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June 25, 2019

PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION FILING CLERK

Hon. Meaghan Bailey Hon. Steven D. Arnold Hon. Elizabeth Drews Administrative Law Judges State Office of Administrative Hearings 300 West 15<sup>th</sup> Street Austin, Texas 78701

Re: SOAH Docket No. 473-19-3864; PUC Docket No. 49421; Application of CenterPoint Energy Houston Electric, LLC for Authority to Change Rates

Dear Judges Bailey, Arnold and Drews:

Attached please find CenterPoint Energy Houston Electric, LLC's Errata 6 in the abovereferenced proceeding. The Errata corrects the rebuttal testimony of Company witness Robert B. Hevert consistent with errors discovered this week. Please do not hesitate to contact our office if you have any questions or concerns.

Best regards,

Mark A. Santos

cc: All Parties of Record

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**CEHE Errata 6** 

**Rebuttal Testimony of Robert B. Hevert** 

emphasis applied to a particular method in a prior proceeding or under different
 market conditions is not appropriate in the current instance.

3 Regarding the Company's Cost of Equity, none of the analyses provided or 4 positions taken by the Opposing Witnesses have caused me to revise my 5 recommended range (10.00 percent to 10.75 percent), or my specific 6 recommendation (10.40 percent). For example, certain of the Opposing Witnesses support their recommendations by reference to authorized ROEs, suggesting those 7 8 returns have trended downward over time. If we consider individual cases over a 9 relevant timeframe (rather than annual averages over long periods), there is no 10 downward trend.


As to the Company's capital structure, certain of the Opposing Witnesses recommend capitalization ratios that include more leverage (that is, contain more debt) than those in place at utility operating companies. As discussed below (*see* Section IV.F), the capital structure ratios in place at the <del>at</del>-electric utility operating companies continue to support the Company's proposed capital structure of 50.00 percent Common Equity, and 50.00 percent Long-Term Debt.


#### 17 Q. PLEASE NOW PROVIDE AN OVERVIEW OF YOUR RESPONSE TO THE

18 **ROE RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY THE OPPOSING WITNESSES.** 


A. In this proceeding, certain of the Opposing Witnesses give considerable weight to
 the DCF method, even though it produces ROE estimates 275 basis points (and
 more) below the returns authorized for other electric utilities.<sup>1</sup> For example, Mr.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> For example, the low end of Ms. Winker's DCF range is 6.76 percent, which is 292 basis points below the 9.68 percent average ROE authorized for electric utilities since 2014 (excludes limited-issue riders and Illinois formula rate proceedings). *See*, Direct Testimony of Anjuli Winker, at 40.





I then extended the post-event window to December 31, 2018. Even in that case,
 with the effect of intervening events, the abnormal return remained well below zero
 (see Figure 7, below).





<sup>4</sup> 

 $<sup>\</sup>frac{45}{\text{ source: S&P Global Market Intelligence. Based on a t-test, the cumulative abnormal returns are significant.}$ 

default service obligation, or how such differences would affect capital structure
 decisions.

3	If we consider credit ratings as measures of relative risk, the ratings for the
4	distribution-only operating companies within Mr. Ordonez's proxy group are not
5	substantially different than CenterPoint Houston's (see Figure 8). By way of
6	example, Figure 8 also provides the ratings for AEP Texas Inc., and Baltimore Gas
7	and Electric Company (both of which are providers of last resort as is CenterPoint
8	Houston). Again, there is no meaningful difference between those two companies
9	and CenterPoint Houston. In large measure, that may result from distribution
10	companies' ability to recover default service costs in a "reasonably timely"
11	fashion. <sup>50</sup> In any event, the Company's credit ratings are consistent with those of
12	other distribution utilities.

Figure 8: Credit Ratings for CenterPoint Houston, AEP Texas Inc., Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, and Distribution-Only Proxy Companies<sup>51</sup>

	Moody's LT Issuer	S&P LT Issuer	Moody's Corp.	S&P Corp.	Moody's Sr. Unsecured	S&P Sr. Unsecured
CenterPoint Houston	A3	BBB+	A3	BBB+	A3	N/A
Mr. Ordonez's Distribution- Only Proxy Companies	Baa1	А-	A3	A-	A3	A-
AEP Texas Inc.	Baal	А-	Baal	A-	Baal	A-
Baltimore Gas and Electric Company	A3	Α	A3	A	A3	А

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As discussed earlier, it is the capital-intensive nature of utility operations,

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which requires continuing and efficient access to long-term capital to finance long-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> See, Moody's Investors Service, Rating Methodology, Regulated Electric and Gas Utilities, June 23, 2017, at 14.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence




Figure 28: Frequency Distribution of Capital Appreciation Returns, 1926-2018<sup>202</sup>

### 1 Q. PLEASE NOW SUMMARIZE MR. GORMAN'S REVIEW OF THE DCF

#### 2 MODEL COMPONENTS.

3 Mr. Gorman argues utility dividend yields are reasonable by reference to utility bond Α. 4 yields, and growth rates are sensible relative to historical dividend growth, and 5 expected GDP growth rates. He reasons that together, the Constant Growth DCF model components are economically logical,<sup>203</sup> and its results are reliable.<sup>204</sup> In 6 particular, Mr. Gorman suggests because the current spread between A-rated utility 7 8 bonds and utility dividend yields is comparable to the historical average, it therefore should be considered reasonable.<sup>205</sup> Mr. Gorman then compares dividend growth 9 10 projections to the average dividend growth over the last thirteen years, and earnings

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>202</sup> Duff & Phelps, <u>2019 SBBI Yearbook</u>, at A-3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>203</sup> Direct Testimony of Michael P. Gorman, at 77.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>204</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>205</sup> *Ibid.*, at 77-78.

position that the DCF model currently renders reliable estimates of the Company's
 Cost of Equity.

3 Regarding Mr. Gorman's comparison of expected and historical dividend 4 growth rates, the relevant issue is whether investors rely on either in pricing utility 5 stocks. As explained in my response to Ms. WinkerDr. Woolridge, dividend 6 growth rates have not been statistically related to utility stock valuation levels. That 7 finding is important because (as also discussed in my response to Ms. Winker), the 8 DCF method is based on the fundamental present value formula, assuming the 9 current market price is an accurate measure of long-term intrinsic value. If dividend 10 growth rates have no meaningful ability to explain market valuations, I do not 11 believe they should be relied on to conclude the DCF model currently provides 12 economically logical and reliable results.

# 13 Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE MR. GORMAN'S CONCERNS WITH YOUR 14 CAPM ANALYSIS.

A. Mr. Gorman's concerns with my CAPM analysis lie primarily with my Market Risk
Premium estimates.<sup>209</sup> In particular, Mr. Gorman argues my 13.75 percent and
17 17.14 percent projected returns on the market are "inflated."<sup>210</sup> Mr. Gorman further
argues there is a "mismatch" between my calculation of the expected market return
and the projected Treasury yields used in my CAPM analyses.<sup>211</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>209</sup> Direct Testimony of Michael P. Gorman, at 79.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>210</sup> *Ibid.*, at 81.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>211</sup> *Ibid.*, at 79.