward-looking, the utilization of analysts' forecasts in estimating return requirements provides reasonable empirical results that can be useful in practical applications.

Section I provides background on the estimation of equity required returns and a brief discussion of related

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literature on financial analysts' forecasts (FAF). In Section II, models and data are discussed. Following a comparison of the results to historical risk premia, the estimates are subjected to economic tests of both their time-series and cross-sectional characteristics in Section III. Finally, conclusions are offered in Section IV.

I. Background and Literature Review

In establishing economic criteria for resource allocation, it is often convenient to use the notion of a shareholder's required rate of return. Such a rate (k) is the minimum level of expected return necessary to compensate the investor for bearing risks and receiving dollars in the future rather than in the present. In general, k will depend on returns available on alternative investments (e.g., bonds or other equities) and the riskiness of the stock. To isolate the effects of risk, it is useful to work in terms of a risk premium (rp), defined as

$$rp = k - i, \qquad (1)$$

where i = required return for a zero risk investment.[1]

Lacking a superior alternative, investigators often use averages of historical realizations to estimate a benchmark "market" risk premium which then may be adjusted for the relative risk of individual stocks (e.g., using the CAPM or a variant). The historical studies of Ibbotson Associates [13] have been used frequently to implement this approach.[2] This historical approach requires the assumptions that past realizations are a good surrogate for future expectations and, as typically applied, that risk premia are constant over time. Carleton and Lakonishok [5] demonstrate empirically some of the problems with such historical premia when they are disaggregated for different time periods or groups of firms.

As an alternative to historical estimates, the current paper derives estimates of k, and hence, implied values of rp, using publicly available expectational data. This expectational approach employs the dividend growth model (hereafter referred to as the discounted cash flow or DCF model) in which a consensus measure of financial analysts' forecasts (FAF) of earnings is used as a proxy for investor expectations. Earlier works by Malkiel [17], Brigham, Vinson, and Shome [4], and Harris [12] have used FAF in DCF models, and this approach has been employed in regulatory settings (see Harris [12]) and suggested by consultants as an alternative to use of historical data (e.g., Ibbotson Associates [13, pp. 127, 128]). Unfortunately, the published studies use data extending to 1984 at the latest. Our paper draws on this earlier work but extends it through 1991.[3] Our work is closest to that done by Harris [12], who reviews literature showing a strong link between equity prices and FAF and supporting the use of FAF as a proxy for investor expectations. Using data from 1982 to 1984, Harris' results suggest that this expectational approach to estimating equity risk premia is an encouraging alternative to the use of historical averages. He also demonstrates that such risk premia vary both cross-sectionally with the riskiness of individual stocks and over time with financial market conditions.

II. Models and Data

A. Model for Estimation

The simplest and most commonly used version of the DCF model to estimate shareholders' required rate of return, k, is shown in Equation (2):

$$k = \left(\frac{D_1}{P_0}\right) + g, \qquad (2)$$

where D_1 = dividend per share expected to be received at time one, P_0 = current price per share (time 0), and g = expected growth rate in dividends per share. The limitations of this model are well known, and it is straightforward to derive expressions for k based on more general specifications of the DCF model.[4] The primary difficulty in using the DCF model is obtaining an estimate of g, since it should reflect market expectations of future perfor-

[1]Theoretically, i is a risk-free rate, though empirically its proxy (e.g., yield to maturity on a government bond) is only a "least risk" alternative that is itself subject to risk. In this development, the effects of tax codes on required returns are ignored.

[2]Many leading texts in financial management use such historical risk premia to estimate a market return. See, for example, Brealey and Myers [3]. Often a market risk premium is adjusted for the observed relative risk of a stock.

[3]See Harris [12] for a discussion of the earlier work and a detailed discussion of the approach employed here.

[4]As stated, Equation (2) requires expectations of either an infinite horizon of dividend growth at a rate g or a finite horizon of dividend growth at rate g and special assumptions about the price of the stock at the end of that horizon. Essentially, the assumption must ensure that the stock price grows at a compound rate of g over the finite horizon. One could alternatively estimate a nonconstant growth model, although the proxies for multistage growth rates are even more difficult to obtain than single stage growth estimates. Marston, Harris, and Crawford [19] examine publicly available data from 1982-1985 and find that plausible measures of risk are more closely related to expected returns derived from a constant growth model than to those derived from multistage growth models. These findings illustrate empirical difficulties in finding empirical proxies for multistage growth models for large samples.

mance. Without a ready source for measuring such expectations, application of the DCF model is fraught with difficulties. This paper uses published FAF of long-run growth in earnings as a proxy for g.

B. Data

FAF for this research come from IBES (Institutional Broker's Estimate System), which is a product of Lynch, Jones, and Ryan, a major brokerage firm.[5] Representative of industry practice, IBES contains estimates of (*i*) EPS for the upcoming fiscal years (up to five separate years), and (*ii*) a five-year growth rate in EPS. Each item is available at monthly intervals.

The mean value of individual analysts' forecasts of five-year growth rate in EPS will be used as a proxy for g in the DCF model.[6] The five-year horizon is the longest horizon over which such forecasts are available from IBES and often is the longest horizon used by analysts. IBES requests "normalized" five-year growth rates from analysts in order to remove short-term distortions that might stem from using an unusually high or low earnings year as a base.

Dividend and other firm-specific information come from COMPUSTAT. Interest rates (both government and corporate) are gathered from Federal Reserve Bulletins and *Moody's Bond Record*. Exhibit 1 describes key variables used in the study. Data collected cover all dividend paying stocks in the Standard & Poor's 500 stock (S&P 500) index, plus approximately 100 additional stocks of regulated companies. Since five-year growth rates are first available from IBES beginning in 1982, the analysis covers the 113-month period from January 1982 to May 1991.

III. Risk Premia and Required Rates of Return

A. Construction of Risk Premia

For each month, a "market" required rate of return is calculated using each dividend paying stock in the S&P 500 index for which data are available. The DCF model in

[5]Harris [12] provides a discussion of IBES data and its limitations. In more recent years, IBES has begun collecting forecasts for each of the next five years. Since this work was completed, the FAF used here have become available from IBES Inc., now a subsidiary of CitiBank.

[6]While the model calls for expected growth in dividends, no source of data on such projections is readily available. In addition, in the long run, dividend growth is sustainable only via growth in earnings. As long as payout ratios are not expected to change, the two growth rates will be the same.

For equity

Exhibit 1. Variable Definitions

k	=	Equity required rate of return.
P_0	=	Average daily price per share.
D_1	=	Expected dividend per share measured as current indicated annual dividend from COMPUSTAT multiplied by $(1 + g)$.[a]
g	=	Average financial analysts' forecast of five-year growth rate in earnings per share (from IBES).
i_{lt}	=	Yield to maturity on long-term U.S. government obligations (source: Federal Reserve Bulletin, constant maturity series).
i_c	=	Yield to maturity on long-term corporate bonds: Moody's average.[b]
rp	=	Equity risk premium calculated as $rp = k - i$.
β	=	beta, calculated from CRSP monthly data over 60 months.

Notes:
[a]See footnote 7 for a discussion of the $(1 + g)$ adjustment.
[b]The average corporate bond yield across bond rating categories as reported by Moody's. See *Moody's Bond Survey* for a brief description and the latest published list of bonds included in the bond rating categories.

Equation (2) is applied to each stock and the results weighted by market value of equity to produce the market required return.[7] The return is converted to a risk premium

[7]The construction of D_1 is controversial since dividends are paid quarterly and may be expected to change during the year; whereas, Equation (2), as is typical, is being applied to annual data. Both the quarterly payment of dividends (due to investors' reinvestment income before year's end, see Linke and Zumwalt [15]) and any growth during the year require an upward adjustment of the current annual rate of dividends to construct D_1. If quarterly dividends grow at a constant rate, both factors could be accommodated straightforwardly by applying Equation (2) to quarterly data with a quarterly growth rate and then annualizing the estimated quarterly required return. Unfortunately, with lumpy changes in dividends, the precise nature of the adjustment depends on both an individual company's pattern of growth during the calendar year and an individual company's required return (and hence reinvestment income in the risk class).
In this work, D_1 is calculated as $D_0 (1 + g)$. The full g adjustment is a crude approximation to adjust for both growth and reinvestment income. For example, if one expected dividends to have been raised, on average, six months ago, a "1/2 g" adjustment would allow for growth, and the remaining "1/2 g" would be justified on the basis of reinvestment income. Any precise accounting for both reinvestment income and growth would require tracking each company's dividend change history and making explicit judgments about the quarter of the next change. Since no organized "market" forecast of such a detailed nature exists, such a procedure is not possible. To get a feel for the magnitudes involved, during the sample period the dividend yield (D_1/P_0) and growth (market value weighted) for the S&P 500 were typically 4% to 6% and 11% to 13%, respectively. As a result, a "full g" adjustment on average increases the required return by 60 to 70 basis points (relative to no g adjustment).

Exhibit 2. Bond Market Yields, Equity Required Return, and Equity Risk Premium,[a] 1982-1991

	Bond Market Yields[b]		Equity Market Required Return[c]	Equity Risk Premium	
Year	(1) U.S. Gov't	(2) Moody's Corporates	(3) S&P 500	U.S. Gov't (3) - (1)	Moody's Corporates (3) - (2)
1982	12.92	14.94	20.08	7.16	5.14
1983	11.34	12.78	17.89	6.55	5.11
1984	12.48	13.49	17.26	4.78	3.77
1985	10.97	12.05	16.32	5.37	4.28
1986	7.85	9.71	15.09	7.24	5.38
1987	8.58	9.84	14.71	6.13	4.86
1988	8.96	10.18	15.37	6.41	5.19
1989	8.46	9.66	15.06	6.60	5.40
1990	8.61	9.77	15.69	7.08	5.92
1991[d]	8.21	9.41	15.61	7.40	6.20
Average[e]	9.84	11.18	16.31	6.47	5.13

Notes:
[a]Values are averages of monthly figures in percent.
[b]Yields to maturity.
[c]Required return on value weighted S&P 500 index using Equation (1).
[d]Figures for 1991 are through May.
[e]Months weighted equally.

over government bonds by subtracting i_{lt}, the yield to maturity on long-term government bonds. A risk premium over corporate bond yields is also constructed by subtracting i_c, the yield on long-term corporate bonds. Exhibit 2 reports the results by year (averages of monthly data).

The results are quite consistent with the patterns reported earlier (i.e., Harris [12]). The estimated risk premia in Exhibit 2 are positive, consistent with equity owners demanding additional rewards over and above returns on debt securities. The average expectational risk premium (1982 to 1991) over government bonds is 6.47%, only slightly higher than the 6.16% average for 1982 to 1984 reported earlier (Harris [12]). Furthermore, Exhibit 2 shows the estimated risk premia change over time, suggesting changes in the market's perception of the incremental risk of investing in equity rather than debt securities.

For comparison purposes, Exhibit 3 contains historical returns and risk premia. The average expectational risk premium reported in Exhibit 2 falls roughly midway between the arithmetic (7.5%) and geometric (5.7%) long-term differentials between returns on stocks and long-term government bonds. Note, however, that the expectational risk premia appear to change over time. In the following sections, we examine the estimated risk premia to see if they vary cross-sectionally with the risk of individual stocks and over time with financial market conditions.

B. Cross-Sectional Tests

Earlier, Harris [12] conducted crude tests of whether expectational equity risk premia varied with risk proxied by bond ratings and the dispersion of analysts' forecasts and found that required returns increased with higher risk. Here we examine the link between these premia and beta, perhaps the most commonly used measure of risk for equities.[8] In keeping with traditional work in this area, we adopt the methodology introduced by Fama and Macbeth [9] but replace realized returns with expected returns from Equation (2) as the variable to be explained. For this portion of our tests, we restrict our sample to 1982-1987

[8]For other efforts using expectational data in the context of the two-parameter CAPM, see Friend, Westerfield, and Granito [10], Cragg and Malkiel [7], Marston, Crawford, and Harris [19], Marston and Harris [20], and Linke, Kannan, Whitford, and Zumwalt [16]. For a more complete treatment of the subject, see Marston and Harris [20] from which we draw some of these results. Marston and Harris also investigate the role of unsystematic risk and the difference in estimates found when using expected versus realized returns.

Exhibit 3. Average Historical Returns on Bonds, Stocks, Bills, and Inflation in the U.S., 1926-1989

Historical Return Realizations	Geometric	Arithmetic
Common stock	10.3%	12.4%
Long-term government bonds	4.6%	4.9%
Long-term corporate bonds	5.2%	5.5%
Treasury bills	3.6%	3.7%
Inflation rate	3.1%	3.2%

Source: Ibbotson Associates, Inc., *1990 Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation*, 1990 Yearbook.

and in any month include firms that have at least three forecasts of earnings growth to reduce measurement error associated with individual forecasts.[9] This restricted sample still consists of, on average, 399 firms for each of the 72 months (or 28,744 company months).

For a given company in a given month, beta is estimated via the market model (using ordinary least squares) on the prior 60 months of return data taken from CRSP. Beta estimates are updated monthly and are calculated against an equally weighted index of all NYSE securities. For each month, we aggregate firms into 20 portfolios (consisting of approximately 20 securities each). The advantage of grouped data is the reduction in potential measurement error inherent in independent variables at the company level. Portfolios are formed based on a ranking of beta estimated from a prior time period ($t = -61$ to $t = -120$). Portfolio expected returns and beta are calculated as the simple averages for the individual securities.

Using these data, we estimate the following model for each of the 72 months:

$$R_p = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \beta_p + u_p, \quad p = 1...20, \qquad (3)$$

where:

R_p = Expected return for portfolio p in the given month,

β_p = Portfolio beta, estimated over 60 prior months, and

u_p = A random error term with mean zero.

As a result of estimating regression (3) for each month, 72 estimates of each coefficient (α_0 and α_1) are obtained. Using realized returns as the dependent variable, the traditional approach (e.g., Fama and Macbeth [9]) is to assume that realized returns are a fair game. Given this assumption, the mean of the 72 values of each coefficient is an unbiased estimate of the mean over that same time period if one could have actually used expected returns as the dependent variable. Note that if expected returns are used as the dependent variable the fair-game assumption is not required. Making the additional assumption that the true value of the coefficient is constant over the 72 months, a test of whether the mean coefficient is different from zero is performed using a t-statistic where the denominator is the standard error of the 72 values of the coefficient. This is the technique employed by Fama and Macbeth [9]. If one assumes the CAPM is correct, the coefficient α_1 is an empirical estimate of the market risk premium, which should be positive.

To test the sensitivity of the results, we also repeat our procedures using individual security returns rather than portfolios. To account, at least in part, for differences in precision of coefficient estimates in different months we also report results in which monthly parameter estimates are weighted inversely by the standard error of the coefficient estimate rather than being weighted equally (following Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok [6]).

Exhibit 4 shows that there is a significant positive link between expectational required returns and beta. For instance, in Panel A, the mean coefficient of 2.78 on beta is significantly different from zero at better than the 0.001 level ($t = 35.31$), and each of the 72 monthly coefficients going into this average is positive (as shown by that 100% positive figure). Using individual stock returns, the significant positive link between beta and expected return remains, though it is smaller in magnitude than for portfolios.[10] Comparison of Panels A and B shows that the results are not sensitive to the weighting of monthly coefficients.

While the findings in Exhibit 4 suggest a strong positive link between beta and risk premia (a result often not supported when realized returns are used as a proxy for expectations; e.g., see Tinic and West [22]), the results do not support the predictions of a simple CAPM. In particular, the intercept is higher than a proxy for the risk-free rate over the sample period and the coefficient of beta is well below estimates of a market risk premium obtained from either expectational (Exhibit 2) or historical data (Exhibit

[9]Firms for which the standard deviation of individual FAF exceeded 20 in any month were excluded since we suspect some of these involve errors in data entry. This screen eliminated very few companies in any month. The 1982-1987 period was chosen due to the availability of data on betas.

[10]The smaller coefficients on beta using individual stock portfolio returns are likely due in part to the higher measurement error in measuring individual stock versus portfolio betas.

Exhibit 4. Mean Values of Monthly Parameter Estimates for the Relationship Between Required Returns and Beta for Both Portfolios and Individual Securities (Figures in Parentheses are *t* Values and Percent Positive), 1982-1987

	Intercept	B	Adjusted $R^{2\,c}$	F^c
Panel A. Equal Weighting[a]				
Portfolio returns	14.06 (54.02, 100)	2.78 (35.31, 100)	0.503	25.4
Security returns	14.77 (58.10, 100)	1.91 (16.50, 99)	0.080	39.0
Panel B. Weighted by Standard Errors[b]				
Portfolio returns	13.86 (215.6, 100)	2.67 (35.80, 100)	0.503	25.4
Security returns	14.63 (398.9, 100)	1.92 (47.3, 99)	0.080	39.0

[a]Equally weighted average of monthly parameters estimated using cross-sectional data for each of the 72 months, January 1982 - December 1987.
[b]In obtaining the reported means, estimates of the monthly intercept and slope coefficients are weighted inversely by the standard error of the estimate from the cross-sectional regression for that month.
[c]Values are averages for the 72 monthly regressions.

3).[11] Nonetheless, the results show that the estimated risk premia conform to the general theoretical relationship between risk and required return that is expected when investors are risk-averse.

C. Time Series Tests — Changes in Market Risk Premia

A potential benefit of using ex ante risk premia is the estimation of changes in market risk premia over time. With changes in the economy and financial markets, equity investments may be perceived to change in risk. For instance, investor sentiment about future business conditions likely affects attitudes about the riskiness of equity investments compared to investments in the bond markets. Moreover, since bonds are risky investments themselves, equity risk premia (relative to bonds) could change due to changes in perceived riskiness of bonds, even if equities displayed no shifts in risk. For example, during the high interest rate period of the early 1980s, the high level of interest rate volatility made fixed income investments more risky holdings than they were in a world of relatively stable rates.

Studying changes in risk premia for utility stocks, Brigham, et al [4] conclude that, prior to 1980, utility risk premia increased with the level of interest rates, but that this pattern reversed thereafter, resulting in an inverse correlation between risk premia and interest rates. Studying risk premia for both utilities and the equity market generally, Harris [12] also reports that risk premia appear to change over time. Specifically, he finds that equity risk premia decreased with the level of government interest rates, increased with the increases in the spread between corporate and government bond yields, and increased with increases in the dispersion of analysts' forecasts. Harris' study is, however, restricted to the 36-month period, 1982 to 1984.

Exhibit 5 reports results of analyzing the relationship between equity risk premia, interest rates, and yield spreads between corporate and government bonds. Following Harris [12], these bond yield spreads are used as a time series proxy for equity risk. As the perceived riskiness of corporate activity increases, the difference between yields on corporate bonds and government bonds should increase. One would expect the sources of increased riskiness to corporate bonds to also increase risks to shareholders. All regressions in Exhibit 5 are corrected for serial correlation.[12]

[11]Estimation difficulties confound precise interpretation of the intercept as the risk-free rate and the coefficient on beta as the market risk premium (see Miller and Scholes [21], and Black, Jensen, and Scholes [2]). The higher than expected intercept and lower than expected slope coefficient on beta are consistent with the prior studies of Black, Jensen, and Scholes [2], and Fama and MacBeth [9] using historical returns. Such results are consistent with Black's [1] zero beta model, although alternative explanations for these findings exist as well (as noted by Black, Jensen, and Scholes [2]).

[12]Ordinary least squares regressions showed severe positive autocorrelation in many cases, with Durbin Watson statistics typically below one. Estimation used the Prais-Winsten method. See Johnston [14, pp. 321-325].

Exhibit 5. Changes in Equity Risk Premia Over Time — Entries are Coefficient (t-value); Dependent Variable is Equity Risk Premium

Time period	Intercept	i_{lt}	$i_c - i_{lt}$	R^2
A. May 1991-1992	0.131	-0.651		0.53
	(19.82)	(-11.16)		
	0.092	-0.363	0.666	0.54
	(14.26)	(-6.74)	(5.48)	
B. 1982-1984	0.140	-0.637		0.43
	(8.15)	(-5.00)		
	0.064	-0.203	1.549	0.60
	(3.25)	(-1.63)	(4.84)	
C. 1985-1987	0.131	-0.739		0.74
	(7.73)	(-9.67)		
	0.110	-0.561	0.317	0.77
	(12.53)	(-7.30)	(1.87)	
D. 1988-1991	0.136	-0.793		0.68
	(16.23)	(-8.29)		
	0.130	-0.738	0.098	0.68
	(8.71)	(-4.96)	(0.40)	

Note: All variables are defined in Exhibit 1. Regressions were estimated using monthly data and were corrected for serial correlation using the Prais-Winsten method. For purposes of this regression, variables are expressed in decimal form, e.g., 14% = 0.14.

For the entire sample period, Panel A shows that risk premia are negatively related to the level of interest rates — as proxied by yields on government bonds, i_{lt}. This negative relationship is also true for each of the subperiods displayed in Panels B through D. Such a negative relationship may result from increases in the perceived riskiness of investment in government debt at high levels of interest rates. A direct measure of uncertainty about investments in government bonds would be necessary to test this hypothesis directly.

For the entire 1982 to 1991 period, the addition of the yield spread risk proxy to the regressions dramatically lowers the magnitude of the coefficient on government bond yields, as can be seen by comparing Equations 1 and 2 of Panel A. Furthermore, the coefficient of the yield spread (0.666) is itself significantly positive. This pattern suggests that a reduction in the risk differential between investment in government bonds and in corporate activity is translated into a lower equity market risk premium. Further examination of Panels B through D, however, suggests that the yield spread variable is much more important in explaining changes in equity risk premia in the early portion of the 1980s than in the 1988 to 1991 period.

In summary, market equity risk premia change over time and appear inversely related to the level of government interest rates but positively related to the bond yield spread, which proxies for the incremental risk of investing in equities as opposed to government bonds.

IV. Conclusions

Shareholder required rates of return and risk premia are based on theories about investors' expectations for the future. In practice, however, risk premia are often estimated using averages of historical returns. This paper applies an alternate approach to estimating risk premia that employs publicly available expectational data. At least for the decade studied (1982 to 1991), the resultant average market equity risk premium over government bonds is comparable in magnitude to long-term differences (1926 to 1989) in historical returns between stocks and bonds. There is strong evidence, however, that market risk premia change over time and, as a result, use of a constant historical average risk premium is not likely to mirror changes in investor return requirements. The results also show that the expectational risk premia vary cross-sectionally with the relative risk (beta) of individual stocks.

The approach offers a straightforward and powerful aid in establishing required rates of return either for corporate investment decisions or in the regulatory arena. Since data are readily available on a wide range of equities, an investigator can analyze various proxy groups (e.g., portfolios of utility stocks) appropriate for a particular decision as well as analyze changes in equity return requirements over time.

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Investor growth expectations: Analysts vs. history

Analysts' growth forecasts dominate past trends in predicting stock prices.

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For the purposes of implementing the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) cost of equity model, the analyst must know which growth estimate is embodied in the firm's stock price. A study by Cragg and Malkiel (1982) suggests that the stock valuation process embodies analysts' forecasts rather than historically based growth figures such as the ten-year historical growth in dividends per share or the five-year growth in book value per share. The Cragg and Malkiel study is based on data for the 1960s, however, a decade that was considerably more stable than the recent past.

As the issue of which growth rate to use in implementing the DCF model is so important to applications of the model, we decided to investigate whether the Cragg and Malkiel conclusions continue to hold in more recent periods. This paper describes the results of our study.

STATISTICAL MODEL

The DCF model suggests that the firm's stock price is equal to the present value of the stream of dividends that investors expect to receive from owning the firm's shares. Under the assumption that investors expect dividends to grow at a constant rate, g, in perpetuity, the stock price is given by the following simple expression:

$$P_S = \frac{D\,(1 + g)}{k - g} \quad (1)$$

where:

P_S = current price per share of the firm's stock;

D = current annual dividend per share;

g = expected constant dividend growth rate; and

k = required return on the firm's stock.

Dividing both sides of Equation (1) by the firm's current earnings, E, we obtain:

$$\frac{P_S}{E} = \frac{D}{E} \cdot \frac{(1 + g)}{k - g} \quad (2)$$

Thus, the firm's price/earnings (P/E) ratio is a nonlinear function of the firm's dividend payout ratio (D/E), the expected growth in dividends (g), and the required rate of return.

To investigate what growth expectation is embodied in the firm's current stock price, it is more convenient to work with a linear approximation to Equation (2). Thus, we will assume that:

$$P/E = a_0(D/E) + a_1 g + a_2 k. \quad (3)$$

(Cragg and Malkiel found this assumption to be reasonable throughout their investigation.)

Furthermore, we will assume that the required

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rate of return, k, in Equation (3) depends on the values of the risk variables B, Cov, Rsq, and Sa, where B is the firm's Value Line beta; Cov is the firm's pretax interest coverage ratio; Rsq is a measure of the stability of the firm's five-year historical EPS; and Sa is the standard deviation of the consensus analysts' five-year EPS growth forecast for the firm. Finally, as the linear form of the P/E equation is only an approximation to the true P/E equation, and B, Cov, Rsq, and Sa are only proxies for k, we will add an error term, e, that represents the degree of approximation to the true relationship.

With these assumptions, the final form of our P/E equation is as follows:

$$P/E = a_0(D/E) + a_1 g + a_2 B + a_3 Cov + a_4 Rsq + a_5 Sa + e. \qquad (4)$$

The purpose of our study is to use more recent data to determine which of the popular approaches for estimating future growth in the Discounted Cash Flow model is embodied in the market price of the firm's shares.

We estimated Equation (4) to determine which estimate of future growth, g, when combined with the payout ratio, D/E, and risk variables B, Cov, Rsq, and Sa, provides the best predictor of the firm's P/E ratio. To paraphrase Cragg and Malkiel, we would expect that growth estimates found in the best-fitting equation more closely approximate the expectation used by investors than those found in poorer-fitting equations.

DESCRIPTION OF DATA

Our data sets include both historically based measures of future growth and the consensus analysts' forecasts of five-year earnings growth supplied by the Institutional Brokers Estimate System of Lynch, Jones & Ryan (IBES). The data also include the firm's dividend payout ratio and various measures of the firm's risk. We include the latter items in the regression, along with earnings growth, to account for other variables that may affect the firm's stock price.

The data include:

Earnings Per Share. Because our goal is to determine which earnings variable is embodied in the firm's market price, we need to define this variable with care. Financial analysts who study a firm's financial results in detail generally prefer to "normalize" the firm's reported earnings for the effect of extraordinary items, such as write-offs of discontinued operations, or mergers and acquisitions. They also attempt, to the extent possible, to state earnings for different firms using a common set of accounting conventions.

We have defined "earnings" as the consensus analyst estimate (as reported by IBES) of the firm's earnings for the forthcoming year.[1] This definition approximates the normalized earnings that investors most likely have in mind when they make stock purchase and sell decisions. It implicitly incorporates the analysts' adjustments for differences in accounting treatment among firms and the effects of the business cycle on each firm's results of operations. Although we thought at first that this earnings estimate might be highly correlated with the analysts' five-year earnings growth forecasts, that was not the case. Thus, we avoided a potential spurious correlation problem.

Price/Earnings Ratio. Corresponding to our definition of "earnings," the price/earnings ratio (P/E) is calculated as the closing stock price for the year divided by the consensus analyst earnings forecast for the forthcoming fiscal year.

Dividends. Dividends per share represent the common dividends declared per share during the calendar year, after adjustment for all stock splits and stock dividends). The firm's dividend payout ratio is then defined as common dividends per share divided by the consensus analyst estimate of the earnings per share for the forthcoming calendar year (D/E). Although this definition has the deficiency that it is obviously biased downward — it divides this year's dividend by next year's earnings — it has the advantage that it implicitly uses a "normalized" figure for earnings. We believe that this advantage outweighs the deficiency, especially when one considers the flaws of the apparent alternatives. Furthermore, we have verified that the results are insensitive to reasonable alternative definitions (see footnote 1).

Growth. In comparing historically based and consensus analysts' forecasts, we calculated forty-one different historical growth measures. These included the following: 1) the past growth rate in EPS as determined by a log-linear least squares regression for the latest year,[2] two years, three years, . . ., and ten years; 2) the past growth rate in DPS for the latest year, two years, three years, . . ., and ten years; 3) the past growth rate in book value per share (computed as the ratio of common equity to the outstanding common equity shares) for the latest year, two years, three years, . . ., and ten years; 4) the past growth rate in cash flow per share (computed as the ratio of pretax income, depreciation, and deferred taxes to the outstanding common equity shares) for the latest year, two years, three years, . . ., and ten years; and 5) plowback growth (computed as the firm's retention ratio for the current year times the firm's latest annual return on common equity).

We also used the five-year forecast of earnings per share growth compiled by IBES and reported in mid-January of each year. This number represents the consensus (i.e., mean) forecast produced by analysts from the research departments of leading Wall Street and regional brokerage firms over the preceding three months. IBES selects the contributing brokers "because of the superior quality of their research, professional reputation, and client demand" (IBES *Monthly Summary Book*).

Risk Variables. Although many risk factors could potentially affect the firm's stock price, most of these factors are highly correlated with one another. As shown above in Equation (4), we decided to restrict our attention to four risk measures that have intuitive appeal and are followed by many financial analysts: 1) B, the firm's beta as published by Value Line; 2) Cov, the firm's pretax interest coverage ratio (obtained from Standard & Poor's Compustat); 3) Rsq, the stability of the firm's five-year historical EPS (measured by the R^2 from a log-linear least squares regression); and 4) Sa, the standard deviation of the consensus analysts' five-year EPS growth forecast (mean forecast) as computed by IBES.

After careful analysis of the data used in our study, we felt that we could obtain more meaningful results by imposing six restrictions on the companies included in our study:

1. Because of the need to calculate ten-year historical growth rates, and because we studied three different time periods, 1981, 1982, and 1983, our study requires data for the thirteen-year period 1971-1983. We included only companies with at least a thirteen-year operating history in our study.
2. As our historical growth rate calculations were based on log-linear regressions, and the logarithm of a negative number is not defined, we excluded all companies that experienced negative EPS during any of the years 1971-1983.
3. For similar reasons, we also eliminated companies that did not pay a dividend during any one of the years 1971-1983.
4. To insure comparability of time periods covered by each consensus earnings figure in the P/E ratios, we eliminated all companies that did not have a December 31 fiscal year-end.
5. To eliminate distortions caused by highly unusual events that distort current earnings but not expected future earnings, and thus the firm's price/earnings ratio, we eliminated any firm with a price/earnings ratio greater than 50.
6. As the evaluation of analysts' forecasts is a major part of this study, we eliminated all firms that IBES did not follow.

Our final sample consisted of approximately sixty-five utility firms.[3]

RESULTS

To keep the number of calculations in our study to a reasonable level, we performed the study in two stages. In Stage 1, all forty-one historically oriented approaches for estimating future growth were correlated with each firm's P/E ratio. In Stage 2, the historical growth rate with the highest correlation to the P/E ratio was compared to the consensus analyst growth rate in the multiple regression model described by Equation (4) above. We performed our regressions for each of three recent time periods, because we felt the results of our study might vary over time.

First-Stage Correlation Study

Table 1 gives the results of our first-stage correlation study for each group of companies in each of the years 1981, 1982, and 1983. The values in this table measure the correlation between the historically oriented growth rates for the various time periods and the firm's end-of-year P/E ratio.

The four variables for which historical growth rates were calculated are shown in the left-hand column: EPS indicates historical earnings per share growth, DPS indicates historical dividend per share growth, BVPS indicates historical book value per share growth, and CFPS indicates historical cash flow per share growth. The term "plowback" refers to the product of the firm's retention ratio in the currennt year and its return on book equity for that year. In all, we calculated forty-one historically oriented growth rates for each group of firms in each study period.

The goal of the first-stage correlation analysis was to determine which historically oriented growth rate is most highly correlated with each group's year-end P/E ratio. Eight-year growth in CFPS has the highest correlation with P/E in 1981 and 1982, and ten-year growth in CFPS has the highest correlation with year-end P/E in 1983. In all cases, the plowback estimate of future growth performed poorly, indicating that — contrary to generally held views — plowback is not a factor in investor expectations of future growth.

Second-Stage Regression Study

In the second stage of our regression study, we ran the regression in Equation (4) using two different measures of future growth, g: 1) the best historically oriented growth rate (g_h) from the first-stage correlation study, and 2) the consensus analysts' forecast (g_a) of five-year EPS growth. The regression results, which are shown in Table 2, support at least

TABLE 1

Correlation Coefficients of All Historically Based Growth Estimates by Group and by Year with P/E

Historical Growth Rate Period in Years

Current Year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1981										
EPS	−0.02	0.07	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.12	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.09
DPS	0.05	0.18	0.14	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.19	0.23	0.23	0.23
BVPS	0.01	0.11	0.13	0.13	0.16	0.18	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15
CFPS	−0.05	0.04	0.13	0.22	0.28	0.31	0.30	0.31	−0.57	−0.54
Plowback	0.19									
1982										
EPS	−0.10	−0.13	−0.06	−0.02	−0.02	−0.01	−0.03	−0.03	0.00	0.00
DPS	−0.19	−0.10	0.03	0.05	0.07	0.08	0.09	0.11	0.13	0.13
BVPS	0.07	0.08	0.11	0.11	0.09	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.09	0.09
CFPS	−0.02	−0.08	0.00	0.10	0.16	0.19	0.23	0.25	0.24	0.07
Plowback	0.04									
1983										
EPS	−0.06	−0.25	−0.25	−0.24	−0.16	−0.11	−0.05	0.00	0.02	0.02
DPS	0.03	−0.10	−0.03	0.08	0.15	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.24
BVPS	0.03	0.10	0.04	0.09	0.15	0.16	0.19	0.21	0.22	0.21
CFPS	−0.08	0.01	0.02	0.08	0.20	0.29	0.35	0.38	0.40	0.42
Plowback	−0.08									

two general conclusions regarding the pricing of equity securities.

First, we found overwhelming evidence that the consensus analysts' forecast of future growth is superior to historically oriented growth measures in predicting the firm's stock price. In every case, the R^2 in the regression containing the consensus analysts' forecast is higher than the R^2 in the regression containing the historical growth measure. The regression coefficients in the equation containing the consensus analysts' forecast also are considerably more significant than they are in the alternative regression. These results are consistent with those found by Cragg and Malkiel for data covering the period 1961-1968. Our results also are consistent with the hypothesis that investors use analysts' forecasts, rather than historically oriented growth calculations, in making stock buy-and-sell decisions.

TABLE 2

Regression Results
Model I

Part A: *Historical*

$P/E = a_c + a_1 D/E + a_2 g_h + a_3 B + a_4 Cov + a_5 Rsq + a_6 Sa$

Year	$\hat{a}_0$	$\hat{a}_1$	$\hat{a}_2$	$\hat{a}_3$	$\hat{a}_4$	$\hat{a}_5$	$\hat{a}_6$	R^2	F Ratio
1981	−6.42*	10.31*	7.67*	3.24	0.54*	1.42*	57.43	0.83	46.49
	(5.50)	(14.79)	(2.20)	(2.86)	(2.50)	(2.85)	(4.07)		
1982	−2.90*	9.32*	8.49*	2.85	0.45*	−0.42	3.63	0.86	65.53
	(2.75)	(18.52)	(4.18)	(2.83)	(2.60)	(0.05)	(0.26)		
1983	−5.96*	10.20*	19.78*	4.85	0.44*	0.33	32.49	0.82	45.26
	(3.70)	(12.20)	(4.83)	(2.95)	(1.89)	(0.50)	(1.29)		

Part B: *Analysis*

$P/E = a_0 + a_1 D/E + a_2 g_a + a_3 B + a_4 Cov + a_5 Rsq + a_6 Sa$

Year	$\hat{a}_0$	$\hat{a}_1$	$\hat{a}_2$	$\hat{a}_3$	$\hat{a}_4$	$\hat{a}_5$	$\hat{a}_6$	R^2	F Ratio
1981	−4.97*	10.62*	54.85*	−0.61	0.33*	0.63*	4.34	0.91	103.10
	(6.23)	(21.57)	(8.56)	(0.68)	(2.28)	(1.74)	(0.37)		
1982	−2.16*	9.47*	50.71*	−1.07	0.36*	−0.31	119.05*	0.90	97.62
	(2.59)	(22.46)	(9.31)	(1.14)	(2.53)	(1.09)	(1.60)		
1983	−8.47*	11.96*	79.05*	2.16	0.56*	0.20	−34.43	0.87	69.81
	(7.07)	(16.48)	(7.84)	(1.55)	(3.08)	(0.38)	(1.44)		

Notes:
* Coefficient is significant at the 5% level (using a one-tailed test) and has the correct sign. T-statistic in parentheses.

Second, there is some evidence that investors tend to view risk in traditional terms. The interest coverage variable is statistically significant in all but one of our samples, and the stability of the operating income variable is statistically significant in six of the twelve samples we studied. On the other hand, the beta is never statistically significant, and the standard deviation of the analysts' five-year growth forecasts is statistically significant in only two of our twelve samples. This evidence is far from conclusive, however, because, as we demonstrate later, a significant degree of cross-correlation among our four risk variables makes any general inference about risk extremely hazardous.

Possible Misspecification of Risk

The stock valuation theory says nothing about which risk variables are most important to investors. Therefore, we need to consider the possibility that the risk variables of our study are only proxies for the "true" risk variables used by investors. The inclusion of proxy variables may increase the variance of the parameters of most concern, which in this case are the coefficients of the growth variables.[4]

To allow for the possibility that the use of risk proxies has caused us to draw incorrect conclusions concerning the relative importance of analysts' growth forecasts and historical growth extrapolations, we have also estimated Equation (4) with the risk variables excluded. The results of these regressions are shown in Table 3.

Again, there is overwhelming evidence that the consensus analysts' growth forecast is superior to the historically oriented growth measures in predicting the firm's stock price. The R^2 and t-statistics are higher in every case.

CONCLUSION

The relationship between growth expectations and share prices is important in several major areas of finance. The data base of analysts' growth forecasts collected by Lynch, Jones & Ryan provides a unique opportunity to test the hypothesis that investors rely more heavily on analysts' growth forecasts than on historical growth extrapolations in making security buy-and-sell decisions. With the help of this data base, our studies affirm the superiority of analysts' forecasts over simple historical growth extrapolations in the stock price formation process. Indirectly, this finding lends support to the use of valuation models whose input includes expected growth rates.

TABLE 3

Regression Results
Model II

Part A: *Historical*

$P/E = a_0 + a_1 D/E + a_2 g_h$

Year	$\hat{a}_0$	$\hat{a}_1$	$\hat{a}_2$	R^2	F Ratio
1981	−1.05	9.59	21.20	0.73	82.95
	(1.61)	(12.13)	(7.05)		
1982	0.54	8.92	12.18	0.83	167.97
	(1.38)	(17.73)	(6.95)		
1983	−0.75	8.92	12.18	0.77	107.82
	(1.13)	(12.38)	(7.94)		

Part B: *Analysis*

$P/E + a_0 + a_1 D/E + a_2 g_a$

Year	$\hat{a}_0$	$\hat{a}_1$	$\hat{a}_2$	R^2	F Ratio
1981	3.96	10.07	60.53	0.90	274.16
	(8.31)	(8.31)	(20.91)	(15.79)	
1982	−1.75	9.19	44.92	0.88	246.36
	(4.00)	(4.00)	(21.35)	(11.06)	
1983	−4.97	10.95	82.02	0.83	168.28
	(6.93)	(6.93)	(15.93)	(11.02)	

Notes:
* Coefficient is significant at the 5% level (using a one-tailed test) and has the correct sign. T-statistic in parentheses.

[1] We also tried several other definitions of "earnings," including the firm's most recent primary earnings per share prior to any extraordinary items or discontinued operations. As our results were insensitive to reasonable alternative definitions of "earnings" we report only the results for the IBES consensus.

[2] For the latest year, we actually employed a point-to-point growth calculation because there were only two available observations.

[3] We use the word "approximately," because the set of available firms varied each year. In any case, the number varied only from zero to three firms on either side of the figures cited here.

[4] See Maddala (1977).

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Cost of Capital Estimation

The Risk Premium Approach to Measuring a Utility's Cost of Equity

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■ In the mid-1960s, Myron Gordon and others began applying the theory of finance to help estimate utilities' costs of capital. Previously, the standard approach in cost of equity studies was the "comparable earnings method," which involved selecting a sample of unregulated companies whose investment risk was judged to be comparable to that of the utility in question, calculating the average return on book equity (ROE) of these sample companies, and setting the utility's service rates at a level that would permit the utility to achieve the same ROE as comparable companies. This procedure has now been thoroughly discredited (see Robichek [15]), and it has been replaced by three market-oriented (as opposed to accounting-oriented) approaches: (i) the DCF method, (ii) the bond-yield-plus-risk-premium method, and (iii) the CAPM, which is a specific version of the generalized bond-yield-plus-risk-premium approach.

Our purpose in this paper is to discuss the risk-premium approach, including the market risk premium that is used in the CAPM. First, we critique the various procedures that have been used in the past to estimate risk premiums. Second, we present some data on estimated risk premiums since 1965. Third, we examine the relationship between equity risk premiums and the level of interest rates, because it is important, for purposes of estimating the cost of capital, to know just how stable the relationship between risk premiums and interest rates is over time. If stability exists, then one can estimate the cost of equity at any point in time as a function of interest rates as reported in *The Wall Street Journal*, the *Federal Reserve Bulletin*, or some similar source.[1] Fourth, while we do not discuss the CAPM directly, our analysis does have some important implications for selecting a market risk premium for use in that model. Our focus is on utilities, but the methodology is applicable to the estimation of the cost of

[1]For example, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's Staff recently proposed that a risk premium be estimated every two years and that, between estimation dates, the last-determined risk premium be added to the current yield on ten-year Treasury bonds to obtain an estimate of the cost of equity to an average utility (Docket RM 80-36). Subsequently, the FCC made a similar proposal ("Notice of Proposed Rulemaking," August 13, 1984, Docket No. 84-800). Obviously, the validity of such procedures depends on (i) the accuracy of the risk premium estimate and (ii) the stability of the relationship between risk premiums and interest rates. Both proposals are still under review.

equity for any publicly traded firm, and also for non-traded firms for which an appropriate risk class can be assessed, including divisions of publicly traded corporations.[2]

Alternative Procedures for Estimating Risk Premiums

In a review of both rate cases and the academic literature, we have identified three basic methods for estimating equity risk premiums: (i) the *ex post*, or historic, yield spread method; (ii) the survey method; and (iii) an *ex ante* yield spread method based on DCF analysis.[3] In this section, we briefly review these three methods.

Historic Risk Premiums

A number of researchers, most notably Ibbotson and Sinquefield [12], have calculated historic holding period returns on different securities and then estimated risk premiums as follows:

$$\text{Historic Risk Premium} = \begin{pmatrix}\text{Average of the}\\ \text{annual returns on}\\ \text{a stock index for}\\ \text{a particular}\\ \text{past period}\end{pmatrix} - \begin{pmatrix}\text{Average of the}\\ \text{annual returns on}\\ \text{a bond index for}\\ \text{the same}\\ \text{past period}\end{pmatrix}. \quad (1)$$

Ibbotson and Sinquefield (I&S) calculated both arithmetic and geometric average returns, but most of their risk-premium discussion was in terms of the geometric averages. Also, they used both corporate and Treasury bond indices, as well as a T-bill index, and they analyzed all possible holding periods since 1926. The I&S study has been employed in numerous rate cases in two ways: (i) directly, where the I&S historic risk premium is added to a company's bond yield to obtain an estimate of its cost of equity, and (ii) indirectly, where I&S data are used to estimate the market risk premium in CAPM studies.

There are both conceptual and measurement problems with using I&S data for purposes of estimating the cost of capital. Conceptually, there is no compelling reason to think that investors expect the same relative returns that were earned in the past. Indeed, evidence presented in the following sections indicates that relative expected returns should, and do, vary significantly over time. Empirically, the measured historic premium is sensitive both to the choice of estimation horizon and to the end points. These choices are essentially arbitrary, yet they can result in significant differences in the final outcome. These measurement problems are common to most forecasts based on time series data.

The Survey Approach

One obvious way to estimate equity risk premiums is to poll investors. Charles Benore [1], the senior utility analyst for Paine Webber Mitchell Hutchins, a leading institutional brokerage house, conducts such a survey of major institutional investors annually. His 1983 results are reported in Exhibit 1.

Exhibit 1. Results of Risk Premium Survey, 1983*

Assuming a double A, long-term utility bond currently yields 12½%, the common stock for the same company would be fairly priced relative to the bond if its expected return was as follows:

Total Return	Indicated Risk Premium (basis points)	Percent of Respondents
over 20½%	over 800	
20½%	800	
19½%	700	
18½%	600	10%
17½%	500	8%
16½%	400	29%
15½%	300	35%
14½%	200	16%
13½%	100	0%
under 13½%	under 100	1%
Weighted average	358	100%

*Benore's questionnaire included the first two columns, while his third column provided a space for the respondents to indicate which risk premium they thought applied. We summarized Benore's responses in the frequency distribution given in Column 3. Also, in his questionnaire each year, Benore adjusts the double A bond yield and the total returns (Column 1) to reflect current market conditions. Both the question above and the responses to it were taken from the survey conducted in April 1983.

[2]The FCC is particularly interested in risk-premium methodologies, because (i) only eighteen of the 1,400 telephone companies it regulates have publicly-traded stock, and hence offer the possibility of DCF analysis, and (ii) most of the publicly-traded telephone companies have both regulated and unregulated assets, so a corporate DCF cost might not be applicable to the regulated units of the companies.

[3]In rate cases, some witnesses also have calculated the differential between the yield to maturity (YTM) of a company's bonds and its concurrent ROE, and then called this differential a risk premium. In general, this procedure is unsound, because the YTM on a bond is a *future expected* return on the bond's *market value*, while the ROE is the *past realized* return on the stock's *book value*. Thus, comparing YTMs and ROEs is like comparing apples and oranges.

Benore's results, as measured by the average risk premiums, have varied over the years as follows:

Year	Average RP (basis points)
1978	491
1979	475
1980	423
1981	349
1982	275
1983	358

The survey approach is conceptually sound in that it attempts to measure investors' expectations regarding risk premiums, and the Benore data also seem to be carefully collected and processed. Therefore, the Benore studies do provide one useful basis for estimating risk premiums. However, as with most survey results, the possibility of biased responses and/or biased sampling always exists. For example, if the responding institutions are owners of utility stocks (and many of them are), and if the respondents think that the survey results might be used in a rate case, then they might bias upward their responses to help utilities obtain higher authorized returns. Also, Benore surveys large institutional investors, whereas a high percentage of utility stocks are owned by individuals rather than institutions, so there is a question as to whether his reported risk premiums are really based on the expectations of the "representative" investor. Finally, from a pragmatic standpoint, there is a question as to how to use the Benore data for utilities that are not rated AA. The Benore premiums can be applied as an add-on to the own-company bond yields of any given utility only if it can be assumed that the premiums are constant across bond rating classes. *A priori*, there is no reason to believe that the premiums will be constant.

DCF-Based *Ex Ante* Risk Premiums

In a number of studies, the DCF model has been used to estimate the *ex ante* market risk premium, RP_M. Here, one estimates the average expected future return on equity for a group of stocks, k_M, and then subtracts the concurrent risk-free rate, R_F, as proxied by the yield to maturity on either corporate or Treasury securities:[4]

$$RP_M = k_M - R_F. \quad (2)$$

Conceptually, this procedure is exactly like the I&S approach except that one makes direct estimates of future expected returns on stocks and bonds rather than assuming that investors expect future returns to mirror past returns.

The most difficult task, of course, is to obtain a valid estimate of k_M, the expected rate of return on the market. Several studies have attempted to estimate DCF risk premiums for the utility industry and for other stock market indices. Two of these are summarized next.

Vandell and Kester. In a recently published monograph, Vandell and Kester [18] estimated *ex ante* risk premiums for the period from 1944 to 1978. R_F was measured both by the yield on 90-day T-bills and by the yield on the Standard and Poor's AA Utility Bond Index. They measured k_M as the average expected return on the S&P's 500 Index, with the expected return on individual securities estimated as follows:

$$k_i = \left(\frac{D_1}{P_0}\right)_i + g_i, \quad (3)$$

where,

D_1 = dividend per share expected over the next twelve months,
P_0 = current stock price,
g = estimated long-term constant growth rate, and
i = the i^{th} stock.

To estimate g_i, Vandell and Kester developed fifteen forecasting models based on both exponential smoothing and trend-line forecasts of earnings and dividends, and they used historic data over several estimating horizons. Vandell and Kester themselves acknowledge that, like the Ibbotson-Sinquefield premiums, their analysis is subject to potential errors associated with trying to estimate expected future growth purely from past data. We shall have more to say about this point later.

[4]In this analysis, most people have used yields on long-term bonds rather than short-term money market instruments. It is recognized that long-term bonds, even Treasury bonds, are not risk free, so an RP_M based on these debt instruments is smaller than it would be if there were some better proxy to the long-term riskless rate. People have attempted to use the T-bill rate for R_F, but the T-bill rate embodies a different average inflation premium than stocks, and it is subject to random fluctuations caused by monetary policy, international currency flows, and other factors. Thus, many people believe that for cost of capital purposes, R_F should be based on long-term securities.

We did test to see how debt maturities would affect our calculated risk premiums. If a short-term rate such as the 30-day T-bill rate is used, measured risk premiums jump around widely and, so far as we could tell, randomly. The choice of a maturity in the 10- to 30-year range has little effect, as the yield curve is generally fairly flat in that range.

Malkiel. Malkiel [14] estimated equity risk premiums for the Dow Jones Industrials using the DCF model. Recognizing that the constant dividend growth assumption may not be valid, Malkiel used a nonconstant version of the DCF model. Also, rather than rely exclusively on historic data, he based his growth rates on Value Line's five-year earnings growth forecasts plus the assumption that each company's growth rate would, after an initial five-year period, move toward a long-run real national growth rate of four percent. He also used ten-year maturity government bonds as a proxy for the riskless rate. Malkiel reported that he tested the sensitivity of his results against a number of different types of growth rates, but, in his words, "The results are remarkably robust, and the estimated risk premiums are all very similar." Malkiel's is, to the best of our knowledge, the first risk-premium study that uses analysts' forecasts. A discussion of analysts' forecasts follows.

Security Analysts' Growth Forecasts

Ex ante DCF risk premium estimates can be based either on expected growth rates developed from time series data, such as Vandell and Kester used, or on analysts' forecasts, such as Malkiel used. Although there is nothing inherently wrong with time series-based growth rates, an increasing body of evidence suggests that primary reliance should be placed on analysts' growth rates. First, we note that the observed market price of a stock reflects the consensus view of investors regarding its future growth. Second, we know that most large brokerage houses, the larger institutional investors, and many investment advisory organizations employ security analysts who forecast future EPS and DPS, and, to the extent that investors rely on analysts' forecasts, the consensus of analysts' forecasts is embodied in market prices. Third, there have been literally dozens of academic research papers dealing with the accuracy of analysts' forecasts, as well as with the extent to which investors actually use them. For example, Cragg and Malkiel [7] and Brown and Rozeff [5] determined that security analysts' forecasts are more relevant in valuing common stocks and estimating the cost of capital than are forecasts based solely on historic time series. Stanley, Lewellen, and Schlarbaum [16] and Linke [13] investigated the importance of analysts' forecasts and recommendations to the investment decisions of individual and institutional investors. Both studies indicate that investors rely heavily on analysts' reports and incorporate analysts' forecast information in the formation of their expectations about stock returns. A representative listing of other work supporting the use of analysts' forecasts is included in the References section. Thus, evidence in the current literature indicates that (i) analysts' forecasts are superior to forecasts based solely on time series data, and (ii) investors do rely on analysts' forecasts. Accordingly, we based our cost of equity, and hence risk premium estimates, on analysts' forecast data.[5]

Risk Premium Estimates

For purposes of estimating the cost of capital using the risk premium approach, it is necessary either that the risk premiums be time-invariant or that there exists a predictable relationship between risk premiums and interest rates. If the premiums are constant over time, then the constant premium could be added to the prevailing interest rate. Alternatively, if there exists a stable relationship between risk premiums and interest rates, it could be used to predict the risk premium from the prevailing interest rate.

To test for stability, we obviously need to calculate risk premiums over a fairly long period of time. Prior to 1980, the only consistent set of data we could find came from Value Line, and, because of the work involved, we could develop risk premiums only once a year (on January 1). Beginning in 1980, however, we began collecting and analyzing Value Line data on a monthly basis, and in 1981 we added monthly estimates from Merrill Lynch and Salomon Brothers to our data base. Finally, in mid-1983, we expanded our analysis to include the IBES data.

Annual Data and Results, 1966–1984

Over the period 1966–1984, we used Value Line data to estimate risk premiums both for the electric utility industry and for industrial companies, using the companies included in the Dow Jones Industrial and Utility averages as representative of the two groups. Value Line makes a five-year growth rate forecast, but it also gives data from which one can develop a longer-term forecast. Since DCF theory calls for a truly long-term (infinite horizon) growth rate, we concluded that it was better to develop and use such a forecast than to

[5]Recently, a new type of service that summarizes the key data from most analysts' reports has become available. We are aware of two sources of such services, the Lynch, Jones, and Ryan's Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES) and Zack's Icarus Investment Service. IBES and the Icarus Service gather data from both buy-side and sell-side analysts and provide it to subscribers on a monthly basis in both a printed and a computer-readable format.

Exhibit 2. Estimated Annual Risk Premiums, Nonconstant (Value Line) Model, 1966–1984

January 1 of the Year Reported	Dow Jones Electrics			Dow Jones Industrials			
	k_{Avg}	R_F	RP	k_{Avg}	R_F	RP	(3) ÷ (6)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1966	8.11%	4.50%	3.61%	9.56%	4.50%	5.06%	0.71
1967	9.00%	4.76%	4.24%	11.57%	4.76%	6.81%	0.62
1968	9.68%	5.59%	4.09%	10.56%	5.59%	4.97%	0.82
1969	9.34%	5.88%	3.46%	10.96%	5.88%	5.08%	0.68
1970	11.04%	6.91%	4.13%	12.22%	6.91%	5.31%	0.78
1971	10.80%	6.28%	4.52%	11.23%	6.28%	4.95%	0.91
1972	10.53%	6.00%	4.53%	11.09%	6.00%	5.09%	0.89
1973	11.37%	5.96%	5.41%	11.47%	5.96%	5.51%	0.98
1974	13.85%	7.29%	6.56%	12.38%	7.29%	5.09%	1.29
1975	16.63%	7.91%	8.72%	14.83%	7.91%	6.92%	1.26
1976	13.97%	8.23%	5.74%	13.32%	8.23%	5.09%	1.13
1977	12.96%	7.30%	5.66%	13.63%	7.30%	6.33%	0.89
1978	13.42%	7.87%	5.55%	14.75%	7.87%	6.88%	0.81
1979	14.92%	8.99%	5.93%	15.50%	8.99%	6.51%	0.91
1980	16.39%	10.18%	6.21%	16.53%	10.18%	6.35%	0.98
1981	17.61%	11.99%	5.62%	17.37%	11.99%	5.38%	1.04
1982	17.70%	14.00%	3.70%	19.30%	14.00%	5.30%	0.70
1983	16.30%	10.66%	5.64%	16.53%	10.66%	5.87%	0.96
1984	16.03%	11.97%	4.06%	15.72%	11.97%	3.75%	1.08

use the five-year prediction.[6] Therefore, we obtained data as of January 1 from Value Line for each of the Dow Jones companies and then solved for k, the expected rate of return, in the following equation:

$$P_0 = \sum_{t=1}^{n} \frac{D_t}{(1+k)^t} + \left(\frac{D_n(1+g_n)}{k-g_n}\right)\left(\frac{1}{1+k}\right)^n. \quad (4)$$

Equation (4) is the standard nonconstant growth DCF model; P_0 is the current stock price; D_t represents the forecasted dividends during the nonconstant growth period; n is the years of nonconstant growth; D_n is the first constant growth dividend; and g_n is the constant, long-run growth rate after year n. Value Line provides D_t values for t = 1 and t = 4, and we interpolated to obtain D_2 and D_3. Value Line also gives estimates for ROE and for the retention rate (b) in the terminal year, n, so we can forecast the long-term growth rate as g_n = b(ROE). With all the values in Equation (4) specified except k, we can solve for k, which is the DCF rate of return that would result if the Value Line forecasts were met, and, hence, the DCF rate of return implied in the Value Line forecast.[7]

Having estimated a k value for each of the electric and industrial companies, we averaged them (using market-value weights) to obtain a k value for each group, after which we subtracted R_F (taken as the December 31 yield on twenty-year constant maturity Treasury bonds) to obtain the estimated risk premiums shown in Exhibit 2. The premiums for the electrics are plotted in Exhibit 3, along with interest rates. The following points are worthy of note:

1. Risk premiums fluctuate over time. As we shall see in the next section, fluctuations are even wider when measured on a monthly basis.
2. The last column of Exhibit 2 shows that risk premi-

[6]This is a debatable point. Cragg and Malkiel, as well as many practicing analysts, feel that most investors actually focus on five-year forecasts. Others, however, argue that five-year forecasts are too heavily influenced by base-year conditions and/or other nonpermanent conditions for use in the DCF model. We note (i) that most published forecasts do indeed cover five years, (ii) that such forecasts are typically "normalized" in some fashion to alleviate the base-year problem, and (iii) that for relatively stable companies like those in the Dow Jones averages, it generally does not matter greatly if one uses a normalized five-year or a longer-term forecast, because these companies meet the conditions of the constant-growth DCF model rather well.

[7]Value Line actually makes an explicit price forecast for each stock, and one could use this price, along with the forecasted dividends, to develop an expected rate of return. However, Value Line's forecasted stock price builds in a forecasted *change* in k. Therefore, the forecasted price is inappropriate for use in estimating current values of k.

Exhibit 3. Equity Risk Premiums for Electric Utilities and Yields on 20-Year Government Bonds, 1970–1984*



*Standard errors of the coefficients are shown in parentheses below the coefficients.

ums for the utilities increased relative to those for the industrials from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s. Subsequently, the perceived riskiness of the two groups has, on average, been about the same.

3. Exhibit 3 shows that, from 1970 through 1979, utility risk premiums tended to have a positive association with interest rates: when interest rates rose, so did risk premiums, and vice versa. However, beginning in 1980, an inverse relationship appeared: rising interest rates led to declining risk premiums. We shall discuss this situation further in the next section.

Monthly Data and Results, 1980–1984

In early 1980, we began calculating risk premiums on a monthly basis. At that time, our only source of analysts' forecasts was Value Line, but beginning in 1981 we also obtained Merrill Lynch and Salomon Brothers' data, and then, in mid-1983, we obtained IBES data. Because our focus was on utilities, we restricted our monthly analysis to that group.

Our 1980–1984 monthly risk premium data, along with Treasury bond yields, are shown in Exhibits 4 and 5 and plotted in Exhibits 6, 7, and 8. Here are some comments on these Exhibits:

1. Risk premiums, like interest rates and stock prices, are volatile. Our data indicate that it would not be appropriate to estimate the cost of equity by adding the current cost of debt to a risk premium that had been estimated in the past. Current risk premiums should be matched with current interest rates.
2. Exhibit 6 confirms the 1980–1984 section of Exhibit 3 in that it shows a strong inverse relationship between interest rates and risk premiums; we shall discuss shortly why this relationship holds.
3. Exhibit 7 shows that while risk premiums based on Value Line, Merrill Lynch, and Salomon Brothers

Exhibit 4. Estimated Monthly Risk Premiums for Electric Utilities Using Analysts' Growth Forecasts, January 1980–June 1984

Beginning of Month	Value Line	Merrill Lynch	Salomon Brothers	Average Premiums	20-Year Treasury Bond Yield, Constant Maturity Series
Jan 1980	6.21%	NA	NA	6.21%	10.18%
Feb 1980	5.77%	NA	NA	5.77%	10.86%
Mar 1980	4.73%	NA	NA	4.73%	12.59%
Apr 1980	5.02%	NA	NA	5.02%	12.71%
May 1980	4.73%	NA	NA	4.73%	11.04%
Jun 1980	5.09%	NA	NA	5.09%	10.37%
Jul 1980	5.41%	NA	NA	5.41%	9.86%
Aug 1980	5.72%	NA	NA	5.72%	10.29%
Sep 1980	5.16%	NA	NA	5.16%	11.41%
Oct 1980	5.62%	NA	NA	5.62%	11.75%
Nov 1980	5.09%	NA	NA	5.09%	12.33%
Dec 1980	5.65%	NA	NA	5.65%	12.37%
Annual Avg.	5.35%			5.35%	11.31%
Jan 1981	5.62%	4.76%	5.63%	5.34%	11.99%
Feb 1981	4.82%	4.87%	5.16%	4.95%	12.48%
Mar 1981	4.70%	3.73%	4.97%	4.47%	13.10%
Apr 1981	4.24%	3.23%	4.52%	4.00%	13.11%
May 1981	3.54%	3.24%	4.24%	3.67%	13.51%
Jun 1981	3.57%	4.04%	4.27%	3.96%	13.39%
Jul 1981	3.61%	3.63%	4.16%	3.80%	13.32%
Aug 1981	3.17%	3.05%	3.04%	3.09%	14.23%
Sep 1981	2.11%	2.24%	2.35%	2.23%	14.99%
Oct 1981	2.83%	2.64%	3.24%	2.90%	14.93%
Nov 1981	2.08%	2.49%	3.03%	2.53%	15.27%
Dec 1981	3.72%	3.45%	4.24%	3.80%	13.12%
Annual Avg.	3.67%	3.45%	4.07%	3.73%	13.62%
Jan 1982	3.70%	3.37%	4.04%	3.70%	14.00%
Feb 1982	3.05%	3.37%	3.70%	3.37%	14.37%
Mar 1982	3.15%	3.28%	3.75%	3.39%	13.96%
Apr 1982	3.49%	3.61%	4.29%	3.80%	13.69%
May 1982	3.08%	4.25%	3.91%	3.75%	13.47%
Jun 1982	3.16%	4.51%	4.72%	4.13%	13.53%
Jul 1982	2.57%	4.21%	4.21%	3.66%	14.48%
Aug 1982	4.33%	4.83%	5.27%	4.81%	13.69%
Sep 1982	4.08%	5.14%	5.58%	4.93%	12.40%
Oct 1982	5.35%	5.24%	6.34%	5.64%	11.95%
Nov 1982	5.67%	5.95%	6.91%	6.18%	10.97%
Dec 1982	6.31%	6.71%	7.45%	6.82%	10.52%
Annual Avg.	4.00%	4.54%	5.01%	4.52%	13.09%
Jan 1983	5.64%	6.04%	6.81%	6.16%	10.66%
Feb 1983	4.68%	5.99%	6.10%	5.59%	11.01%
Mar 1983	4.99%	6.89%	6.43%	6.10%	10.71%
Apr 1983	4.75%	5.82%	6.31%	5.63%	10.84%
May 1983	4.50%	6.41%	6.24%	5.72%	10.57%
Jun 1983	4.29%	5.21%	6.16%	5.22%	10.90%
Jul 1983	4.78%	5.72%	6.42%	5.64%	11.12%
Aug 1983	3.89%	4.74%	5.41%	4.68%	11.78%
Sep 1983	4.07%	4.90%	5.57%	4.85%	11.71%
Oct 1983	3.79%	4.64%	5.38%	4.60%	11.64%
Nov 1983	2.84%	3.77%	4.46%	3.69%	11.90%
Dec 1983	3.36%	4.27%	5.00%	4.21%	11.83%
Annual Avg.	4.30%	5.37%	5.86%	5.17%	11.22%
Jan 1984	4.06%	5.04%	5.65%	4.92%	11.97%
Feb 1984	4.25%	5.37%	5.96%	5.19%	11.76%
Mar 1984	4.73%	6.05%	6.38%	5.72%	12.12%
Apr 1984	4.78%	5.33%	6.32%	5.48%	12.51%
May 1984	4.36%	5.30%	6.42%	5.36%	12.78%
Jun 1984	3.54%	4.00%	5.63%	4.39%	13.60%

Exhibit 5. Monthly Risk Premiums Based on IBES Data

Beginning of Month	Average of Merrill Lynch, Salomon Brothers, and Value Line Premiums for Dow Jones Electrics	IBES Premiums for Dow Jones Electrics	IBES Premiums for Entire Electric Industry
Aug 1983	4.68%	4.10%	4.16%
Sep 1983	4.85%	4.43%	4.27%
Oct 1983	4.60%	4.31%	3.90%
Nov 1983	3.69%	3.36%	3.36%
Dec 1983	4.21%	3.86%	3.54%
Jan 1984	4.92%	4.68%	4.18%
Feb 1984	5.19%	5.00%	4.36%
Mar 1984	5.72%	5.35%	4.45%
Apr 1984	5.48%	5.33%	4.23%
May 1984	5.36%	5.26%	4.30%
Jun 1984	4.39%	4.47%	3.40%
Average Premiums	4.83%	4.56%	4.01%

Exhibit 6. Utility Risk Premiums and Interest Rates, 1980–1984



Exhibit 7. Monthly Risk Premiums, Electric Utilities, 1981–1984 (to Date)



Exhibit 8. Comparative Risk Premium Data



●: Value Line, ML, SB: Dow Jones Electrics
■: IBES: Dow Jones Electrics
▲: IBES: All Electric Utilities

do differ, the differences are not large given the nature of the estimates, and the premiums follow one another closely over time. Since all of the analysts are examining essentially the same data and since utility companies are not competitive with one another, and hence have relatively few secrets, the similarity among the analysts' forecasts is not surprising.

4. The IBES data, presented in Exhibit 5 and plotted in Exhibit 8, contain too few observations to enable us to draw strong conclusions, but (i) the Dow Jones Electrics risk premiums based on our three-analyst data have averaged 27 basis points above premiums based on the larger group of analysts surveyed by IBES and (ii) the premiums on the 11 Dow Jones Electrics have averaged 54 basis points higher than premiums for the entire utility industry followed by IBES. Given the variability in the data, we are, at this point, inclined to attribute these differences to random fluctuations, but as more data become available, it may turn out that the differences are statistically significant. In particular, the 11 electric utilities included in the Dow Jones Utility Index all have large nuclear investments, and this may cause them to be regarded as riskier than the industry average, which includes both nuclear and non-nuclear companies.

Tests of the Reasonableness of the Risk Premium Estimates

So far our claims to the reasonableness of our risk-premium estimates have been based on the reasonableness of our variable measures, particularly the measures of expected dividend growth rates. Essentially, we have argued that since there is strong evidence in the literature in support of analysts' forecasts, risk premiums based on these forecasts are reasonable. In the spirit of positive economics, however, it is also important to demonstrate the reasonableness of our results more directly.

It is theoretically possible to test for the validity of the risk-premium estimates in a CAPM framework. In a cross-sectional estimate of the CAPM equation,

$$(k - R_F)_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1\beta_i + u_i, \qquad (5)$$

we would expect

$$\hat{\alpha}_0 = 0 \text{ and } \hat{\alpha}_1 = k_M - R_F = \text{Market risk premium.}$$

This test, of course, would be a joint test of both the CAPM and the reasonableness of our risk-premium estimates. There is a great deal of evidence that questions the empirical validity of the CAPM, especially when applied to regulated utilities. Under these conditions, it is obvious that no unambiguous conclusion can be drawn regarding the efficacy of the premium estimates from such a test.[8]

A simpler and less ambiguous test is to show that the risk premiums are higher for lower rated firms than for higher rated firms. Using 1984 data, we classified the

[8]We carried out the test on a monthly basis for 1984 and found positive but statistically insignificant coefficients. A typical result (for April 1984) follows:

$$(k - R_F)_i = \underset{(0.91)}{3.1675} + \underset{(1.44)}{1.8031}\ \beta_i.$$

The figures in parentheses are standard errors. Utility risk premiums do increase with betas, but the intercept term is not zero as the CAPM would predict, and α_1 is both less than the predicted value and not statistically significant. Again, the observation that the coefficients do not conform to CAPM predictions could be as much a problem with CAPM specification for utilities as with the risk premium estimates.

A similar test was carried out by Friend, Westerfield, and Granito [9]. They tested the CAPM using expectational (survey) data rather than *ex post* holding period returns. They actually found their coefficient of β_i to be negative in all their cross-sectional tests.

Exhibit 9. Relationship between Risk Premiums and Bond Ratings, 1984*

Month	Aaa/AA	AA	Aa/A	A	A/BBB	BBB	Below BBB
January†	—	2.61%	3.06%	3.70%	5.07%	4.90%	9.45%
February	2.98%	3.17%	3.36%	4.03%	5.26%	5.14%	7.97%
March	2.34%	3.46%	3.29%	4.06%	5.43%	5.02%	8.28%
April	2.37%	3.03%	3.29%	3.88%	5.29%	4.97%	6.96%
May	2.00%	2.48%	3.42%	3.72%	4.72%	6.64%	8.81%
June	0.72%	2.17%	2.46%	3.16%	3.76%	5.00%	5.58%
Average	2.08%	2.82%	3.15%	3.76%	4.92%	5.28%	7.84%

*The risk premiums are based on IBES data for the electric utilities followed by both IBES and Salomon Brothers. The number of electric utilities followed by both firms varies from month to month. For the period between January and June 1984, the number of electrics followed by both firms ranged from 96 to 99 utilities.
†In January, there were no Aaa/AA companies. Subsequently, four utilities were upgraded to Aaa/AA.

utility industry into risk groups based on bond ratings. For each rating group, we estimated the average risk premium. The results, presented in Exhibit 9, clearly show that the lower the bond rating, the higher the risk premiums. Our premium estimates therefore would appear to pass this simple test of reasonableness.

Risk Premiums and Interest Rates

Traditionally, stocks have been regarded as being riskier than bonds because bondholders have a prior claim on earnings and assets. That is, stockholders stand at the end of the line and receive income and/or assets only after the claims of bondholders have been satisfied. However, if interest rates fluctuate, then the holders of long-term bonds can suffer losses (either realized or in an opportunity cost sense) even though they receive all contractually due payments. Therefore, if investors' worries about "interest rate risk" versus "earning power risk" vary over time, then perceived risk differentials between stocks and bonds, and hence risk premiums, will also vary.

Any number of events could occur to cause the perceived riskiness of stocks versus bonds to change, but probably the most pervasive factor, over the 1966–1984 period, is related to inflation. Inflationary expectations are, of course, reflected in interest rates. Therefore, one might expect to find a relationship between risk premiums and interest rates. As we noted in our discussion of Exhibit 3, risk premiums were positively correlated with interest rates from 1966 through 1979, but, beginning in 1980, the relationship turned negative. A possible explanation for this change is given next.

1966–1979 Period. During this period, inflation heated up, fuel prices soared, environmental problems surfaced, and demand for electricity slowed even as expensive new generating units were nearing completion. These cost increases required offsetting rate hikes to maintain profit levels. However, political pressure, combined with administrative procedures that were not designed to deal with a volatile economic environment, led to long periods of "regulatory lag" that caused utilities' earned ROEs to decline in absolute terms and to fall far below the cost of equity. These factors combined to cause utility stockholders to experience huge losses: S&P's Electric Index dropped from a mid-1960s high of 60.90 to a mid-1970s low of 20.41, a decrease of 66.5%. Industrial stocks also suffered losses during this period, but, on average, they were only one third as severe as the utilities' losses. Similarly, investors in long-term bonds had losses, but bond losses were less than half those of utility stocks. Note also that, during this period, (i) bond investors were able to reinvest coupons and maturity payments at rising rates, whereas the earned returns on equity did not rise, and (ii) utilities were providing a rising share of their operating income to debtholders versus stockholders (interest expense/book value of debt was rising, while net income/common equity was declining). This led to a widespread belief that utility commissions would provide enough revenues to keep utilities from going bankrupt (barring a disaster), and hence to protect the bondholders, but that they would not necessarily provide enough revenues either to permit the expected rate of dividend growth to occur or, perhaps, even to allow the dividend to be maintained.

Because of these experiences, investors came to regard inflation as having a more negative effect on utility stocks than on bonds. Therefore, when fears of inflation increased, utilities' measured risk premiums

Exhibit 10. Relative Volatility* of Stocks and Bonds, 1965–1984



*Volatility is measured as the standard deviation of total returns over the last 5 years.
Source: Merrill Lynch, *Quantitative Analysis*, May/June 1984.

also increased. A regression over the period 1966–1979, using our Exhibit 2 data, produced this result:

$$RP = 0.30\% + 0.73\ R_F; \qquad r^2 = 0.48.$$
$$(0.22)$$

This indicates that a one percentage point increase in the Treasury bond rate produced, on average, a 0.73 percentage point increase in the risk premium, and hence a 1.00 + 0.73 = 1.73 percentage point increase in the cost of equity for utilities.

1980–1984 Period. The situation changed dramatically in 1980 and thereafter. Except for a few companies with nuclear construction problems, the utilities' financial situations stabilized in the early 1980s, and then improved significantly from 1982 to 1984. Both the companies and their regulators were learning to live with inflation; many construction programs were completed; regulatory lags were shortened; and in general the situation was much better for utility equity investors. In the meantime, over most of the 1980–1984 period, interest rates and bond prices fluctuated violently, both in an absolute sense and relative to common stocks. Exhibit 10 shows the volatility of corporate bonds very clearly. Over most of the eighteen-year period, stock returns were much more volatile than returns on bonds. However, that situation changed in October 1979, when the Fed began to focus on the money supply rather than on interest rates.[9]

In the 1980–1984 period, an increase in inflationary expectations has had a more adverse effect on bonds than on utility stocks. If the expected rate of inflation increases, then interest rates *will increase* and bond prices *will fall*. Thus, uncertainty about inflation translates directly into risk in the bond markets. The effect of inflation on stocks, including utility stocks, is less clear. If inflation increases, then utilities should, in theory, be able to obtain rate increases that would offset increases in operating costs and also compensate for the higher cost of equity. Thus, with "proper" regulation, utility stocks would provide a better hedge against unanticipated inflation than would bonds. This hedge did not work at all well during the 1966–1979 period, because inflation-induced increases in operating and capital costs were not offset by timely rate increases. However, as noted earlier, both the utilities and their regulators seem to have learned to live better with inflation during the 1980s.

Since inflation is today regarded as a major investment risk, and since utility stocks now seem to provide a better hedge against unanticipated inflation than do

[9]Because the standard deviations in Exhibit 10 are based on the last five years of data, even if bond returns stabilize, as they did beginning in 1982, their reported volatility will remain high for several more years. Thus, Exhibit 10 gives a rough indication of the current relative riskiness of stocks versus bonds, but the measure is by no means precise or necessarily indicative of future expectations.

bonds, the interest-rate risk inherent in bonds offsets, to a greater extent than was true earlier, the higher operating risk that is inherent in equities. Therefore, when inflationary fears rise, the perceived riskiness of bonds rises, helping to push up interest rates. However, since investors are today less concerned about inflation's impact on utility stocks than on bonds, the utilities' cost of equity does not rise as much as that of debt, so the observed risk premium tends to fall.

For the 1980–1984 period, we found the following relationship (see Exhibit 6):

$$RP = 12.53\% - \underset{(0.05)}{0.63}\, R_F; \qquad r^2 = 0.73.$$

Thus, a one percentage point increase in the T-bond rate, on average, caused the risk premium to fall by 0.63%, and hence it led to a 1.00 − 0.63 = 0.37 percentage point increase in the cost of equity to an average utility. This contrasts sharply with the pre-1980 period, when a one percentage point increase in interest rates led, on average, to a 1.73 percentage point increase in the cost of equity.

Summary and Implications

We began by reviewing a number of earlier studies. From them, we concluded that, for cost of capital estimation purposes, risk premiums must be based on expectations, not on past realized holding period returns. Next, we noted that expectational risk premiums may be estimated either from surveys, such as the ones Charles Benore has conducted, or by use of DCF techniques. Further, we found that, although growth rates for use in the DCF model can be either developed from time-series data or obtained from security analysts, analysts' growth forecasts are more reflective of investors' views, and, hence, in our opinion are preferable for use in risk-premium studies.

Using analysts' growth rates and the DCF model, we estimated risk premiums over several different periods. From 1966 to 1984, risk premiums for both electric utilities and industrial stocks varied widely from year to year. Also, during the first half of the period, the utilities had smaller risk premiums than the industrials, but after the mid-1970s, the risk premiums for the two groups were, on average, about equal.

The effects of changing interest rates on risk premiums shifted dramatically in 1980, at least for the utilities. From 1965 through 1979, inflation generally had a more severe adverse effect on utility stocks than on bonds, and, as a result, an increase in inflationary expectations, as reflected in interest rates, caused an increase in equity risk premiums. However, in 1980 and thereafter, rising inflation and interest rates increased the perceived riskiness of bonds more than that of utility equities, so the relationship between interest rates and utility risk premiums shifted from positive to negative. Earlier, a 1.00 percentage point increase in interest rates had led, on average, to a 1.73% increase in the utilities' cost of equity, but after 1980 a 1.00 percentage point increase in the cost of debt was associated with an increase of only 0.37% in the cost of equity.

Our study also has implications for the use of the CAPM to estimate the cost of equity for utilities. The CAPM studies that we have seen typically use either Ibbotson-Sinquefield or similar historic holding period returns as the basis for estimating the market risk premium. Such usage implicitly assumes (i) that *ex post* returns data can be used to proxy *ex ante* expectations and (ii) that the market risk premium is relatively stable over time. Our analysis suggests that neither of these assumptions is correct; at least for utility stocks, *ex post* returns data do not appear to be reflective of *ex ante* expectations, and risk premiums are volatile, not stable.

Unstable risk premiums also make us question the FERC and FCC proposals to estimate a risk premium for the utilities every two years and then to add this premium to a current Treasury bond rate to determine a utility's cost of equity. Administratively, this proposal would be easy to handle, but risk premiums are simply too volatile to be left in place for two years.

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
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observed market price. Clearly, given that dividends are paid quarterly and that the observed stock price reflects the quarterly nature of dividend payments, the market-required return must recognize quarterly compounding, for the investor receives dividend checks and reinvests the proceeds on a quarterly schedule. Perforce, a stock that pays four quarterly dividends of $1.00 commands a higher price than a stock that pays a $4.00 dividend a year hence. Since investors are aware of the quarterly timing of dividend payments and since the stock price already fully reflects the quarterly payment of dividends, the DCF model used to estimate equity costs should also reflect the actual timing of quarterly dividends.

The annual DCF model inherently understates the investors' true return because it assumes that all cash flows received by investors are paid annually. By analogy, a bank rate on deposits that does not take into consideration the timing of the interest payments understates the true yield if the customer receives the interest payments more than once a year. The actual yield will exceed the stated nominal rate. Bond yield calculations are also routinely adjusted for the receipts of semi-annual interest payments. What is true for bank deposits and for bonds is equally germane to common stocks.

Most, if not all, finance textbooks discuss frequency of compounding in computing the yield on a financial security. The handbooks that accompany popular financial calculators as well as the financial functions available in popular spreadsheet programs such as Excel, used almost universally by the financial community, contain abundant directions with respect to frequency of compounding.

The quarterly DCF model assumes that the company pays dividends quarterly and that each dividend payment is constant for four consecutive quarters. There are four different possible quarterly dividend patterns, depending on the timing of the next dividend increase.[1] Figure 11-2 displays the four dividend increase scenarios.

Appendix 11-A formally derives the quarterly DCF model, which has the following form:

$$K = \frac{[d_1(1 + K)^{3/4} + d_2(1 + K)^{1/2} + d_3(1 + K)^{1/4} + d_4]}{P_0} + g \qquad (11\text{-}1)$$

where: d_1, d_2, d_3, d_4 = quarterly dividends expected over the coming year
g = expected growth in dividends
P_0 = current stock price
K = required return on equity

[1] This section is adapted from Vander Weide (2003).

Appendix A-1

Large-Capitalization Stocks: Total Return
From 1926 to 2020

Year	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Year	Jan–Dec
1926	0.0000	-0.0385	-0.0575	0.0253	0.0179	0.0457	0.0479	0.0248	0.0252	-0.0284	0.0347	0.0196	1926	0.1162
1927	-0.0193	0.0537	0.0087	0.0201	0.0607	-0.0067	0.0670	0.0515	0.0450	-0.0502	0.0721	0.0279	1927	0.3749
1928	-0.0040	-0.0125	0.1101	0.0345	0.0197	-0.0385	0.0141	0.0803	0.0259	0.0168	0.1292	0.0049	1928	0.4361
1929	0.0583	-0.0019	-0.0012	0.0176	-0.0362	0.1140	0.0471	0.1028	-0.0476	-0.1973	-0.1246	0.0282	1929	-0.0842
1930	0.0639	0.0259	0.0812	-0.0080	-0.0096	-0.1625	0.0386	0.0141	-0.1282	-0.0855	-0.0089	-0.0706	1930	-0.2490
1931	0.0502	0.1193	-0.0675	-0.0935	-0.1279	0.1421	-0.0722	0.0182	-0.2973	0.0896	-0.0798	-0.1400	1931	-0.4334
1932	-0.0271	0.0570	-0.1158	-0.1997	-0.2196	-0.0022	0.3815	0.3869	-0.0346	-0.1349	-0.0417	0.0565	1932	-0.0819
1933	0.0087	-0.1772	0.0353	0.4256	0.1683	0.1338	-0.0862	0.1206	-0.1118	-0.0855	0.1127	0.0253	1933	0.5399
1934	0.1069	-0.0322	0.0000	-0.0251	-0.0736	0.0229	-0.1132	0.0611	-0.0033	-0.0286	0.0942	-0.0010	1934	-0.0144
1935	-0.0411	-0.0341	-0.0286	0.0980	0.0409	0.0699	0.0850	0.0280	0.0256	0.0777	0.0474	0.0394	1935	0.4767
1936	0.0670	0.0224	0.0268	-0.0751	0.0545	0.0333	0.0701	0.0151	0.0031	0.0775	0.0134	-0.0029	1936	0.3392
1937	0.0390	0.0191	-0.0077	-0.0809	-0.0024	-0.0504	0.1045	-0.0483	-0.1403	-0.0981	-0.0866	-0.0459	1937	-0.3503
1938	0.0152	0.0674	-0.2487	0.1447	-0.0330	0.2503	0.0744	-0.0226	0.0166	0.0776	-0.0273	0.0401	1938	0.3112
1939	-0.0674	0.0390	-0.1339	-0.0027	0.0733	-0.0612	0.1105	-0.0648	0.1673	-0.0123	-0.0398	0.0270	1939	-0.0041
1940	-0.0336	0.0133	0.0124	-0.0024	-0.2289	0.0809	0.0341	0.0350	0.0123	0.0422	-0.0316	0.0009	1940	-0.0978
1941	-0.0463	-0.0060	0.0071	-0.0612	0.0183	0.0578	0.0579	0.0010	-0.0068	-0.0657	-0.0284	-0.0407	1941	-0.1159
1942	0.0161	-0.0159	-0.0652	-0.0400	0.0796	0.0221	0.0337	0.0164	0.0290	0.0678	-0.0021	0.0549	1942	0.2034
1943	0.0737	0.0583	0.0545	0.0035	0.0552	0.0223	-0.0526	0.0171	0.0263	-0.0108	-0.0654	0.0617	1943	0.2590
1944	0.0171	0.0042	0.0195	-0.0100	0.0505	0.0543	-0.0193	0.0157	-0.0008	0.0023	0.0133	0.0374	1944	0.1975
1945	0.0158	0.0683	-0.0441	0.0902	0.0195	-0.0007	-0.0180	0.0641	0.0438	0.0322	0.0396	0.0116	1945	0.3644
1946	0.0714	-0.0641	0.0480	0.0393	0.0288	-0.0370	-0.0239	-0.0674	-0.0997	-0.0060	-0.0027	0.0457	1946	-0.0807
1947	0.0255	-0.0077	-0.0149	-0.0363	0.0014	0.0554	0.0381	-0.0203	-0.0111	0.0238	-0.0175	0.0233	1947	0.0571
1948	-0.0379	-0.0388	0.0793	0.0292	0.0879	0.0054	-0.0508	0.0158	-0.0276	0.0710	-0.0961	0.0346	1948	0.0550
1949	0.0039	-0.0296	0.0328	-0.0179	-0.0258	0.0014	0.0650	0.0219	0.0263	0.0340	0.0175	0.0486	1949	0.1879
1950	0.0197	0.0199	0.0070	0.0486	0.0509	-0.0548	0.0119	0.0443	0.0592	0.0093	0.0169	0.0513	1950	0.3171
1951	0.0637	0.0157	-0.0156	0.0509	-0.0299	-0.0228	0.0711	0.0478	0.0013	-0.0103	0.0096	0.0424	1951	0.2402
1952	0.0181	-0.0282	0.0503	-0.0402	0.0343	0.0490	0.0196	-0.0071	-0.0176	0.0020	0.0571	0.0382	1952	0.1837
1953	-0.0049	-0.0106	-0.0212	-0.0237	0.0077	-0.0134	0.0273	-0.0501	0.0034	0.0540	0.0204	0.0053	1953	-0.0099
1954	0.0536	0.0111	0.0325	0.0516	0.0418	0.0031	0.0589	-0.0275	0.0851	-0.0167	0.0909	0.0534	1954	0.5262
1955	0.0197	0.0098	-0.0030	0.0396	0.0055	0.0841	0.0622	-0.0025	0.0130	-0.0284	0.0827	0.0015	1955	0.3156
1956	-0.0347	0.0413	0.0710	-0.0004	-0.0593	0.0409	0.0530	-0.0328	-0.0440	0.0066	-0.0050	0.0370	1956	0.0656

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Large-Capitalization Stocks: Total Return
From 1926 to 2020

Year	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Year	Jan–Dec*
1957	-0.0401	-0.0264	0.0215	0.0388	0.0437	0.0004	0.0131	-0.0505	-0.0602	-0.0302	0.0231	-0.0395	1957	-0.1078
1958	0.0445	-0.0141	0.0328	0.0337	0.0212	0.0279	0.0449	0.0176	0.0501	0.0270	0.0284	0.0535	1958	0.4336
1959	0.0053	0.0049	0.0020	0.0402	0.0240	-0.0022	0.0363	-0.0102	-0.0443	0.0128	0.0186	0.0292	1959	0.1196
1960	-0.0700	0.0147	-0.0123	-0.0161	0.0326	0.0211	-0.0234	0.0317	-0.0590	-0.0007	0.0465	0.0479	1960	0.0047
1961	0.0645	0.0319	0.0270	0.0051	0.0239	-0.0275	0.0342	0.0243	-0.0184	0.0298	0.0447	0.0046	1961	0.2689
1962	-0.0366	0.0209	-0.0046	-0.0607	-0.0811	-0.0803	0.0652	0.0208	-0.0465	0.0064	0.1086	0.0153	1962	-0.0873
1963	0.0506	-0.0239	0.0370	0.0500	0.0193	-0.0188	-0.0022	0.0535	-0.0097	0.0339	-0.0046	0.0262	1963	0.2280
1964	0.0283	0.0147	0.0165	0.0075	0.0162	0.0178	0.0195	-0.0118	0.0301	0.0096	0.0005	0.0056	1964	0.1648
1965	0.0345	0.0031	-0.0133	0.0356	-0.0030	-0.0473	0.0147	0.0272	0.0334	0.0289	-0.0031	0.0106	1965	0.1245
1966	0.0062	-0.0131	-0.0205	0.0220	-0.0492	-0.0146	-0.0120	-0.0725	-0.0053	0.0494	0.0095	0.0002	1966	-0.1006
1967	0.0798	0.0072	0.0409	0.0437	-0.0477	0.0190	0.0468	-0.0070	0.0342	-0.0276	0.0065	0.0278	1967	0.2398
1968	-0.0425	-0.0261	0.0110	0.0834	0.0161	0.0105	-0.0172	0.0164	0.0400	0.0087	0.0531	-0.0402	1968	0.1106
1969	-0.0068	-0.0426	0.0359	0.0229	0.0026	-0.0542	-0.0587	0.0454	-0.0236	0.0459	-0.0297	-0.0177	1969	-0.0850
1970	-0.0743	0.0558	0.0044	-0.0875	-0.0578	-0.0466	0.0769	0.0478	0.0362	-0.0083	0.0506	0.0597	1970	0.0386
1971	0.0432	0.0117	0.0394	0.0389	-0.0391	0.0033	-0.0387	0.0388	-0.0044	-0.0392	0.0002	0.0888	1971	0.1430
1972	0.0206	0.0277	0.0083	0.0068	0.0197	-0.0194	0.0048	0.0369	-0.0025	0.0118	0.0481	0.0142	1972	0.1900
1973	-0.0149	-0.0352	0.0008	-0.0383	-0.0163	-0.0040	0.0407	-0.0341	0.0427	0.0017	-0.1109	0.0198	1973	-0.1469
1974	-0.0072	-0.0007	-0.0205	-0.0359	-0.0302	-0.0113	-0.0742	-0.0864	-0.1152	0.1681	-0.0488	-0.0156	1974	-0.2647
1975	0.1272	0.0638	0.0254	0.0510	0.0477	0.0477	-0.0644	-0.0176	-0.0312	0.0653	0.0282	-0.0081	1975	0.3723
1976	0.1217	-0.0084	0.0337	-0.0078	-0.0111	0.0443	-0.0048	-0.0018	0.0258	-0.0186	-0.0041	0.0561	1976	0.2393
1977	-0.0473	-0.0182	-0.0105	0.0042	-0.0196	0.0494	-0.0124	-0.0172	0.0016	-0.0390	0.0316	0.0075	1977	-0.0716
1978	-0.0574	-0.0203	0.0294	0.0902	0.0092	-0.0138	0.0583	0.0301	-0.0032	-0.0872	0.0215	0.0196	1978	0.0657
1979	0.0443	-0.0321	0.0596	0.0063	-0.0217	0.0435	0.0134	0.0577	0.0043	-0.0640	0.0475	0.0214	1979	0.1861
1980	0.0622	-0.0001	-0.0972	0.0462	0.0515	0.0316	0.0696	0.0101	0.0294	0.0202	0.1065	-0.0302	1980	0.3250
1981	-0.0418	0.0174	0.0400	-0.0193	0.0026	-0.0063	0.0021	-0.0577	-0.0493	0.0540	0.0413	-0.0256	1981	-0.0492
1982	-0.0131	-0.0559	-0.0052	0.0452	-0.0341	-0.0150	-0.0178	0.1214	0.0125	0.1151	0.0404	0.0193	1982	0.2155
1983	0.0372	0.0229	0.0369	0.0788	-0.0087	0.0389	-0.0295	0.0150	0.0138	-0.0116	0.0211	-0.0052	1983	0.2256
1984	-0.0056	-0.0352	0.0173	0.0095	-0.0554	0.0217	-0.0124	0.1104	0.0002	0.0039	-0.0112	0.0263	1984	0.0627
1985	0.0779	0.0122	0.0007	-0.0009	0.0578	0.0157	-0.0015	-0.0085	-0.0313	0.0462	0.0686	0.0484	1985	0.3173
1986	0.0056	0.0747	0.0558	-0.0113	0.0532	0.0169	-0.0559	0.0742	-0.0827	0.0577	0.0243	-0.0255	1986	0.1867
1987	0.1347	0.0395	0.0289	-0.0089	0.0087	0.0505	0.0507	0.0373	-0.0219	-0.2154	-0.0824	0.0761	1987	0.0525

*Compound annual return

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Appendix A-1

Large-Capitalization Stocks: Total Return
From 1926 to 2020

Year	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Year	Jan–Dec*
1988	0.0421	0.0466	-0.0309	0.0111	0.0086	0.0459	-0.0038	-0.0339	0.0426	0.0278	-0.0143	0.0174	1988	0.1661
1989	0.0732	-0.0249	0.0233	0.0519	0.0405	-0.0057	0.0903	0.0195	-0.0041	-0.0232	0.0204	0.0240	1989	0.3169
1990	-0.0671	0.0129	0.0265	-0.0249	0.0975	-0.0067	-0.0032	-0.0904	-0.0487	-0.0043	0.0646	0.0279	1990	-0.0310
1991	0.0436	0.0715	0.0242	0.0024	0.0431	-0.0458	0.0466	0.0237	-0.0167	0.0134	-0.0403	0.1144	1991	0.3047
1992	-0.0186	0.0130	-0.0194	0.0294	0.0049	-0.0149	0.0409	-0.0205	0.0118	0.0035	0.0341	0.0123	1992	0.0762
1993	0.0084	0.0136	0.0211	-0.0242	0.0268	0.0029	-0.0040	0.0379	-0.0077	0.0207	-0.0095	0.0121	1993	0.1008
1994	0.0340	-0.0271	-0.0436	0.0128	0.0164	-0.0245	0.0328	0.0410	-0.0245	0.0225	-0.0364	0.0148	1994	0.0132
1995	0.0259	0.0390	0.0295	0.0294	0.0400	0.0232	0.0332	0.0025	0.0422	-0.0036	0.0439	0.0193	1995	0.3758
1996	0.0340	0.0093	0.0096	0.0147	0.0258	0.0038	-0.0442	0.0211	0.0563	0.0276	0.0756	-0.0198	1996	0.2296
1997	0.0625	0.0078	-0.0411	0.0597	0.0609	0.0448	0.0796	-0.0560	0.0548	-0.0334	0.0463	0.0172	1997	0.3336
1998	0.0111	0.0721	0.0512	0.0101	-0.0172	0.0406	-0.0106	-0.1446	0.0641	0.0813	0.0606	0.0576	1998	0.2858
1999	0.0418	-0.0311	0.0400	0.0387	-0.0236	0.0555	-0.0312	-0.0049	-0.0274	0.0633	0.0203	0.0589	1999	0.2104
2000	-0.0502	-0.0189	0.0978	-0.0301	-0.0205	0.0247	-0.0156	0.0621	-0.0528	-0.0042	-0.0788	0.0049	2000	-0.0910
2001	0.0355	-0.0912	-0.0634	0.0777	0.0067	-0.0243	-0.0098	-0.0626	-0.0808	0.0191	0.0767	0.0088	2001	-0.1189
2002	-0.0146	-0.0193	0.0376	-0.0606	-0.0074	-0.0712	-0.0780	0.0066	-0.1087	0.0880	0.0589	-0.0587	2002	-0.2210
2003	-0.0262	-0.0150	0.0097	0.0824	0.0527	0.0128	0.0176	0.0195	-0.0106	0.0566	0.0088	0.0524	2003	0.2868
2004	0.0184	0.0139	-0.0151	-0.0157	0.0137	0.0194	-0.0331	0.0040	0.0108	0.0153	0.0405	0.0340	2004	0.1088
2005	-0.0244	0.0210	-0.0177	-0.0190	0.0318	0.0014	0.0372	-0.0091	0.0081	-0.0167	0.0378	0.0003	2005	0.0491
2006	0.0265	0.0027	0.0124	0.0134	-0.0288	0.0014	0.0062	0.0238	0.0258	0.0326	0.0190	0.0140	2006	0.1579
2007	0.0151	-0.0196	0.0112	0.0443	0.0349	-0.0166	-0.0310	0.0150	0.0374	0.0159	-0.0418	-0.0069	2007	0.0549
2008	-0.0600	-0.0325	-0.0043	0.0487	0.0130	-0.0843	-0.0084	0.0145	-0.0891	-0.1679	-0.0718	0.0106	2008	-0.3700
2009	-0.0843	-0.1065	0.0876	0.0957	0.0559	0.0020	0.0756	0.0361	0.0373	-0.0186	0.0600	0.0193	2009	0.2646
2010	-0.0360	0.0310	0.0603	0.0158	-0.0799	-0.0523	0.0701	-0.0451	0.0892	0.0380	0.0001	0.0668	2010	0.1506
2011	0.0237	0.0343	0.0004	0.0296	-0.0113	-0.0167	-0.0203	-0.0543	-0.0703	0.1093	-0.0022	0.0102	2011	0.0211
2012	0.0448	0.0432	0.0329	-0.0063	-0.0601	0.0412	0.0139	0.0225	0.0258	-0.0185	0.0058	0.0091	2012	0.1600
2013	0.0518	0.0136	0.0375	0.0193	0.0234	-0.0134	0.0509	-0.0290	0.0314	0.0460	0.0305	0.0253	2013	0.3239
2014	-0.0346	0.0457	0.0084	0.0074	0.0235	0.0207	-0.0138	0.0400	-0.0140	0.0244	0.0269	-0.0025	2014	0.1369
2015	-0.0300	0.0575	-0.0158	0.0096	0.0129	-0.0194	0.0210	-0.0603	-0.0247	0.0844	0.0030	-0.0158	2015	0.0138
2016	-0.0496	-0.0013	0.0678	0.0039	0.0180	0.0026	0.0369	0.0014	0.0002	-0.0182	0.0370	0.0198	2016	0.1196
2017	0.0190	0.0397	0.0012	0.0103	0.0141	0.0062	0.0206	0.0031	0.0206	0.0233	0.0307	0.0111	2017	0.2183
2018	0.0573	-0.0369	-0.0254	0.0038	0.0241	0.0062	0.0372	0.0326	0.0057	-0.0684	0.0204	-0.0903	2018	-0.0438
2019	0.0801	0.0321	0.0194	0.0405	-0.0635	0.0705	0.0144	-0.0158	0.0187	0.0217	0.0363	0.0302	2019	0.3149
2020	-0.0004	-0.0823	-0.1235	0.1282	0.0476	0.0199	0.0564	0.0719	-0.0380	-0.0266	0.1095	0.0384	2020	0.1840

*Compound annual return

Appendix A-7

Long-term Government Bonds: Income Returns
From 1926 to 2020

Year	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Year	Jan–Dec*
1926	0.0031	0.0028	0.0032	0.0030	0.0028	0.0033	0.0031	0.0031	0.0030	0.0030	0.0031	0.0030	1926	0.0373
1927	0.0030	0.0027	0.0029	0.0027	0.0028	0.0027	0.0027	0.0029	0.0027	0.0028	0.0027	0.0027	1927	0.0341
1928	0.0027	0.0025	0.0027	0.0026	0.0027	0.0027	0.0027	0.0029	0.0027	0.0030	0.0027	0.0029	1928	0.0322
1929	0.0029	0.0027	0.0028	0.0034	0.0030	0.0029	0.0032	0.0030	0.0032	0.0031	0.0026	0.0031	1929	0.0347
1930	0.0029	0.0026	0.0029	0.0027	0.0027	0.0029	0.0028	0.0026	0.0029	0.0027	0.0026	0.0028	1930	0.0332
1931	0.0028	0.0026	0.0029	0.0027	0.0026	0.0028	0.0027	0.0027	0.0027	0.0029	0.0031	0.0032	1931	0.0333
1932	0.0032	0.0032	0.0031	0.0030	0.0028	0.0028	0.0028	0.0028	0.0026	0.0027	0.0026	0.0027	1932	0.0369
1933	0.0027	0.0023	0.0027	0.0025	0.0028	0.0025	0.0026	0.0026	0.0025	0.0026	0.0025	0.0028	1933	0.0312
1934	0.0029	0.0024	0.0027	0.0025	0.0025	0.0024	0.0024	0.0024	0.0023	0.0027	0.0025	0.0025	1934	0.0318
1935	0.0025	0.0021	0.0022	0.0023	0.0023	0.0022	0.0024	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0024	0.0024	1935	0.0281
1936	0.0024	0.0023	0.0024	0.0022	0.0022	0.0024	0.0023	0.0023	0.0021	0.0023	0.0022	0.0022	1936	0.0277
1937	0.0021	0.0020	0.0022	0.0023	0.0022	0.0025	0.0024	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0024	0.0023	1937	0.0266
1938	0.0023	0.0021	0.0023	0.0022	0.0022	0.0021	0.0021	0.0022	0.0021	0.0022	0.0021	0.0022	1938	0.0264
1939	0.0021	0.0019	0.0021	0.0019	0.0020	0.0018	0.0019	0.0018	0.0019	0.0023	0.0020	0.0019	1939	0.0240
1940	0.0020	0.0018	0.0019	0.0018	0.0019	0.0019	0.0020	0.0019	0.0018	0.0018	0.0018	0.0017	1940	0.0223
1941	0.0016	0.0016	0.0018	0.0017	0.0017	0.0016	0.0016	0.0016	0.0016	0.0016	0.0014	0.0016	1941	0.0194
1942	0.0021	0.0019	0.0021	0.0020	0.0019	0.0021	0.0021	0.0021	0.0020	0.0021	0.0020	0.0021	1942	0.0246
1943	0.0020	0.0019	0.0021	0.0020	0.0019	0.0021	0.0021	0.0021	0.0020	0.0020	0.0021	0.0021	1943	0.0244
1944	0.0021	0.0020	0.0021	0.0020	0.0022	0.0020	0.0021	0.0021	0.0020	0.0021	0.0020	0.0020	1944	0.0246
1945	0.0021	0.0018	0.0020	0.0019	0.0019	0.0019	0.0018	0.0019	0.0018	0.0019	0.0018	0.0018	1945	0.0234
1946	0.0017	0.0015	0.0016	0.0017	0.0018	0.0016	0.0019	0.0017	0.0018	0.0019	0.0018	0.0019	1946	0.0204
1947	0.0018	0.0016	0.0018	0.0017	0.0017	0.0019	0.0018	0.0017	0.0018	0.0018	0.0017	0.0021	1947	0.0213
1948	0.0020	0.0019	0.0022	0.0020	0.0018	0.0021	0.0019	0.0021	0.0020	0.0019	0.0021	0.0020	1948	0.0240
1949	0.0020	0.0018	0.0019	0.0018	0.0020	0.0019	0.0017	0.0019	0.0017	0.0018	0.0017	0.0017	1949	0.0225
1950	0.0018	0.0016	0.0018	0.0016	0.0019	0.0017	0.0018	0.0018	0.0017	0.0019	0.0018	0.0018	1950	0.0212
1951	0.0020	0.0017	0.0019	0.0020	0.0021	0.0020	0.0023	0.0021	0.0019	0.0023	0.0021	0.0022	1951	0.0238
1952	0.0023	0.0021	0.0023	0.0022	0.0020	0.0022	0.0022	0.0021	0.0023	0.0023	0.0021	0.0024	1952	0.0266
1953	0.0023	0.0021	0.0025	0.0024	0.0024	0.0027	0.0025	0.0025	0.0025	0.0023	0.0024	0.0024	1953	0.0284
1954	0.0023	0.0022	0.0025	0.0022	0.0020	0.0025	0.0022	0.0023	0.0022	0.0021	0.0023	0.0023	1954	0.0279
1955	0.0022	0.0022	0.0024	0.0022	0.0025	0.0023	0.0023	0.0027	0.0024	0.0025	0.0024	0.0024	1955	0.0275
1956	0.0025	0.0023	0.0023	0.0026	0.0026	0.0023	0.0026	0.0026	0.0025	0.0029	0.0027	0.0028	1956	0.0299

*Compound annual return

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Appendix A-7

Long-term Government Bonds: Income Returns
From 1926 to 2020

Year	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Year	Jan–Dec*
1957	0.0029	0.0025	0.0026	0.0029	0.0029	0.0025	0.0033	0.0030	0.0031	0.0031	0.0029	0.0029	1957	0.0344
1958	0.0027	0.0025	0.0027	0.0026	0.0024	0.0027	0.0027	0.0027	0.0032	0.0032	0.0028	0.0033	1958	0.0327
1959	0.0031	0.0031	0.0035	0.0033	0.0033	0.0036	0.0035	0.0035	0.0034	0.0035	0.0035	0.0036	1959	0.0401
1960	0.0035	0.0037	0.0036	0.0032	0.0037	0.0034	0.0032	0.0034	0.0032	0.0033	0.0032	0.0033	1960	0.0426
1961	0.0033	0.0030	0.0031	0.0031	0.0034	0.0032	0.0033	0.0033	0.0032	0.0034	0.0032	0.0031	1961	0.0383
1962	0.0037	0.0032	0.0033	0.0033	0.0032	0.0030	0.0034	0.0034	0.0030	0.0035	0.0031	0.0032	1962	0.0400
1963	0.0032	0.0029	0.0031	0.0034	0.0033	0.0030	0.0036	0.0033	0.0034	0.0034	0.0032	0.0036	1963	0.0389
1964	0.0035	0.0032	0.0037	0.0035	0.0032	0.0038	0.0035	0.0035	0.0034	0.0034	0.0035	0.0035	1964	0.0415
1965	0.0033	0.0032	0.0038	0.0033	0.0033	0.0038	0.0034	0.0037	0.0035	0.0034	0.0037	0.0037	1965	0.0419
1966	0.0038	0.0034	0.0040	0.0036	0.0041	0.0039	0.0038	0.0043	0.0041	0.0040	0.0038	0.0039	1966	0.0449
1967	0.0040	0.0034	0.0039	0.0035	0.0043	0.0039	0.0043	0.0042	0.0040	0.0045	0.0045	0.0044	1967	0.0459
1968	0.0050	0.0042	0.0043	0.0049	0.0046	0.0042	0.0048	0.0042	0.0044	0.0045	0.0043	0.0049	1968	0.0550
1969	0.0050	0.0046	0.0047	0.0055	0.0047	0.0055	0.0052	0.0048	0.0055	0.0057	0.0049	0.0060	1969	0.0595
1970	0.0056	0.0052	0.0056	0.0054	0.0055	0.0064	0.0059	0.0057	0.0056	0.0055	0.0058	0.0053	1970	0.0674
1971	0.0051	0.0046	0.0056	0.0048	0.0047	0.0056	0.0052	0.0055	0.0050	0.0047	0.0051	0.0050	1971	0.0632
1972	0.0050	0.0047	0.0049	0.0048	0.0055	0.0049	0.0051	0.0049	0.0047	0.0052	0.0048	0.0045	1972	0.0587
1973	0.0054	0.0051	0.0056	0.0057	0.0058	0.0055	0.0061	0.0062	0.0055	0.0063	0.0056	0.0060	1973	0.0651
1974	0.0061	0.0055	0.0059	0.0068	0.0068	0.0061	0.0072	0.0065	0.0071	0.0070	0.0062	0.0067	1974	0.0727
1975	0.0068	0.0060	0.0066	0.0067	0.0067	0.0070	0.0068	0.0065	0.0073	0.0072	0.0061	0.0075	1975	0.0799
1976	0.0065	0.0061	0.0071	0.0064	0.0059	0.0073	0.0065	0.0069	0.0064	0.0061	0.0066	0.0063	1976	0.0789
1977	0.0059	0.0057	0.0065	0.0061	0.0067	0.0062	0.0059	0.0067	0.0061	0.0063	0.0063	0.0062	1977	0.0714
1978	0.0069	0.0060	0.0069	0.0063	0.0075	0.0069	0.0073	0.0070	0.0065	0.0073	0.0071	0.0068	1978	0.0790
1979	0.0079	0.0065	0.0074	0.0076	0.0077	0.0071	0.0076	0.0073	0.0068	0.0082	0.0083	0.0083	1979	0.0886
1980	0.0083	0.0084	0.0099	0.0100	0.0087	0.0086	0.0084	0.0081	0.0097	0.0097	0.0091	0.0108	1980	0.0997
1981	0.0094	0.0088	0.0111	0.0101	0.0104	0.0109	0.0109	0.0110	0.0114	0.0117	0.0113	0.0100	1981	0.1155
1982	0.0108	0.0103	0.0124	0.0112	0.0101	0.0120	0.0114	0.0112	0.0100	0.0091	0.0095	0.0093	1982	0.1350
1983	0.0087	0.0081	0.0089	0.0085	0.0091	0.0090	0.0088	0.0103	0.0096	0.0095	0.0094	0.0094	1983	0.1038
1984	0.0103	0.0092	0.0098	0.0104	0.0103	0.0106	0.0116	0.0106	0.0094	0.0108	0.0091	0.0098	1984	0.1174
1985	0.0096	0.0082	0.0094	0.0102	0.0097	0.0080	0.0094	0.0085	0.0088	0.0089	0.0081	0.0086	1985	0.1125
1986	0.0079	0.0073	0.0071	0.0063	0.0062	0.0070	0.0066	0.0063	0.0065	0.0069	0.0059	0.0070	1986	0.0898
1987	0.0064	0.0059	0.0066	0.0065	0.0066	0.0075	0.0073	0.0075	0.0075	0.0079	0.0075	0.0078	1987	0.0792

*Compound annual return

Appendix A-7

Long-term Government Bonds: Income Returns
From 1926 to 2020

Year	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Year	Jan–Dec*
1988	0.0072	0.0071	0.0072	0.0070	0.0078	0.0076	0.0071	0.0083	0.0076	0.0076	0.0070	0.0075	1988	0.0897
1989	0.0080	0.0069	0.0079	0.0070	0.0080	0.0070	0.0068	0.0066	0.0065	0.0072	0.0064	0.0064	1989	0.0881
1990	0.0073	0.0066	0.0071	0.0075	0.0075	0.0068	0.0074	0.0071	0.0069	0.0081	0.0071	0.0072	1990	0.0819
1991	0.0071	0.0064	0.0064	0.0076	0.0068	0.0063	0.0076	0.0068	0.0068	0.0065	0.0060	0.0068	1991	0.0822
1992	0.0061	0.0059	0.0067	0.0065	0.0061	0.0067	0.0063	0.0060	0.0058	0.0057	0.0061	0.0063	1992	0.0726
1993	0.0059	0.0055	0.0063	0.0057	0.0052	0.0062	0.0054	0.0056	0.0050	0.0049	0.0053	0.0055	1993	0.0717
1994	0.0055	0.0049	0.0058	0.0057	0.0063	0.0061	0.0060	0.0066	0.0061	0.0066	0.0064	0.0066	1994	0.0659
1995	0.0070	0.0059	0.0064	0.0058	0.0065	0.0054	0.0056	0.0057	0.0052	0.0057	0.0051	0.0049	1995	0.0760
1996	0.0054	0.0048	0.0052	0.0059	0.0058	0.0054	0.0062	0.0057	0.0060	0.0058	0.0052	0.0056	1996	0.0618
1997	0.0056	0.0051	0.0059	0.0059	0.0058	0.0059	0.0058	0.0049	0.0058	0.0054	0.0047	0.0054	1997	0.0664
1998	0.0048	0.0044	0.0052	0.0049	0.0048	0.0052	0.0049	0.0048	0.0044	0.0042	0.0045	0.0045	1998	0.0583
1999	0.0042	0.0040	0.0053	0.0048	0.0045	0.0055	0.0051	0.0054	0.0052	0.0050	0.0056	0.0055	1999	0.0557
2000	0.0057	0.0051	0.0054	0.0047	0.0056	0.0052	0.0052	0.0050	0.0046	0.0053	0.0048	0.0045	2000	0.0650
2001	0.0049	0.0042	0.0045	0.0047	0.0050	0.0047	0.0052	0.0046	0.0041	0.0048	0.0041	0.0046	2001	0.0553
2002	0.0048	0.0043	0.0043	0.0054	0.0049	0.0044	0.0051	0.0044	0.0042	0.0040	0.0040	0.0045	2002	0.0559
2003	0.0041	0.0038	0.0040	0.0040	0.0039	0.0036	0.0038	0.0042	0.0046	0.0041	0.0039	0.0047	2003	0.0480
2004	0.0042	0.0038	0.0043	0.0039	0.0040	0.0048	0.0043	0.0045	0.0040	0.0038	0.0041	0.0043	2004	0.0502
2005	0.0041	0.0035	0.0041	0.0039	0.0040	0.0036	0.0034	0.0040	0.0035	0.0039	0.0039	0.0039	2005	0.0469
2006	0.0040	0.0036	0.0039	0.0039	0.0048	0.0044	0.0045	0.0043	0.0039	0.0042	0.0039	0.0036	2006	0.0468
2007	0.0043	0.0038	0.0039	0.0042	0.0041	0.0040	0.0046	0.0042	0.0037	0.0043	0.0039	0.0037	2007	0.0486
2008	0.0040	0.0034	0.0037	0.0035	0.0037	0.0040	0.0039	0.0036	0.0039	0.0037	0.0036	0.0033	2008	0.0445
2009	0.0024	0.0030	0.0035	0.0029	0.0033	0.0038	0.0036	0.0036	0.0034	0.0033	0.0035	0.0034	2009	0.0347
2010	0.0036	0.0033	0.0040	0.0038	0.0034	0.0037	0.0031	0.0032	0.0026	0.0027	0.0032	0.0032	2010	0.0425
2011	0.0035	0.0032	0.0036	0.0034	0.0036	0.0032	0.0032	0.0034	0.0026	0.0022	0.0024	0.0022	2011	0.0382
2012	0.0021	0.0020	0.0022	0.0025	0.0023	0.0018	0.0020	0.0018	0.0017	0.0021	0.0019	0.0019	2012	0.0246
2013	0.0022	0.0022	0.0021	0.0026	0.0023	0.0024	0.0030	0.0028	0.0029	0.0029	0.0027	0.0031	2013	0.0288
2014	0.0032	0.0026	0.0029	0.0028	0.0028	0.0025	0.0027	0.0026	0.0023	0.0025	0.0023	0.0022	2014	0.0341
2015	0.0020	0.0015	0.0021	0.0019	0.0020	0.0023	0.0024	0.0022	0.0021	0.0021	0.0022	0.0022	2015	0.0247
2016	0.0021	0.0020	0.0018	0.0017	0.0020	0.0018	0.0014	0.0016	0.0015	0.0016	0.0018	0.0022	2016	0.0230
2017	0.0024	0.0021	0.0023	0.0021	0.0024	0.0021	0.0022	0.0022	0.0019	0.0022	0.0021	0.0020	2017	0.0267
2018	0.0024	0.0022	0.0024	0.0025	0.0025	0.0023	0.0025	0.0025	0.0022	0.0030	0.0028	0.0027	2018	0.0282
2019	0.0025	0.0022	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0018	0.0021	0.0019	0.0015	0.0016	0.0016	0.0018	2019	0.0255
2020	0.0020	0.0015	0.0013	0.0009	0.0009	0.0009	0.0010	0.0008	0.0000	0.0009	0.0011	0.0011	2020	0.0142

*Compound annual return

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The model is analogous to the standard CAPM, but with the return on a minimum risk portfolio that is unrelated to market returns, R_Z, replacing the risk-free rate, R_F. The model has been empirically tested by Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972), who find a flatter than predicted SML, consistent with the model and other researchers' findings. An updated version of the Black-Jensen-Scholes study is available in Brealey, Myers, and Allen (2006) and reaches similar conclusions.

The zero-beta CAPM cannot be literally employed to estimate the cost of capital, since the zero-beta portfolio is a statistical construct difficult to replicate. Attempts to estimate the model are formally equivalent to estimating the constants, a and b, in Equation 6-2. A practical alternative is to employ the Empirical CAPM, to which we now turn.

6.3 Empirical CAPM

As discussed in the previous section, several finance scholars have developed refined and expanded versions of the standard CAPM by relaxing the constraints imposed on the CAPM, such as dividend yield, size, and skewness effects. These enhanced CAPMs typically produce a risk-return relationship that is flatter than the CAPM prediction in keeping with the actual observed risk-return relationship. The ECAPM makes use of these empirical findings. The ECAPM estimates the cost of capital with the equation:

$$K = R_F + \acute{\alpha} + \beta \times (MRP - \acute{\alpha}) \qquad (6\text{-}5)$$

where $\acute{\alpha}$ is the "alpha" of the risk-return line, a constant, and the other symbols are defined as before. All the potential vagaries of the CAPM are telescoped into the constant $\acute{\alpha}$, which must be estimated econometrically from market data. Table 6-2 summarizes[10] the empirical evidence on the magnitude of alpha.[11]

[10] The technique is formally applied by Litzenberger, Ramaswamy, and Sosin (1980) to public utilities in order to rectify the CAPM's basic shortcomings. Not only do they summarize the criticisms of the CAPM insofar as they affect public utilities, but they also describe the econometric intricacies involved and the methods of circumventing the statistical problems. Essentially, the average monthly returns over a lengthy time period on a large cross-section of securities grouped into portfolios are related to their corresponding betas by statistical regression techniques; that is, Equation 6-5 is estimated from market data. The utility's beta value is substituted into the equation to produce the cost of equity figure. Their own results demonstrate how the standard CAPM underestimates the cost of equity capital of public utilities because of utilities' high dividend yield and return skewness.

[11] Adapted from Vilbert (2004).

TABLE 6-2
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE ALPHA FACTOR

Author	Range of alpha
Fischer (1993)	−3.6% to 3.6%
Fischer, Jensen and Scholes (1972)	−9.61% to 12.24%
Fama and McBeth (1972)	4.08% to 9.36%
Fama and French (1992)	10.08% to 13.56%
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979)	5.32% to 8.17%
Litzenberger, Ramaswamy and Sosin (1980)	1.63% to 5.04%
Pettengill, Sundaram and Mathur (1995)	4.6%
Morin (1989)	2.0%

For an alpha in the range of 1%–2% and for reasonable values of the market risk premium and the risk-free rate, Equation 6-5 reduces to the following more pragmatic form:

$$K = R_F + 0.25\ (R_M - R_F) + 0.75\ \beta(R_M - R_F) \qquad (6\text{-}6)$$

Over reasonable values of the risk-free rate and the market risk premium, Equation 6-6 produces results that are indistinguishable from the ECAPM of Equation 6-5.[12]

An alpha range of 1%–2% is somewhat lower than that estimated empirically. The use of a lower value for alpha leads to a lower estimate of the cost of capital for low-beta stocks such as regulated utilities. This is because the use of a long-term risk-free rate rather than a short-term risk-free rate already incorporates some of the desired effect of using the ECAPM. That is, the

[12] Typical of the empirical evidence on the validity of the CAPM is a study by Morin (1989) who found that the relationship between the expected return on a security and beta over the period 1926–1984 was given by:

$$\text{Return} = 0.0829 + 0.0520\ \beta$$

Given that the risk-free rate over the estimation period was approximately 6% and that the market risk premium was 8% during the period of study, the intercept of the observed relationship between return and beta exceeds the risk-free rate by about 2%, or 1/4 of 8%, and that the slope of the relationship is close to 3/4 of 8%. Therefore, the empirical evidence suggests that the expected return on a security is related to its risk by the following approximation:

$$K = R_F + x(R_M - R_F) + (1 - x)\beta(R_M - R_F)$$

where x is a fraction to be determined empirically. The value of x that best explains the observed relationship Return = 0.0829 + 0.0520 β is between 0.25 and 0.30. If x = 0.25, the equation becomes:

$$K = R_F + 0.25(R_M - R_F) + 0.75\beta(R_M - R_F)$$

long-term risk-free rate version of the CAPM has a higher intercept and a flatter slope than the short-term risk-free version which has been tested. Thus, it is reasonable to apply a conservative alpha adjustment. Moreover, the lowering of the tax burden on capital gains and dividend income enacted in 2002 may have decreased the required return for taxable investors, steepening the slope of the ECAPM risk-return trade-off and bring it closer to the CAPM predicted returns.[13]

To illustrate the application of the ECAPM, assume a risk-free rate of 5%, a market risk premium of 7%, and a beta of 0.80. The Empirical CAPM equation (6-6) above yields a cost of equity estimate of 11.0% as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} K &= 5\% + 0.25\,(12\% - 5\%) + 0.75 \times 0.80\,(12\% - 5\%) \\ &= 5.0\% + 1.8\% + 4.2\% \\ &= 11.0\% \end{aligned}$$

As an alternative to specifying alpha, see Example 6-1.

Some have argued that the use of the ECAPM is inconsistent with the use of adjusted betas, such as those supplied by Value Line and Bloomberg. This is because the reason for using the ECAPM is to allow for the tendency of betas to regress toward the mean value of 1.00 over time, and, since Value Line betas are already adjusted for such trend, an ECAPM analysis results in double-counting. This argument is erroneous. Fundamentally, the ECAPM is not an adjustment, increase or decrease, in beta. This is obvious from the fact that the expected return on high beta securities is actually lower than that produced by the CAPM estimate. The ECAPM is a formal recognition that the observed risk-return tradeoff is flatter than predicted by the CAPM based on myriad empirical evidence. The ECAPM and the use of adjusted betas comprised two separate features of asset pricing. Even if a company's beta is estimated accurately, the CAPM still understates the return for low-beta stocks. Even if the ECAPM is used, the return for low-beta securities is understated if the betas are understated. Referring back to Figure 6-1, the ECAPM is a return (vertical axis) adjustment and not a beta (horizontal axis) adjustment. Both adjustments are necessary. Moreover, recall from Chapter 3 that the use of adjusted betas compensates for interest rate sensitivity of utility stocks not captured by unadjusted betas.

[13] The lowering of the tax burden on capital gains and dividend income has no impact as far as non-taxable institutional investors (pension funds, 401K, and mutual funds) are concerned, and such investors engage in very large amounts of trading on security markets. It is quite plausible that taxable retail investors are relatively inactive traders and that large non-taxable investors have a substantial influence on capital markets.

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Chapter 6
Alternative Asset Pricing Models

6.1 Empirical Validity of the CAPM

The last chapter showed that the practical difficulties of implementing the CAPM approach are surmountable. Conceptual and empirical problems remain, however.

At the conceptual level, the CAPM has been submitted to criticisms by academicians and practitioners. Contrary to the core assumption of the CAPM, investors may choose not to diversify, and bear company-specific risk if abnormal returns are expected. A substantial percentage of individual investors are indeed inadequately diversified. Short selling is somewhat restricted, in violation of CAPM assumptions. Factors other than market risk (beta) may also influence investor behavior, such as taxation, firm size, and restrictions on borrowing.

At the empirical level, there have been countless tests of the CAPM to determine to what extent security returns and betas are related in the manner predicted by the CAPM. The results of the tests support the idea that beta is related to security returns, that the risk-return tradeoff is positive, and that the relationship is linear. The contradictory finding is that the risk-return tradeoff is not as steeply sloped as predicted by the CAPM. With few exceptions, the empirical studies agree that the implied intercept term exceeds the risk-free rate and the slope term is less than predicted by the CAPM. That is, low-beta securities earn returns somewhat higher than the CAPM would predict, and high-beta securities earn less than predicted. This is shown pictorially in Figure 6-1. A CAPM-based estimate of cost of capital underestimates the return required from low-beta securities and overstates the return required from high-beta securities, based on the empirical evidence. Brealey, Myers, and Allen (2006), among many others,[1] provide recent empirical evidence very similar to the relationship depicted in Figure 6-1. This is one of the most

[1] For a summary of the empirical evidence on the CAPM, see Jensen (1972) and Ross (1978). The major empirical tests of the CAPM were published by Friend and Blume (1975), Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972), Miller and Scholes (1972), Blume and Friend (1973), Blume and Husic (1973), Fama and Macbeth (1972), Basu (1977), Reinganum (1981B), Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979), Banz (1981), Gibbons (1982), Stambaugh (1982), Shanken (1985), Black (1993), and Brealey, Myers, and Allen (2006). Evidence in the Canadian context is available in Morin (1980, 1981).

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The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Theory and Evidence

Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French

The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) of William Sharpe (1964) and John Lintner (1965) marks the birth of asset pricing theory (resulting in a Nobel Prize for Sharpe in 1990). Four decades later, the CAPM is still widely used in applications, such as estimating the cost of capital for firms and evaluating the performance of managed portfolios. It is the centerpiece of MBA investment courses. Indeed, it is often the only asset pricing model taught in these courses.[1]

The attraction of the CAPM is that it offers powerful and intuitively pleasing predictions about how to measure risk and the relation between expected return and risk. Unfortunately, the empirical record of the model is poor—poor enough to invalidate the way it is used in applications. The CAPM's empirical problems may reflect theoretical failings, the result of many simplifying assumptions. But they may also be caused by difficulties in implementing valid tests of the model. For example, the CAPM says that the risk of a stock should be measured relative to a comprehensive "market portfolio" that in principle can include not just traded financial assets, but also consumer durables, real estate and human capital. Even if we take a narrow view of the model and limit its purview to traded financial assets, is it

[1] Although every asset pricing model is a capital asset pricing model, the finance profession reserves the acronym CAPM for the specific model of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Black (1972) discussed here. Thus, throughout the paper we refer to the Sharpe-Lintner-Black model as the CAPM.

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legitimate to limit further the market portfolio to U.S. common stocks (a typical choice), or should the market be expanded to include bonds, and other financial assets, perhaps around the world? In the end, we argue that whether the model's problems reflect weaknesses in the theory or in its empirical implementation, the failure of the CAPM in empirical tests implies that most applications of the model are invalid.

We begin by outlining the logic of the CAPM, focusing on its predictions about risk and expected return. We then review the history of empirical work and what it says about shortcomings of the CAPM that pose challenges to be explained by alternative models.

The Logic of the CAPM

The CAPM builds on the model of portfolio choice developed by Harry Markowitz (1959). In Markowitz's model, an investor selects a portfolio at time $t - 1$ that produces a stochastic return at t. The model assumes investors are risk averse and, when choosing among portfolios, they care only about the mean and variance of their one-period investment return. As a result, investors choose "mean-variance-efficient" portfolios, in the sense that the portfolios 1) minimize the variance of portfolio return, given expected return, and 2) maximize expected return, given variance. Thus, the Markowitz approach is often called a "mean-variance model."

The portfolio model provides an algebraic condition on asset weights in mean-variance-efficient portfolios. The CAPM turns this algebraic statement into a testable prediction about the relation between risk and expected return by identifying a portfolio that must be efficient if asset prices are to clear the market of all assets.

Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) add two key assumptions to the Markowitz model to identify a portfolio that must be mean-variance-efficient. The first assumption is *complete agreement*: given market clearing asset prices at $t - 1$, investors agree on the joint distribution of asset returns from $t - 1$ to t. And this distribution is the true one—that is, it is the distribution from which the returns we use to test the model are drawn. The second assumption is that there is *borrowing and lending at a risk-free rate*, which is the same for all investors and does not depend on the amount borrowed or lent.

Figure 1 describes portfolio opportunities and tells the CAPM story. The horizontal axis shows portfolio risk, measured by the standard deviation of portfolio return; the vertical axis shows expected return. The curve *abc*, which is called the minimum variance frontier, traces combinations of expected return and risk for portfolios of risky assets that minimize return variance at different levels of expected return. (These portfolios do not include risk-free borrowing and lending.) The tradeoff between risk and expected return for minimum variance portfolios is apparent. For example, an investor who wants a high expected return, perhaps at point *a*, must accept high volatility. At point *T*, the investor can have an interme-

Figure 1
Investment Opportunities



diate expected return with lower volatility. If there is no risk-free borrowing or lending, only portfolios above *b* along *abc* are mean-variance-efficient, since these portfolios also maximize expected return, given their return variances.

Adding risk-free borrowing and lending turns the efficient set into a straight line. Consider a portfolio that invests the proportion x of portfolio funds in a risk-free security and $1 - x$ in some portfolio *g*. If all funds are invested in the risk-free security—that is, they are loaned at the risk-free rate of interest—the result is the point R_f in Figure 1, a portfolio with zero variance and a risk-free rate of return. Combinations of risk-free lending and positive investment in *g* plot on the straight line between R_f and *g*. Points to the right of *g* on the line represent borrowing at the risk-free rate, with the proceeds from the borrowing used to increase investment in portfolio *g*. In short, portfolios that combine risk-free lending or borrowing with some risky portfolio *g* plot along a straight line from R_f through *g* in Figure 1.[2]

[2] Formally, the return, expected return and standard deviation of return on portfolios of the risk-free asset *f* and a risky portfolio *g* vary with x, the proportion of portfolio funds invested in *f*, as

$$R_p = xR_f + (1 - x)R_g,$$

$$E(R_p) = xR_f + (1 - x)E(R_g),$$

$$\sigma(R_p) = (1 - x)\sigma(R_g),\ x \leq 1.0,$$

which together imply that the portfolios plot along the line from R_f through *g* in Figure 1.

To obtain the mean-variance-efficient portfolios available with risk-free borrowing and lending, one swings a line from R_f in Figure 1 up and to the left as far as possible, to the tangency portfolio T. We can then see that all efficient portfolios are combinations of the risk-free asset (either risk-free borrowing or lending) and a single risky tangency portfolio, T. This key result is Tobin's (1958) "separation theorem."

The punch line of the CAPM is now straightforward. With complete agreement about distributions of returns, all investors see the same opportunity set (Figure 1), and they combine the same risky tangency portfolio T with risk-free lending or borrowing. Since all investors hold the same portfolio T of risky assets, it must be the value-weight market portfolio of risky assets. Specifically, each risky asset's weight in the tangency portfolio, which we now call M (for the "market"), must be the total market value of all outstanding units of the asset divided by the total market value of all risky assets. In addition, the risk-free rate must be set (along with the prices of risky assets) to clear the market for risk-free borrowing and lending.

In short, the CAPM assumptions imply that the market portfolio M must be on the minimum variance frontier if the asset market is to clear. This means that the algebraic relation that holds for any minimum variance portfolio must hold for the market portfolio. Specifically, if there are N risky assets,

$$\text{(Minimum Variance Condition for } M) \quad E(R_i) = E(R_{ZM}) + [E(R_M) - E(R_{ZM})]\beta_{iM}, \; i = 1, \ldots, N.$$

In this equation, $E(R_i)$ is the expected return on asset i, and β_{iM}, the market beta of asset i, is the covariance of its return with the market return divided by the variance of the market return,

$$\text{(Market Beta)} \quad \beta_{iM} = \frac{\text{cov}(R_i, R_M)}{\sigma^2(R_M)}.$$

The first term on the right-hand side of the minimum variance condition, $E(R_{ZM})$, is the expected return on assets that have market betas equal to zero, which means their returns are uncorrelated with the market return. The second term is a risk premium—the market beta of asset i, β_{iM}, times the premium per unit of beta; which is the expected market return, $E(R_M)$, minus $E(R_{ZM})$.

Since the market beta of asset i is also the slope in the regression of its return on the market return, a common (and correct) interpretation of beta is that it measures the sensitivity of the asset's return to variation in the market return. But there is another interpretation of beta more in line with the spirit of the portfolio model that underlies the CAPM. The risk of the market portfolio, as measured by the variance of its return (the denominator of β_{iM}), is a weighted average of the covariance risks of the assets in M (the numerators of β_{iM} for different assets).

Thus, β_{iM} is the covariance risk of asset i in M measured relative to the average covariance risk of assets, which is just the variance of the market return.[3] In economic terms, β_{iM} is proportional to the risk each dollar invested in asset i contributes to the market portfolio.

The last step in the development of the Sharpe-Lintner model is to use the assumption of risk-free borrowing and lending to nail down $E(R_{ZM})$, the expected return on zero-beta assets. A risky asset's return is uncorrelated with the market return—its beta is zero—when the average of the asset's covariances with the returns on other assets just offsets the variance of the asset's return. Such a risky asset is riskless in the market portfolio in the sense that it contributes nothing to the variance of the market return.

When there is risk-free borrowing and lending, the expected return on assets that are uncorrelated with the market return, $E(R_{ZM})$, must equal the risk-free rate, R_f. The relation between expected return and beta then becomes the familiar Sharpe-Lintner CAPM equation,

$$\text{(Sharpe-Lintner CAPM)} \quad E(R_i) = R_f + [E(R_M) - R_f)]\beta_{iM}, \; i = 1, \ldots, N.$$

In words, the expected return on any asset i is the risk-free interest rate, R_f, plus a risk premium, which is the asset's market beta, β_{iM}, times the premium per unit of beta risk, $E(R_M) - R_f$.

Unrestricted risk-free borrowing and lending is an unrealistic assumption. Fischer Black (1972) develops a version of the CAPM without risk-free borrowing or lending. He shows that the CAPM's key result—that the market portfolio is mean-variance-efficient—can be obtained by instead allowing unrestricted short sales of risky assets. In brief, back in Figure 1, if there is no risk-free asset, investors select portfolios from along the mean-variance-efficient frontier from a to b. Market clearing prices imply that when one weights the efficient portfolios chosen by investors by their (positive) shares of aggregate invested wealth, the resulting portfolio is the market portfolio. The market portfolio is thus a portfolio of the efficient portfolios chosen by investors. With unrestricted short selling of risky assets, portfolios made up of efficient portfolios are themselves efficient. Thus, the market portfolio is efficient, which means that the minimum variance condition for M given above holds, and it is the expected return-risk relation of the Black CAPM.

The relations between expected return and market beta of the Black and Sharpe-Lintner versions of the CAPM differ only in terms of what each says about $E(R_{ZM})$, the expected return on assets uncorrelated with the market. The Black version says only that $E(R_{ZM})$ must be less than the expected market return, so the

[3] Formally, if x_{iM} is the weight of asset i in the market portfolio, then the variance of the portfolio's return is

$$\sigma^2(R_M) = Cov(R_M, R_M) = Cov\left(\sum_{i=1}^{N} x_{iM}R_i, R_M\right) = \sum_{i=1}^{N} x_{iM}Cov(R_i, R_M).$$

premium for beta is positive. In contrast, in the Sharpe-Lintner version of the model, $E(R_{ZM})$ must be the risk-free interest rate, R_f, and the premium per unit of beta risk is $E(R_M) - R_f$.

The assumption that short selling is unrestricted is as unrealistic as unrestricted risk-free borrowing and lending. If there is no risk-free asset and short sales of risky assets are not allowed, mean-variance investors still choose efficient portfolios—points above *b* on the *abc* curve in Figure 1. But when there is no short selling of risky assets and no risk-free asset, the algebra of portfolio efficiency says that portfolios made up of efficient portfolios are not typically efficient. This means that the market portfolio, which is a portfolio of the efficient portfolios chosen by investors, is not typically efficient. And the CAPM relation between expected return and market beta is lost. This does not rule out predictions about expected return and betas with respect to other efficient portfolios—if theory can specify portfolios that must be efficient if the market is to clear. But so far this has proven impossible.

In short, the familiar CAPM equation relating expected asset returns to their market betas is just an application to the market portfolio of the relation between expected return and portfolio beta that holds in any mean-variance-efficient portfolio. The efficiency of the market portfolio is based on many unrealistic assumptions, including complete agreement and either unrestricted risk-free borrowing and lending or unrestricted short selling of risky assets. But all interesting models involve unrealistic simplifications, which is why they must be tested against data.

Early Empirical Tests

Tests of the CAPM are based on three implications of the relation between expected return and market beta implied by the model. First, expected returns on all assets are linearly related to their betas, and no other variable has marginal explanatory power. Second, the beta premium is positive, meaning that the expected return on the market portfolio exceeds the expected return on assets whose returns are uncorrelated with the market return. Third, in the Sharpe-Lintner version of the model, assets uncorrelated with the market have expected returns equal to the risk-free interest rate, and the beta premium is the expected market return minus the risk-free rate. Most tests of these predictions use either cross-section or time-series regressions. Both approaches date to early tests of the model.

Tests on Risk Premiums

The early cross-section regression tests focus on the Sharpe-Lintner model's predictions about the intercept and slope in the relation between expected return and market beta. The approach is to regress a cross-section of average asset returns on estimates of asset betas. The model predicts that the intercept in these regressions is the risk-free interest rate, R_f, and the coefficient on beta is the expected return on the market in excess of the risk-free rate, $E(R_M) - R_f$.

Two problems in these tests quickly became apparent. First, estimates of beta for individual assets are imprecise, creating a measurement error problem when they are used to explain average returns. Second, the regression residuals have common sources of variation, such as industry effects in average returns. Positive correlation in the residuals produces downward bias in the usual ordinary least squares estimates of the standard errors of the cross-section regression slopes.

To improve the precision of estimated betas, researchers such as Blume (1970), Friend and Blume (1970) and Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972) work with portfolios, rather than individual securities. Since expected returns and market betas combine in the same way in portfolios, if the CAPM explains security returns it also explains portfolio returns.[4] Estimates of beta for diversified portfolios are more precise than estimates for individual securities. Thus, using portfolios in cross-section regressions of average returns on betas reduces the critical errors in variables problem. Grouping, however, shrinks the range of betas and reduces statistical power. To mitigate this problem, researchers sort securities on beta when forming portfolios; the first portfolio contains securities with the lowest betas, and so on, up to the last portfolio with the highest beta assets. This sorting procedure is now standard in empirical tests.

Fama and MacBeth (1973) propose a method for addressing the inference problem caused by correlation of the residuals in cross-section regressions. Instead of estimating a single cross-section regression of average monthly returns on betas, they estimate month-by-month cross-section regressions of monthly returns on betas. The times-series means of the monthly slopes and intercepts, along with the standard errors of the means, are then used to test whether the average premium for beta is positive and whether the average return on assets uncorrelated with the market is equal to the average risk-free interest rate. In this approach, the standard errors of the average intercept and slope are determined by the month-to-month variation in the regression coefficients, which fully captures the effects of residual correlation on variation in the regression coefficients, but sidesteps the problem of actually estimating the correlations. The residual correlations are, in effect, captured via repeated sampling of the regression coefficients. This approach also becomes standard in the literature.

Jensen (1968) was the first to note that the Sharpe-Lintner version of the

[4] Formally, if x_{ip}, $i = 1, \ldots, N$, are the weights for assets in some portfolio p, the expected return and market beta for the portfolio are related to the expected returns and betas of assets as

$$E(R_p) = \sum_{i=1}^{N} x_{ip}E(R_i), \text{ and } \beta_{pM} = \sum_{i=1}^{N} x_{ip}\beta_{pM}.$$

Thus, the CAPM relation between expected return and beta,

$$E(R_i) = E(R_f) + [E(R_M) - E(R_f)]\beta_{iM},$$

holds when asset i is a portfolio, as well as when i is an individual security.

relation between expected return and market beta also implies a time-series regression test. The Sharpe-Lintner CAPM says that the expected value of an asset's excess return (the asset's return minus the risk-free interest rate, $R_{it} - R_{ft}$) is completely explained by its expected CAPM risk premium (its beta times the expected value of $R_{Mt} - R_{ft}$). This implies that "Jensen's alpha," the intercept term in the time-series regression,

$$\text{(Time-Series Regression)} \quad R_{it} - R_{ft} = \alpha_i + \beta_{iM}(R_{Mt} - R_{ft}) + \varepsilon_{it},$$

is zero for each asset.

The early tests firmly reject the Sharpe-Lintner version of the CAPM. There is a positive relation between beta and average return, but it is too "flat." Recall that, in cross-section regressions, the Sharpe-Lintner model predicts that the intercept is the risk-free rate and the coefficient on beta is the expected market return in excess of the risk-free rate, $E(R_M) - R_f$. The regressions consistently find that the intercept is greater than the average risk-free rate (typically proxied as the return on a one-month Treasury bill), and the coefficient on beta is less than the average excess market return (proxied as the average return on a portfolio of U.S. common stocks minus the Treasury bill rate). This is true in the early tests, such as Douglas (1968), Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972), Miller and Scholes (1972), Blume and Friend (1973) and Fama and MacBeth (1973), as well as in more recent cross-section regression tests, like Fama and French (1992).

The evidence that the relation between beta and average return is too flat is confirmed in time-series tests, such as Friend and Blume (1970), Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972) and Stambaugh (1982). The intercepts in time-series regressions of excess asset returns on the excess market return are positive for assets with low betas and negative for assets with high betas.

Figure 2 provides an updated example of the evidence. In December of each year, we estimate a preranking beta for every NYSE (1928–2003), AMEX (1963–2003) and NASDAQ (1972–2003) stock in the CRSP (Center for Research in Security Prices of the University of Chicago) database, using two to five years (as available) of prior monthly returns.[5] We then form ten value-weight portfolios based on these preranking betas and compute their returns for the next twelve months. We repeat this process for each year from 1928 to 2003. The result is 912 monthly returns on ten beta-sorted portfolios. Figure 2 plots each portfolio's average return against its postranking beta, estimated by regressing its monthly returns for 1928–2003 on the return on the CRSP value-weight portfolio of U.S. common stocks.

The Sharpe-Lintner CAPM predicts that the portfolios plot along a straight

[5] To be included in the sample for year t, a security must have market equity data (price times shares outstanding) for December of $t - 1$, and CRSP must classify it as ordinary common equity. Thus, we exclude securities such as American Depository Receipts (ADRs) and Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs).

Figure 2
Average Annualized Monthly Return versus Beta for Value Weight Portfolios Formed on Prior Beta, 1928–2003



line, with an intercept equal to the risk-free rate, R_f, and a slope equal to the expected excess return on the market, $E(R_M) - R_f$. We use the average one-month Treasury bill rate and the average excess CRSP market return for 1928–2003 to estimate the predicted line in Figure 2. Confirming earlier evidence, the relation between beta and average return for the ten portfolios is much flatter than the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM predicts. The returns on the low beta portfolios are too high, and the returns on the high beta portfolios are too low. For example, the predicted return on the portfolio with the lowest beta is 8.3 percent per year; the actual return is 11.1 percent. The predicted return on the portfolio with the highest beta is 16.8 percent per year; the actual is 13.7 percent.

Although the observed premium per unit of beta is lower than the Sharpe-Lintner model predicts, the relation between average return and beta in Figure 2 is roughly linear. This is consistent with the Black version of the CAPM, which predicts only that the beta premium is positive. Even this less restrictive model, however, eventually succumbs to the data.

Testing Whether Market Betas Explain Expected Returns

The Sharpe-Lintner and Black versions of the CAPM share the prediction that the market portfolio is mean-variance-efficient. This implies that differences in expected return across securities and portfolios are entirely explained by differences in market beta; other variables should add nothing to the explanation of expected return. This prediction plays a prominent role in tests of the CAPM. In the early work, the weapon of choice is cross-section regressions.

In the framework of Fama and MacBeth (1973), one simply adds predetermined explanatory variables to the month-by-month cross-section regressions of returns on beta. If all differences in expected return are explained by beta, the average slopes on the additional variables should not be reliably different from zero. Clearly, the trick in the cross-section regression approach is to choose specific additional variables likely to expose any problems of the CAPM prediction that, because the market portfolio is efficient, market betas suffice to explain expected asset returns.

For example, in Fama and MacBeth (1973) the additional variables are squared market betas (to test the prediction that the relation between expected return and beta is linear) and residual variances from regressions of returns on the market return (to test the prediction that market beta is the only measure of risk needed to explain expected returns). These variables do not add to the explanation of average returns provided by beta. Thus, the results of Fama and MacBeth (1973) are consistent with the hypothesis that their market proxy—an equal-weight portfolio of NYSE stocks—is on the minimum variance frontier.

The hypothesis that market betas completely explain expected returns can also be tested using time-series regressions. In the time-series regression described above (the excess return on asset i regressed on the excess market return), the intercept is the difference between the asset's average excess return and the excess return predicted by the Sharpe-Lintner model, that is, beta times the average excess market return. If the model holds, there is no way to group assets into portfolios whose intercepts are reliably different from zero. For example, the intercepts for a portfolio of stocks with high ratios of earnings to price and a portfolio of stocks with low earning-price ratios should both be zero. Thus, to test the hypothesis that market betas suffice to explain expected returns, one estimates the time-series regression for a set of assets (or portfolios) and then jointly tests the vector of regression intercepts against zero. The trick in this approach is to choose the left-hand-side assets (or portfolios) in a way likely to expose any shortcoming of the CAPM prediction that market betas suffice to explain expected asset returns.

In early applications, researchers use a variety of tests to determine whether the intercepts in a set of time-series regressions are all zero. The tests have the same asymptotic properties, but there is controversy about which has the best small sample properties. Gibbons, Ross and Shanken (1989) settle the debate by providing an F-test on the intercepts that has exact small-sample properties. They also show that the test has a simple economic interpretation. In effect, the test constructs a candidate for the tangency portfolio T in Figure 1 by optimally combining the market proxy and the left-hand-side assets of the time-series regressions. The estimator then tests whether the efficient set provided by the combination of this tangency portfolio and the risk-free asset is reliably superior to the one obtained by combining the risk-free asset with the market proxy alone. In other words, the Gibbons, Ross and Shanken statistic tests whether the market proxy is the tangency portfolio in the set of portfolios that can be constructed by combining the market portfolio with the specific assets used as dependent variables in the time-series regressions.

Enlightened by this insight of Gibbons, Ross and Shanken (1989), one can see a similar interpretation of the cross-section regression test of whether market betas suffice to explain expected returns. In this case, the test is whether the additional explanatory variables in a cross-section regression identify patterns in the returns on the left-hand-side assets that are not explained by the assets' market betas. This amounts to testing whether the market proxy is on the minimum variance frontier that can be constructed using the market proxy and the left-hand-side assets included in the tests.

An important lesson from this discussion is that time-series and cross-section regressions do not, strictly speaking, test the CAPM. What is literally tested is whether a specific proxy for the market portfolio (typically a portfolio of U.S. common stocks) is efficient in the set of portfolios that can be constructed from it and the left-hand-side assets used in the test. One might conclude from this that the CAPM has never been tested, and prospects for testing it are not good because 1) the set of left-hand-side assets does not include all marketable assets, and 2) data for the true market portfolio of all assets are likely beyond reach (Roll, 1977; more on this later). But this criticism can be leveled at tests of any economic model when the tests are less than exhaustive or when they use proxies for the variables called for by the model.

The bottom line from the early cross-section regression tests of the CAPM, such as Fama and MacBeth (1973), and the early time-series regression tests, like Gibbons (1982) and Stambaugh (1982), is that standard market proxies seem to be on the minimum variance frontier. That is, the central predictions of the Black version of the CAPM, that market betas suffice to explain expected returns and that the risk premium for beta is positive, seem to hold. But the more specific prediction of the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM that the premium per unit of beta is the expected market return minus the risk-free interest rate is consistently rejected.

The success of the Black version of the CAPM in early tests produced a consensus that the model is a good description of expected returns. These early results, coupled with the model's simplicity and intuitive appeal, pushed the CAPM to the forefront of finance.

Recent Tests

Starting in the late 1970s, empirical work appears that challenges even the Black version of the CAPM. Specifically, evidence mounts that much of the variation in expected return is unrelated to market beta.

The first blow is Basu's (1977) evidence that when common stocks are sorted on earnings-price ratios, future returns on high E/P stocks are higher than predicted by the CAPM. Banz (1981) documents a size effect: when stocks are sorted on market capitalization (price times shares outstanding), average returns on small stocks are higher than predicted by the CAPM. Bhandari (1988) finds that high debt-equity ratios (book value of debt over the market value of equity, a measure of leverage) are associated with returns that are too high relative to their market betas.

Finally, Statman (1980) and Rosenberg, Reid and Lanstein (1985) document that stocks with high book-to-market equity ratios (B/M, the ratio of the book value of a common stock to its market value) have high average returns that are not captured by their betas.

There is a theme in the contradictions of the CAPM summarized above. Ratios involving stock prices have information about expected returns missed by market betas. On reflection, this is not surprising. A stock's price depends not only on the expected cash flows it will provide, but also on the expected returns that discount expected cash flows back to the present. Thus, in principle, the cross-section of prices has information about the cross-section of expected returns. (A high expected return implies a high discount rate and a low price.) The cross-section of stock prices is, however, arbitrarily affected by differences in scale (or units). But with a judicious choice of scaling variable X, the ratio X/P can reveal differences in the cross-section of expected stock returns. Such ratios are thus prime candidates to expose shortcomings of asset pricing models—in the case of the CAPM, shortcomings of the prediction that market betas suffice to explain expected returns (Ball, 1978). The contradictions of the CAPM summarized above suggest that earnings-price, debt-equity and book-to-market ratios indeed play this role.

Fama and French (1992) update and synthesize the evidence on the empirical failures of the CAPM. Using the cross-section regression approach, they confirm that size, earnings-price, debt-equity and book-to-market ratios add to the explanation of expected stock returns provided by market beta. Fama and French (1996) reach the same conclusion using the time-series regression approach applied to portfolios of stocks sorted on price ratios. They also find that different price ratios have much the same information about expected returns. This is not surprising given that price is the common driving force in the price ratios, and the numerators are just scaling variables used to extract the information in price about expected returns.

Fama and French (1992) also confirm the evidence (Reinganum, 1981; Stambaugh, 1982; Lakonishok and Shapiro, 1986) that the relation between average return and beta for common stocks is even flatter after the sample periods used in the early empirical work on the CAPM. The estimate of the beta premium is, however, clouded by statistical uncertainty (a large standard error). Kothari, Shanken and Sloan (1995) try to resuscitate the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM by arguing that the weak relation between average return and beta is just a chance result. But the strong evidence that other variables capture variation in expected return missed by beta makes this argument irrelevant. If betas do not suffice to explain expected returns, the market portfolio is not efficient, and the CAPM is dead in its tracks. Evidence on the size of the market premium can neither save the model nor further doom it.

The synthesis of the evidence on the empirical problems of the CAPM provided by Fama and French (1992) serves as a catalyst, marking the point when it is generally acknowledged that the CAPM has potentially fatal problems. Research then turns to explanations.

One possibility is that the CAPM's problems are spurious, the result of data dredging—publication-hungry researchers scouring the data and unearthing contradictions that occur in specific samples as a result of chance. A standard response to this concern is to test for similar findings in other samples. Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok (1991) find a strong relation between book-to-market equity (B/M) and average return for Japanese stocks. Capaul, Rowley and Sharpe (1993) observe a similar B/M effect in four European stock markets and in Japan. Fama and French (1998) find that the price ratios that produce problems for the CAPM in U.S. data show up in the same way in the stock returns of twelve non-U.S. major markets, and they are present in emerging market returns. This evidence suggests that the contradictions of the CAPM associated with price ratios are not sample specific.

Explanations: Irrational Pricing or Risk

Among those who conclude that the empirical failures of the CAPM are fatal, two stories emerge. On one side are the behavioralists. Their view is based on evidence that stocks with high ratios of book value to market price are typically firms that have fallen on bad times, while low B/M is associated with growth firms (Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Fama and French, 1995). The behavioralists argue that sorting firms on book-to-market ratios exposes investor overreaction to good and bad times. Investors overextrapolate past performance, resulting in stock prices that are too high for growth (low B/M) firms and too low for distressed (high B/M, so-called value) firms. When the overreaction is eventually corrected, the result is high returns for value stocks and low returns for growth stocks. Proponents of this view include DeBondt and Thaler (1987), Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) and Haugen (1995).

The second story for explaining the empirical contradictions of the CAPM is that they point to the need for a more complicated asset pricing model. The CAPM is based on many unrealistic assumptions. For example, the assumption that investors care only about the mean and variance of one-period portfolio returns is extreme. It is reasonable that investors also care about how their portfolio return covaries with labor income and future investment opportunities, so a portfolio's return variance misses important dimensions of risk. If so, market beta is not a complete description of an asset's risk, and we should not be surprised to find that differences in expected return are not completely explained by differences in beta. In this view, the search should turn to asset pricing models that do a better job explaining average returns.

Merton's (1973) intertemporal capital asset pricing model (ICAPM) is a natural extension of the CAPM. The ICAPM begins with a different assumption about investor objectives. In the CAPM, investors care only about the wealth their portfolio produces at the end of the current period. In the ICAPM, investors are concerned not only with their end-of-period payoff, but also with the opportunities they will have to consume or invest the payoff. Thus, when choosing a portfolio at time $t - 1$, ICAPM investors consider how their wealth at t might vary with future *state variables,* including labor income, the prices of consumption goods and the nature of portfolio opportunities at t, and expectations about the labor income, consumption and investment opportunities to be available after t.

Like CAPM investors, ICAPM investors prefer high expected return and low return variance. But ICAPM investors are also concerned with the covariances of portfolio returns with state variables. As a result, optimal portfolios are "multifactor efficient," which means they have the largest possible expected returns, given their return variances and the covariances of their returns with the relevant state variables.

Fama (1996) shows that the ICAPM generalizes the logic of the CAPM. That is, if there is risk-free borrowing and lending or if short sales of risky assets are allowed, market clearing prices imply that the market portfolio is multifactor efficient. Moreover, multifactor efficiency implies a relation between expected return and beta risks, but it requires additional betas, along with a market beta, to explain expected returns.

An ideal implementation of the ICAPM would specify the state variables that affect expected returns. Fama and French (1993) take a more indirect approach, perhaps more in the spirit of Ross's (1976) arbitrage pricing theory. They argue that though size and book-to-market equity are not themselves state variables, the higher average returns on small stocks and high book-to-market stocks reflect unidentified state variables that produce undiversifiable risks (covariances) in returns that are not captured by the market return and are priced separately from market betas. In support of this claim, they show that the returns on the stocks of small firms covary more with one another than with returns on the stocks of large firms, and returns on high book-to-market (value) stocks covary more with one another than with returns on low book-to-market (growth) stocks. Fama and French (1995) show that there are similar size and book-to-market patterns in the covariation of fundamentals like earnings and sales.

Based on this evidence, Fama and French (1993, 1996) propose a three-factor model for expected returns,

$$\text{(Three-Factor Model)} \quad E(R_{it}) - R_{ft} = \beta_{iM}[E(R_{Mt}) - R_{ft}] + \beta_{is}E(SMB_t) + \beta_{ih}E(HML_t).$$

In this equation, SMB_t (small minus big) is the difference between the returns on diversified portfolios of small and big stocks, HML_t (high minus low) is the difference between the returns on diversified portfolios of high and low B/M stocks, and the betas are slopes in the multiple regression of $R_{it} - R_{ft}$ on $R_{Mt} - R_{ft}$, SMB_t and HML_t.

For perspective, the average value of the market premium $R_{Mt} - R_{ft}$ for 1927–2003 is 8.3 percent per year, which is 3.5 standard errors from zero. The average values of SMB_t, and HML_t are 3.6 percent and 5.0 percent per year, and they are 2.1 and 3.1 standard errors from zero. All three premiums are volatile, with annual standard deviations of 21.0 percent $(R_{Mt} - R_{ft})$, 14.6 percent (SMB_t) and 14.2 percent (HML_t) per year. Although the average values of the premiums are large, high volatility implies substantial uncertainty about the true expected premiums.

One implication of the expected return equation of the three-factor model is that the intercept α_i in the time-series regression,

$$R_{it} - R_{ft} = \alpha_i + \beta_{iM}(R_{Mt} - R_{ft}) + \beta_{is}SMB_t + \beta_{ih}HML_t + \varepsilon_{it},$$

is zero for all assets *i*. Using this criterion, Fama and French (1993, 1996) find that the model captures much of the variation in average return for portfolios formed on size, book-to-market equity and other price ratios that cause problems for the CAPM. Fama and French (1998) show that an international version of the model performs better than an international CAPM in describing average returns on portfolios formed on scaled price variables for stocks in 13 major markets.

The three-factor model is now widely used in empirical research that requires a model of expected returns. Estimates of α_i from the time-series regression above are used to calibrate how rapidly stock prices respond to new information (for example, Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). They are also used to measure the special information of portfolio managers, for example, in Carhart's (1997) study of mutual fund performance. Among practitioners like Ibbotson Associates, the model is offered as an alternative to the CAPM for estimating the cost of equity capital.

From a theoretical perspective, the main shortcoming of the three-factor model is its empirical motivation. The small-minus-big (SMB) and high-minus-low (HML) explanatory returns are not motivated by predictions about state variables of concern to investors. Instead they are brute force constructs meant to capture the patterns uncovered by previous work on how average stock returns vary with size and the book-to-market equity ratio.

But this concern is not fatal. The ICAPM does not require that the additional portfolios used along with the market portfolio to explain expected returns "mimic" the relevant state variables. In both the ICAPM and the arbitrage pricing theory, it suffices that the additional portfolios are well diversified (in the terminology of Fama, 1996, they are multifactor minimum variance) and that they are sufficiently different from the market portfolio to capture covariation in returns and variation in expected returns missed by the market portfolio. Thus, adding diversified portfolios that capture covariation in returns and variation in average returns left unexplained by the market is in the spirit of both the ICAPM and the Ross's arbitrage pricing theory.

The behavioralists are not impressed by the evidence for a risk-based explanation of the failures of the CAPM. They typically concede that the three-factor model captures covariation in returns missed by the market return and that it picks up much of the size and value effects in average returns left unexplained by the CAPM. But their view is that the average return premium associated with the model's book-to-market factor—which does the heavy lifting in the improvements to the CAPM—is itself the result of investor overreaction that happens to be correlated across firms in a way that just looks like a risk story. In short, in the behavioral view, the market tries to set CAPM prices, and violations of the CAPM are due to mispricing.

The conflict between the behavioral irrational pricing story and the rational risk story for the empirical failures of the CAPM leaves us at a timeworn impasse. Fama (1970) emphasizes that the hypothesis that prices properly reflect available information must be tested in the context of a model of expected returns, like the CAPM. Intuitively, to test whether prices are rational, one must take a stand on what the market is trying to do in setting prices—that is, what is risk and what is the relation between expected return and risk? When tests reject the CAPM, one cannot say whether the problem is its assumption that prices are rational (the behavioral view) or violations of other assumptions that are also necessary to produce the CAPM (our position).

Fortunately, for some applications, the way one uses the three-factor model does not depend on one's view about whether its average return premiums are the rational result of underlying state variable risks, the result of irrational investor behavior or sample specific results of chance. For example, when measuring the response of stock prices to new information or when evaluating the performance of managed portfolios, one wants to account for known patterns in returns and average returns for the period examined, whatever their source. Similarly, when estimating the cost of equity capital, one might be unconcerned with whether expected return premiums are rational or irrational since they are in either case part of the opportunity cost of equity capital (Stein, 1996). But the cost of capital is forward looking, so if the premiums are sample specific they are irrelevant.

The three-factor model is hardly a panacea. Its most serious problem is the momentum effect of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). Stocks that do well relative to the market over the last three to twelve months tend to continue to do well for the next few months, and stocks that do poorly continue to do poorly. This momentum effect is distinct from the value effect captured by book-to-market equity and other price ratios. Moreover, the momentum effect is left unexplained by the three-factor model, as well as by the CAPM. Following Carhart (1997), one response is to add a momentum factor (the difference between the returns on diversified portfolios of short-term winners and losers) to the three-factor model. This step is again legitimate in applications where the goal is to abstract from known patterns in average returns to uncover information-specific or manager-specific effects. But since the momentum effect is short-lived, it is largely irrelevant for estimates of the cost of equity capital.

Another strand of research points to problems in both the three-factor model and the CAPM. Frankel and Lee (1998), Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (1999), Piotroski (2000) and others show that in portfolios formed on price ratios like book-to-market equity, stocks with higher expected cash flows have higher average returns that are not captured by the three-factor model or the CAPM. The authors interpret their results as evidence that stock prices are irrational, in the sense that they do not reflect available information about expected profitability.

In truth, however, one can't tell whether the problem is bad pricing or a bad asset pricing model. A stock's price can always be expressed as the present value of expected future cash flows discounted at the expected return on the stock (Campbell and Shiller, 1989; Vuolteenaho, 2002). It follows that if two stocks have the same price, the one with higher expected cash flows must have a higher expected return. This holds true whether pricing is rational or irrational. Thus, when one observes a positive relation between expected cash flows and expected returns that is left unexplained by the CAPM or the three-factor model, one can't tell whether it is the result of irrational pricing or a misspecified asset pricing model.

The Market Proxy Problem

Roll (1977) argues that the CAPM has never been tested and probably never will be. The problem is that the market portfolio at the heart of the model is theoretically and empirically elusive. It is not theoretically clear which assets (for example, human capital) can legitimately be excluded from the market portfolio, and data availability substantially limits the assets that are included. As a result, tests of the CAPM are forced to use proxies for the market portfolio, in effect testing whether the proxies are on the minimum variance frontier. Roll argues that because the tests use proxies, not the true market portfolio, we learn nothing about the CAPM.

We are more pragmatic. The relation between expected return and market beta of the CAPM is just the minimum variance condition that holds in any efficient portfolio, applied to the market portfolio. Thus, if we can find a market proxy that is on the minimum variance frontier, it can be used to describe differences in expected returns, and we would be happy to use it for this purpose. The strong rejections of the CAPM described above, however, say that researchers have not uncovered a reasonable market proxy that is close to the minimum variance frontier. If researchers are constrained to reasonable proxies, we doubt they ever will.

Our pessimism is fueled by several empirical results. Stambaugh (1982) tests the CAPM using a range of market portfolios that include, in addition to U.S. common stocks, corporate and government bonds, preferred stocks, real estate and other consumer durables. He finds that tests of the CAPM are not sensitive to expanding the market proxy beyond common stocks, basically because the volatility of expanded market returns is dominated by the volatility of stock returns.

One need not be convinced by Stambaugh's (1982) results since his market proxies are limited to U.S. assets. If international capital markets are open and asset prices conform to an international version of the CAPM, the market portfolio should include international assets. Fama and French (1998) find, however, that betas for a global stock market portfolio cannot explain the high average returns observed around the world on stocks with high book-to-market or high earnings-price ratios.

A major problem for the CAPM is that portfolios formed by sorting stocks on price ratios produce a wide range of average returns, but the average returns are not positively related to market betas (Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Fama and French, 1996, 1998). The problem is illustrated in Figure 3, which shows average returns and betas (calculated with respect to the CRSP value-weight portfolio of NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks) for July 1963 to December 2003 for ten portfolios of U.S. stocks formed annually on sorted values of the book-to-market equity ratio (B/M).[6]

Average returns on the B/M portfolios increase almost monotonically, from 10.1 percent per year for the lowest B/M group (portfolio 1) to an impressive 16.7 percent for the highest (portfolio 10). But the positive relation between beta and average return predicted by the CAPM is notably absent. For example, the portfolio with the lowest book-to-market ratio has the highest beta but the lowest average return. The estimated beta for the portfolio with the highest book-to-market ratio and the highest average return is only 0.98. With an average annualized value of the riskfree interest rate, R_f, of 5.8 percent and an average annualized market premium, $R_M - R_f$, of 11.3 percent, the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM predicts an average return of 11.8 percent for the lowest B/M portfolio and 11.2 percent for the highest, far from the observed values, 10.1 and 16.7 percent. For the Sharpe-Lintner model to "work" on these portfolios, their market betas must change dramatically, from 1.09 to 0.78 for the lowest B/M portfolio and from 0.98 to 1.98 for the highest. We judge it unlikely that alternative proxies for the market portfolio will produce betas and a market premium that can explain the average returns on these portfolios.

It is always possible that researchers will redeem the CAPM by finding a reasonable proxy for the market portfolio that is on the minimum variance frontier. We emphasize, however, that this possibility cannot be used to justify the way the CAPM is currently applied. The problem is that applications typically use the same

[6] Stock return data are from CRSP, and book equity data are from Compustat and the Moody's Industrials, Transportation, Utilities and Financials manuals. Stocks are allocated to ten portfolios at the end of June of each year t (1963 to 2003) using the ratio of book equity for the fiscal year ending in calendar year $t - 1$, divided by market equity at the end of December of $t - 1$. Book equity is the book value of stockholders' equity, plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit (if available), minus the book value of preferred stock. Depending on availability, we use the redemption, liquidation or par value (in that order) to estimate the book value of preferred stock. Stockholders' equity is the value reported by Moody's or Compustat, if it is available. If not, we measure stockholders' equity as the book value of common equity plus the par value of preferred stock or the book value of assets minus total liabilities (in that order). The portfolios for year t include NYSE (1963–2003), AMEX (1963–2003) and NASDAQ (1972–2003) stocks with positive book equity in $t - 1$ and market equity (from CRSP) for December of $t - 1$ and June of t. The portfolios exclude securities CRSP does not classify as ordinary common equity. The breakpoints for year t use only securities that are on the NYSE in June of year t.

Figure 3

Average Annualized Monthly Return versus Beta for Value Weight Portfolios Formed on B/M, 1963–2003



market proxies, like the value-weight portfolio of U.S. stocks, that lead to rejections of the model in empirical tests. The contradictions of the CAPM observed when such proxies are used in tests of the model show up as bad estimates of expected returns in applications; for example, estimates of the cost of equity capital that are too low (relative to historical average returns) for small stocks and for stocks with high book-to-market equity ratios. In short, if a market proxy does not work in tests of the CAPM, it does not work in applications.

Conclusions

The version of the CAPM developed by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) has never been an empirical success. In the early empirical work, the Black (1972) version of the model, which can accommodate a flatter tradeoff of average return for market beta, has some success. But in the late 1970s, research begins to uncover variables like size, various price ratios and momentum that add to the explanation of average returns provided by beta. The problems are serious enough to invalidate most applications of the CAPM.

For example, finance textbooks often recommend using the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM risk-return relation to estimate the cost of equity capital. The prescription is to estimate a stock's market beta and combine it with the risk-free interest rate and the average market risk premium to produce an estimate of the cost of equity. The typical market portfolio in these exercises includes just U.S. common stocks. But empirical work, old and new, tells us that the relation between beta and average return is flatter than predicted by the Sharpe-Lintner version of the CAPM. As a result, CAPM estimates of the cost of equity for high beta stocks are too high (relative to historical average returns) and estimates for low beta stocks are too low (Friend and Blume, 1970). Similarly, if the high average returns on value stocks (with high book-to-market ratios) imply high expected returns, CAPM cost of equity estimates for such stocks are too low.[7]

The CAPM is also often used to measure the performance of mutual funds and other managed portfolios. The approach, dating to Jensen (1968), is to estimate the CAPM time-series regression for a portfolio and use the intercept (Jensen's alpha) to measure abnormal performance. The problem is that, because of the empirical failings of the CAPM, even passively managed stock portfolios produce abnormal returns if their investment strategies involve tilts toward CAPM problems (Elton, Gruber, Das and Hlavka, 1993). For example, funds that concentrate on low beta stocks, small stocks or value stocks will tend to produce positive abnormal returns relative to the predictions of the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM, even when the fund managers have no special talent for picking winners.

The CAPM, like Markowitz's (1952, 1959) portfolio model on which it is built, is nevertheless a theoretical tour de force. We continue to teach the CAPM as an introduction to the fundamental concepts of portfolio theory and asset pricing, to be built on by more complicated models like Merton's (1973) ICAPM. But we also warn students that despite its seductive simplicity, the CAPM's empirical problems probably invalidate its use in applications.

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[7] The problems are compounded by the large standard errors of estimates of the market premium and of betas for individual stocks, which probably suffice to make CAPM estimates of the cost of equity rather meaningless, even if the CAPM holds (Fama and French, 1997; Pastor and Stambaugh, 1999). For example, using the U.S. Treasury bill rate as the risk-free interest rate and the CRSP value-weight portfolio of publicly traded U.S. common stocks, the average value of the equity premium $R_{Mt} - R_{ft}$ for 1927–2003 is 8.3 percent per year, with a standard error of 2.4 percent. The two standard error range thus runs from 3.5 percent to 13.1 percent, which is sufficient to make most projects appear either profitable or unprofitable. This problem is, however, hardly special to the CAPM. For example, expected returns in all versions of Merton's (1973) ICAPM include a market beta and the expected market premium. Also, as noted earlier the expected values of the size and book-to-market premiums in the Fama-French three-factor model are also estimated with substantial error.

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An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Risk Premiums for the Electric Utility Industry

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This study examines the relationship between interest rates and utility equity risk premiums. We found that an inverse relationship exists, with the equity risk premium changing by 37 basis points for each 100 basis-point change in the 30-year Treasury bond yield. The inverse relationship is stable; however, changes in the relative risk of debt and equity securities produce shifts in the level of risk premiums, regardless of the behavior of Treasury bond yields. We also found that the equity risk premiums were consistently positive over the study period, which conforms to the basic risk/return tenet of finance.

■ Several studies published in recent years support an inverse relationship between utility equity risk premiums and interest rates during the first half of the 1980s. Our study provides a more current examination of this relationship. Our findings support the conclusion that equity risk premiums for utility stocks continue to vary inversely with interest rates. Further, the inverse relationship between interest rates and risk premiums appears stable over the sample period; however, market behavior at certain points in the sample period appears to reflect changes in the market's evaluation of the relative risk of Treasury bonds and utility stocks. For instance, significant differences in the level of the risk premium were observed during certain periods, irrespective of the level of interest rates. Considering the dynamic nature of risk premiums, we discuss how the study may be applicable for estimating the cost of equity for utilities.

Section I provides background information and a literature review. Section II describes the research methodology and the data. Section III provides the empirical results. Section IV furnishes an example to illustrate the model's usefulness. Section V furnishes conclusions.

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I. Background and Literature Review

The determination of an appropriate cost of equity is a controversial issue in utility rate proceedings. Bond yields provide a readily observable, definitive measure of the market's required return on that investment; however, such a measure is not readily available for stocks. The indefinite life and uncertainty of a firm's future earnings make it necessary to employ theoretical models to arrive at an estimate of the cost of equity. All theoretical models have strengths and weaknesses, and the focus in utility rate proceedings is often on what is wrong with a particular approach rather than what is right. However, the nebulous nature of the true cost of equity provides no definitive way to assess the superiority of one method's results over another's. Consequently, several cost of equity models are typically used to develop a final estimate.

The risk premium method is an alternative approach to the prevalent discounted cash flow (DCF) model in estimating the cost of equity. A fundamental tenet of financial theory is that riskier investments should command a higher expected return than less risky investments. The risk premium may be defined as the difference, or spread, between expected returns on alternative investments. Financial textbooks usually illustrate risk premiums based on a theoretical risk-free rate and the rate for alternative-risk investments along the security market line.

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A widespread application of the risk premium method is based on an average of the realized spreads between total returns on equity and debt investments over some historical period. A refinement of this approach is to calculate the average spread between realized equity total returns and bond yields, in order to obtain a forward-looking measure of the required return on debt. Either type of average risk premium is then added to the current cost of debt to obtain a current cost of equity estimate. The assumption implicit in such approaches is that a constant risk premium is embodied in the current cost of equity. A corollary assumption is that the constant risk premium embodied in expected returns is equal to the average of risk premiums measured from realized returns. In actuality, the time period over which past returns are measured can result in significantly different risk premiums. However, many practitioners of this method argue that if the market risk premium is constant, then it is best approximated by realized returns over very long periods of time. These factors underlie the weaknesses of an ex post risk premium approach. Still, this method has cognitive appeal due to the almost tangible dimension added by the measurement of risk premiums from observed returns. There is also great practical appeal to this approach because it is easy to implement by using readily accessible data from sources like Ibbotson Associates (1993), which provide a regularly updated and consistently available compilation of various risk premiums based on holding periods beginning in 1926.

In recent years, an alternative risk premium model has been proposed. It relies on the expected cost of equity, rather than realized returns, as the appropriate basis for measuring risk premiums. Several studies empirically support the hypothesis that risk premiums, as measured by the expected cost of equity, are not constant but, instead, vary inversely with interest rates (Brigham, Shome, and Vinson, 1985; Harris, 1986; Harris and Marston, 1992; and Shome and Smith, 1988). Generally, studies supporting an ex ante risk premium approach are based on data from as early as the mid-1960s through the mid-1980s. The measurement of the ex ante risk premium holds conceptual appeal because it is consistent with the valuation of equity investments based on *expected* returns. However, a practical concern is the reliability of a risk premium measure that must be based upon an estimate of the cost of equity obtained by some other method, such as a DCF model. If problems exist in the formulation of the model used to estimate the cost of equity, those problems are transferred to the risk premium estimate.

An ex ante risk premium study by Brigham et al. (1985) supported the existence of an inverse relationship between interest rates and utility stock risk premiums from 1980 through the first half of 1984. To determine these risk premiums, they employed a two-stage DCF model to obtain monthly cost of equity estimates for utility stocks. Risk premium measures for each month were then derived by deducting an appropriate Treasury bond yield each month. They found that, prior to 1980, the relationship between equity risk premiums and interest rates had been positive. Shome and Smith (1988) obtained similar results, finding an inverse relationship between interest rates and electric utility risk premiums that continued through 1985. Both studies discussed factors that reduced the impact of regulatory lag on utility stocks from the late 1970s into the early 1980s. Both studies concluded that reduced regulatory lag contributed to shifting the relative risk relationship between debt and utility stocks from positive to negative.

These studies were by and large an outgrowth of the market climate of the early 1980s. During that time, the risk of debt instruments rose in both an absolute sense and compared to stocks. This environment led many to conclude that the risk premium had narrowed and some to even argue it was negative.

Shome and Smith (1988) note that while stocks and bonds are both considered to be hedges against anticipated inflation, common stocks are considered to offer a partial hedge against unanticipated inflation. Therefore, during periods of greater inflation uncertainty, Smith and Shome argue that it would seem reasonable that equity risk premiums would decline as interest rates rise (see Gordon and Halpern, 1976). Stated another way, the risk and required return of the less complete hedge (i.e., debt) would increase at a relatively greater rate than the more complete hedge (i.e., equity), thereby reducing the risk premium during periods of higher uncertainty. However, Carleton, Chambers, and Lakonishok (1983) furnish empirical evidence that risk premiums for utility stocks tend to rise with inflation and interest rates if regulatory lag severely hampers earnings and prevents dividends from keeping pace with inflation.

Harris (1986) also finds an inverse relationship between interest rates and ex ante risk premium measures during the early to mid-1980s, based on utility and broader stock market indices. In a more recent study, Harris and Marston (1992) find an inverse relationship between interest rates and ex ante risk premiums for stocks in the S&P 500, based on data from 1982 to 1991. Blanchard (1993) studied real, rather than nominal, risk premiums between 1926 and 1993. Blanchard hypothesized that the persistence of relatively high risk premiums from the late 1930s through the 1940s could have been due to the market's reaction to the high stock market volatility in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Blanchard also