

1 of A- from Standard & Poor's ("S&P"). The Company has a Ba1 issuer  
2 rating and a Baa2 First Mortgage Bond rating from Moody's Investors  
3 Service ("Moody's"). In light of these various ratings, to improve the  
4 group's comparability with ETI, I restricted the group to companies with  
5 investment grade bond ratings by S&P or Moody's. I also required the  
6 comparable companies to derive at least 70 percent of revenues from  
7 regulated utility sales, to have consistent financial records not affected by  
8 recent mergers or restructuring, and to have a consistent dividend record  
9 with no dividend cuts or resumptions during the past two years. The  
10 fundamental characteristics and bond ratings of the 24 companies in my  
11 comparable group are presented in Exhibit SCH-1.

12 In my risk premium analysis, I relied on current and projected triple-  
13 B utility bond interest rates. These rates are consistent with ETI's triple-B-  
14 range credit ratings. The data sources and the details of my cost of equity  
15 studies are contained in Exhibits SCH-1 through SCH-5.

16  
17 Q9. HOW IS THE REMAINDER OF YOUR TESTIMONY ORGANIZED?

18 A. The remainder of my testimony is divided into four additional sections. In  
19 Section II, I discuss ETI's organizational structure and fundamental  
20 operating characteristics. In Section III, I review general capital market  
21 costs and conditions and discuss recent developments in the electric utility  
22 industry. In Section IV, I review various methods for estimating the cost of  
23 equity, including comparable earnings methods, risk premium methods,

1 and DCF methods. In Section V, I present the details of my cost of equity  
2 studies and describe the specific results from my various models. Also in  
3 this section, I provide a summary table of my results and restate my  
4 conclusions and recommendations.

5  
6 II. ETI'S FUNDAMENTAL OPERATING FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS

7 Q10. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS SECTION OF YOUR TESTIMONY?

8 A. The purpose of this section is to describe the Company's organizational  
9 structure and discuss its fundamental operating characteristics.

10  
11 Q11. PLEASE DESCRIBE ETI'S STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION AND  
12 OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS.

13 A. ETI was formed by a December 31, 2007 jurisdictional separation of  
14 Entergy Gulf States, Inc. into two vertically integrated utility companies.  
15 ETI operates under the sole retail jurisdiction of the Public Utility  
16 Commission of Texas, while the other entity that was the product of the  
17 jurisdictional separation, Entergy Gulf States Louisiana, L.L.C., operates  
18 under the sole retail jurisdiction of the Louisiana Public Service  
19 Commission. ETI now owns all of the former Entergy Gulf States, Inc.  
20 distribution and transmission assets located in Texas, the gas-fired  
21 generating plants located in Texas, and an undivided 42.5% ownership  
22 share of the former Entergy Gulf States, Inc.'s ownership interest in  
23 Nelson 6 and Big Cajun 2, Unit 3, which are coal-fired generating plants

1 located in Louisiana. Other power plants formerly owned by Entergy Gulf  
2 States, Inc. and sited in Louisiana, including the River Bend nuclear plant  
3 and several gas plants, now are owned by Entergy Gulf States Louisiana  
4 and provide capacity and energy to ETI under life of the unit purchased  
5 power contracts. ETI also owns other assets and contract rights to the  
6 extent that such items are related to utility operations in Texas. On a book  
7 value basis, approximately 58.1% of the Entergy Gulf States, Inc. assets  
8 were allocated to Entergy Gulf States Louisiana, L.L.C. and approximately  
9 41.9% were allocated to ETI (2008 10-K at 74).

10 ETI is one of six principal utility operating subsidiaries of Entergy  
11 Corporation. For 2012, ETI provided approximately 15.4 percent of  
12 Entergy's operating revenues and comprised 9.3 percent of its assets.

13 ETI serves a diverse group of residential, commercial, industrial,  
14 and public authority customers. For 2012, ETI's retail revenues were  
15 approximately \$1.2 billion. Based on energy sales volume, residential  
16 customers accounted for 34.3 percent of total retail sales; commercial  
17 customers, 26.9 percent; industrial customers, 37.1 percent; and public  
18 authority customers, 1.7 percent. ETI's dependence on commercial and  
19 industrial revenues is important because sales to such customers may be  
20 significantly affected by changes in economic conditions or other factors  
21 beyond ETI's control.

1 Q12. HOW DOES ETI'S REQUESTED CAPITAL STRUCTURE COMPARE TO  
2 THE CAPITAL STRUCTURES OF THE COMPANIES IN YOUR  
3 INVESTMENT GRADE COMPARABLE COMPANY GROUP?

4 A. ETI's requested capital structure, containing approximately 51 percent  
5 debt, 0 percent preferred stock and 49 percent equity, is similar to the  
6 year-end 2012 average capital structure for my comparable companies.  
7 (See Exhibit SCH-1, page 1).

8

9 Q13. HOW DOES ETI'S RELIANCE ON PURCHASED POWER TO MEET ITS  
10 CAPACITY NEEDS AFFECT YOUR ROE ANALYSIS?

11 A. As explained in the testimony of Company witness Robert R. Cooper, ETI  
12 continues to place significant reliance on purchased power as a  
13 reasonable means to meet its ongoing need for capacity to reliably serve  
14 Texas retail customers. Mr. Cooper further explains how reliance on  
15 purchased power has yielded energy savings for customers, which are  
16 reflected in the over \$460 million in net purchased power energy expense  
17 incurred during the Reconciliation Period in this case (more than half of  
18 the Total Texas Jurisdictional Fuel Factor Cost), as shown in Figure  
19 MHT-1 to the testimony of Company witness Michelle H. Thiry. At the  
20 same time, ETI's per books test year capacity costs totaled approximately  
21 \$260 million, approximately 39% of its Present Base Rate Revenues.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Present Base Rate Revenues, per Schedule Q-1, total approximately \$671 million.

1 Purchased power is a very significant element of the Company's cost of  
2 serving retail customers, and is viewed as having the attributes and impact  
3 of additional debt on an electric utility's balance sheet, which increases the  
4 perceived riskiness of the utility.

5 In addition, PURA § 36.204 (2) states that "in establishing rates for  
6 an electric utility, the commission may . . . authorize additional incentives  
7 for . . . purchased power. . . ." Mr. Cooper's testimony explains that ETI  
8 has chosen to buy incremental purchased power capacity on an ongoing  
9 basis as a preferred means of meeting customer reliability needs at  
10 reasonable cost, and that ETI will continue to factor purchased capacity  
11 into its resource planning going forward. Unlike investment in the  
12 construction of owned generation, which is included in rate base and  
13 earns a return to compensate investors, purchased power capacity costs  
14 are simply pass through expenses that earn no return. While the market  
15 data discussed later in my testimony supports my recommended ROE  
16 level without factoring in ETI's commitment to purchased power, the  
17 Commission should also consider that granting an ROE no less than my  
18 recommendation will provide incentives to the Company to continue to  
19 purchase capacity when that decision is in the best interests of customers.

1 Q14. ARE THERE OTHER ETI-SPECIFIC FACTORS THAT MAY BE  
2 CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING A FAIR RETURN FOR THE  
3 COMPANY'S TEXAS OPERATIONS?

4 A. Yes, there are. Section 36.052 of the Public Utility Regulatory Act  
5 provides that in:

6 establishing a reasonable return on invested capital, the  
7 regulatory authority shall consider applicable factors,  
8 including:

- 9 (1) the efforts and achievements of the  
10 utility in conserving resources;  
11 (2) the quality of the utility's services;  
12 (3) the efficiency of the utility's operations;  
13 and  
14 (4) the quality of the utility's management.

15 In this regard, Company witnesses Shawn B. Corkran,  
16 Philip N. Sharp, and Vernon Pierce address the improvements in service  
17 quality and operational efficiency that ETI has achieved under current  
18 management for its southeast Texas customers. Given the language of  
19 PURA § 36.052, although the Company could have but has not requested  
20 an ROE adjustment based on these factors, in my opinion it is reasonable  
21 to consider the Company's quality, reliability and efficiency of service and  
22 the quality of its management as further support for adoption of a return on  
23 equity no lower than what I recommend in this case.

1           III.    MARKET FACTORS THAT AFFECT THE COST OF  
2                               EQUITY CAPITAL

3   Q15.  WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS SECTION OF YOUR TESTIMONY?

4   A.    In this section, I review recent capital market conditions and industry  
5           factors that should be reflected in the cost of capital estimate.

6  
7   Q16.  WHAT IS THE CURRENT OUTLOOK FOR THE U.S. ECONOMY?

8   A.    The U.S. economy is finally on what appears to be a sustainably  
9           improving track. The housing markets in many parts of the country have  
10          firmed up and prices are increasing. Although the stock market remains  
11          turbulent, it has largely recovered from the losses sustained during the  
12          financial crisis and consumer confidence is improving. Although  
13          unemployment remains a concern, most economists now expect the  
14          government's monetary policy to become less stimulative over the coming  
15          year.

16               In this regard, on June 19, the Fed's Federal Open Market  
17               Committee ("FOMC") issued the following policy statement indicating  
18               somewhat improved economic conditions:

19               Information received since the Federal Open Market  
20               Committee met in May suggests that economic activity has  
21               been expanding at a moderate pace. **Labor market**  
22               **conditions have shown further improvement in recent**  
23               **months, on balance, but the unemployment rate remains**  
24               **elevated. Household spending and business fixed**  
25               **investment advanced, and the housing sector has**  
26               **strengthened further,** but fiscal policy is restraining  
27               economic growth. Partly reflecting transitory influences,  
28               inflation has been running below the Committee's longer-run

1 objective, but longer-term inflation expectations have  
2 remained stable.

3 Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks  
4 to foster maximum employment and price stability. The  
5 Committee expects that, with appropriate policy  
6 accommodation, economic growth will proceed at a  
7 moderate pace and the unemployment rate will gradually  
8 decline toward levels the Committee judges consistent with  
9 its dual mandate. **The Committee sees the downside**  
10 **risks to the outlook for the economy and the labor**  
11 **market as having diminished since the fall.** The  
12 Committee also anticipates that inflation over the medium  
13 term likely will run at or below its 2 percent objective.

14 The Committee will closely monitor incoming information on  
15 economic and financial developments in coming months.  
16 The Committee will continue its purchases of Treasury and  
17 agency mortgage-backed securities, and employ its other  
18 policy tools as appropriate, until the outlook for the labor  
19 market has improved substantially in a context of price  
20 stability. The Committee is prepared to increase or reduce  
21 the pace of its purchases to maintain appropriate policy  
22 accommodation as the outlook for the labor market or  
23 inflation changes. In determining the size, pace, and  
24 composition of its asset purchases, the Committee will  
25 continue to take appropriate account of the likely efficacy  
26 and costs of such purchases as well as the extent of  
27 progress toward its economic objectives. (FOMC Press  
28 Release, [www.federalreserve.gov](http://www.federalreserve.gov), June 19, 2013, emphasis  
29 added.)

30 As noted in the highlighted portions of the announcement, in its June 19  
31 comments, the FOMC recognized the economy's improving conditions.  
32 This slightly changed stance from the FOMC has led to expectations for  
33 less accommodative monetary policy, which, in turn, have led to significant  
34 increases in long-term interest rates.



1 Q17. WHAT IS THE CONNECTION BETWEEN FOMC MONETARY POLICY  
2 AND THE CHANGES IN INTEREST RATES?

3 A. Over the past two years, the FOMC has attempted to stimulate the  
4 economy by various monetary policy methods. Recently, the most widely  
5 discussed of those methods have been programs called "Quantitative  
6 Easing 3" ("QE3") and "Operation Twist." Under the QE3 program, the  
7 FOMC has directed the purchase of \$85 billion per month of long-term  
8 mortgage back securities and other long-term U.S. Government  
9 instruments, thus pushing down the yields on those securities. Through  
10 Operation Twist, the Fed has effectively used the issuance of short-term  
11 U.S. Treasury bills to repurchase longer-term U.S. Treasury bonds, thus  
12 again holding down yields in the longer-term markets. As noted above, in  
13 its June 19, 2013 press release, the FOMC indicated the improving  
14 economic conditions might lead to tapering off of its stimulus programs.  
15 That announcement, therefore, led to the jump in interest rates that has  
16 occurred.

17

18 Q18. WHAT HAS BEEN THE EXPERIENCE IN THE U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS  
19 FOR THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS?

20 A. In Exhibit SCH-2, page 1, I provide a 10-year review of annual interest  
21 rates and rates of inflation. During this time period, interest rates and  
22 inflation generally have been lower than in the previous decade. Inflation  
23 in this time period, as measured by the Consumer Price Index ("CPI"),

1           fluctuated between a low of zero percent (in 2008) and a high of  
2           4.1 percent (caused by the spike in energy costs that occurred in 2007).  
3           The decade's average annual inflation rate (2.4 percent) was 100 basis  
4           points lower than the longer-term average rate of the past 60 years (see  
5           Exhibit SCH-3). Interest rates declined steadily over most of the period,  
6           with the 2012 average utility interest rate at its lowest level for more than  
7           30 years (see Exhibit SCH-5, page 1).

8

9   Q19. WHAT HAS THE MORE RECENT TREND IN UTILITY BORROWING  
10       COSTS BEEN?

11   A.   In Exhibit SCH-2, page 2, I provide the month-by-month interest rate data  
12       since mid-2010. The most recent two years of those data are summarized  
13       below in Table 1.

**Table 1**  
**Long-Term Interest Rate Trends**

<b>Month</b>	<b>Triple-B Utility Rate</b>	<b>30-Year Treasury Rate</b>	<b>Triple-B Utility Spread</b>
Aug-11	5.22	3.65	1.57
Sep-11	5.11	3.18	1.93
Oct-11	5.24	3.13	2.11
Nov-11	4.93	3.02	1.91
Dec-11	5.07	2.98	2.09
Jan-12	5.06	3.03	2.03
Feb-12	5.02	3.11	1.91
Mar-12	5.13	3.28	1.85
Apr-12	5.11	3.18	1.93
May-12	4.97	2.93	2.04
Jun-12	4.91	2.70	2.21
Jul-12	4.85	2.59	2.26
Aug-12	4.88	2.77	2.11
Sep-12	4.81	2.88	1.93
Oct-12	4.54	2.90	1.64
Nov-12	4.42	2.80	1.62
Dec-12	4.56	2.88	1.68
Jan-13	4.66	3.08	1.58
Feb-13	4.74	3.17	1.57
Mar-13	4.72	3.16	1.56
Apr-13	4.49	2.93	1.56
May-13	4.65	3.11	1.54
Jun-13	5.08	3.40	1.68
Jul-13	5.21	3.61	1.60
3-Mo Avg	<b>4.98</b>	<b>3.37</b>	<b>1.61</b>
12-Mo Avg	<b>4.73</b>	<b>3.06</b>	<b>1.67</b>

Sources: Mergent Bond Record; www.federalreserve.gov.

Three month average is for May-July 2013.

Twelve month average is for August 2012-July 2013.

- 1 The data in Table 1 partially reflect the increase in interest rates that has
- 2 occurred since the June 19 FOMC announcement, with the July 2013
- 3 average rates near the highest levels during the past two years.

1 Q20. HAVE LONG-TERM INTEREST RATES MOVED UP FURTHER  
2 RELATIVE TO THE JULY 2013 AVERAGES?

3 A. Yes. The June and July average rates contain about three weeks of data  
4 in June from before the FOMC announcement. Although a changed Fed  
5 posture had been partially anticipated, with interest rates firming up  
6 slightly in May, the June 19 announcement caused a sharper jump. While  
7 I normally rely on the monthly averages and generally base my analysis  
8 on three-month averages to smooth out random fluctuations, when a  
9 significant policy shift occurs, I believe near-term rates should be  
10 considered as well. Therefore, in Table 2, I provide the daily yields for the  
11 30-year and 10-year Treasuries and for long-term single-A corporate and  
12 utility bonds for August 1 forward. In my risk premium analysis, presented  
13 later, I also use the more recent August data to illustrate the effect of  
14 higher interest rates on current ROE estimates.

**Table 2**  
**August 2013 Interest Rates**

	30- Year Treasury	10- Year Treasury	Baa Corporate	Baa Utility
8/1/2013	3.77	2.74	5.40	5.27
8/2/2013	3.69	2.63	5.31	5.18
8/5/2013	3.73	2.67	5.31	5.18
8/6/2013	3.73	2.67	5.37	5.24
8/7/2013	3.68	2.61	5.36	5.23
8/8/2013	3.65	2.58	5.33	5.19
8/9/2013	3.63	2.57	5.31	5.17
8/12/2013	3.67	2.61	5.33	5.20
8/13/2013	3.75	2.71	5.43	5.30
8/14/2013	3.75	2.71	5.43	5.30
8/15/2013	3.81	2.77	5.47	5.33
8/16/2013	3.86	2.84	5.54	5.39
8/19/2013	3.89	2.88	5.58	5.43

Sources: [www.federalreserve.gov](http://www.federalreserve.gov), H-15 Series.  
Moody's (Mergent) Bond Record.

1 Q21. WHAT DO INTEREST RATE FORECASTS SHOW FOR THE COMING  
2 YEAR?

3 A. Interest rates are expected to rise further. In Exhibit SCH-2, page 3, I  
4 provide the forward Bloomberg curve for Treasury yields through  
5 December 31, 2015. These forecasts reflect the significant expected  
6 increase in interest rates. These data are summarized in Table 3 below.

**Table 3**  
**Interest Rate Forecast**

	July 2013	Dec 2014E
1-Yr. Treasuries	0.1%	0.9%
10-Yr. Treasuries	2.6%	3.4%
30-Yr. Treasuries	3.6%	4.2%

Source: [www.federalreserve.gov](http://www.federalreserve.gov) (July rates). Projected rates are from the Bloomberg Active Treasuries curve, August 19, 2013, shown in Exhibit SCH-2, page 3.

1 Q22. HOW DO THESE TRENDS AFFECT THE COST OF EQUITY FOR  
2 UTILITIES SUCH AS ETI?

3 A. There are at least two effects. First, with the tapering off of the Fed's  
4 stimulative monetary policy, which has artificially depressed market  
5 interest rates over the past two years, more normal market supply and  
6 demand conditions should begin to prevail. As this happens, the costs of  
7 both debt and equity should move more in parallel relative to  
8 disequilibrium conditions between debt and equity costs that have existed  
9 while the government's debt market intervention has occurred. As  
10 economic conditions improve and as market-driven, higher interests  
11 prevail, the reliability of cost of equity estimates from the traditional cost of  
12 equity models should improve.

13

14 Q23. WHAT IS THE UTILITY INDUSTRY'S CURRENT FUNDAMENTAL  
15 POSITION?

16 A. The industry has seen significant volatility both in terms of fundamental  
17 operating characteristics and the effects of the economy. Slow economic  
18 growth has reduced sales volumes and uncertain environmental rules  
19 have both increased the difficulty of planning for future load requirements.  
20 Value Line provides a warning of possible overvaluation in its recent  
21 Electric Utility update.

1 **Value Line Investor Survey**

2 [M]ost electric utility issues are up solidly year to date, and  
3 are still trading within their 2016-2018 Target Price Ranges.  
4 Historically, this is an indication that these equities are  
5 expensively priced. Income-oriented investors don't have a  
6 lot of options, with money market and savings instruments  
7 having such low yields. They must be cognizant of the  
8 market risks they are assuming when they purchase stocks  
9 for their generous dividends. (*Value Line Investor Survey*,  
10 June 21, 2013, p. 901.)

11 Artificially low interest rates and the resulting lack of income opportunities  
12 have caused investors to ignore market risk-return relationships. This in  
13 turn has led to potentially overpriced utility shares and an understatement  
14 of the cost of equity in COE estimation models.

15 Standard & Poor's provides further perspective for investors'  
16 dividend preferences for utility shares.

17 **S&P Industry Survey**

18 Electric utility shares underperformed in 2012, but  
19 outperformed in first quarter of 2013. The S&P Electric  
20 Utilities subindex declined 4.3% in 2012, versus a 13.4%  
21 increase for the benchmark S&P 500 Composite stock index  
22 and a 13.7% increase in the broader S&P 1500  
23 SuperComposite stock index. We believe the  
24 underperformance in 2012 reflected, to some degree, a  
25 consolidation of the strong performance in 2011. Primarily,  
26 however, it was driven by the continuing weakness in the  
27 economy and the power markets, the uncertainties related to  
28 the federal tax policy on dividends, the strength of the  
29 broader market, and the impact of Superstorm Sandy (for  
30 those utilities that were affected). (Standard & Poor's  
31 Electric Utility Industry Survey, March 2013, p. 6.)

1 Q24. DO UTILITIES CONTINUE TO FACE THE OPERATING AND FINANCIAL  
2 RISKS THAT EXISTED PRIOR TO THE RECENT FINANCIAL CRISIS?

3 A. Yes. Prior to the recent financial crisis, the most significant risk factor for  
4 utility investors was the industry's continuing transition to more open  
5 market conditions and competition. With the passage of the Energy Policy  
6 Act ("EPAC") in 1992 and the Commission's Order No. 888 in 1996, the  
7 stage was set for vastly increased competition in the electric utility  
8 industry. EPAC's mandate for open access to the transmission grid and  
9 FERC's implementation through Order No. 888 effectively opened the  
10 market for wholesale electricity to competition. Previously protected utility  
11 service territory and lack of wholesale transmission access in some parts  
12 of the country had limited the availability of competitive bulk power prices.  
13 EPAC and Order No. 888 have essentially eliminated such constraints and  
14 allowed most utilities to seek alternative wholesale suppliers for their  
15 incremental power needs.

16 In addition to wholesale issues at the federal level, in states that  
17 have implemented retail access, even retail markets have opened to  
18 competition. Concerns about these issues and additional efforts for  
19 dealing with larger construction programs and power cost recovery  
20 mechanisms have developed as well. As expected, the opening of  
21 previously protected utility markets to competition, the uncertainty created  
22 by the removal of regulatory protection, and continuing fuel price volatility



1           have raised the level of uncertainty about investment returns across the  
2           entire industry.

3

4   Q25. IS ETI AFFECTED BY THESE SAME UNCERTAINTIES AND  
5       INCREASING UTILITY CAPITAL COSTS?

6   A.   Yes. To some extent all electric utilities are being affected by the  
7       industry's transition to competition. Although retail deregulation has not  
8       occurred in the ETI's service territory in Texas, the Company's power  
9       costs and other operating activities have been significantly affected by  
10      transition and restructuring events around the country. In fact, the  
11      uncertainty associated with the changes that are transforming the utility  
12      industry as a whole, as viewed from the perspective of the investor,  
13      remain a factor in assessing any utility's required ROE, including the ROE  
14      from ETI's operations in Texas.

15

16   Q26. HOW DO CAPITAL MARKET CONCERNS AND FINANCIAL RISK  
17       PERCEPTIONS AFFECT THE COST OF EQUITY CAPITAL?

18   A.   As I discussed previously, equity investors respond to changing  
19       assessments of risk and financial prospects by changing the price they are  
20       willing to pay for a given security. When the risk perceptions increase or  
21       financial prospects decline, investors refuse to pay the previously existing  
22       market price for a company's securities and market supply and demand  
23       forces then establish a new lower price. The lower market price typically

1 translates into a higher cost of capital through a higher dividend yield  
2 requirement as well as the potential for increased capital gains if  
3 prospects improve. In addition to market losses for prior shareholders, the  
4 higher cost of capital is transmitted directly to the company by the need to  
5 earn a higher cost of capital on existing and new investment just to  
6 maintain the stock's new lower price level and the reality that the firm must  
7 issue more shares to raise any given amount of capital for future  
8 investment. The additional shares also impose additional future dividend  
9 requirements and may reduce future earnings per share growth prospects  
10 if the proceeds of the share issuance are unable to earn their expected  
11 rate of return.

12

13 Q27. HOW HAVE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS RESPONDED TO THESE  
14 CHANGING MARKET AND INDUSTRY CONDITIONS?

15 A. Over the past five years, average allowed ROEs have ranged between  
16 10.6 percent to 9.8 percent. Table 4 below summarizes the ROE data for  
17 integrated electric utilities like ETI.

**Table 4**  
**Authorized Equity Returns for Vertically-Integrated Electric**  
**Utilities**

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013*
Average ROE	10.63%	10.38%	10.24%	10.10%	9.84%

Source: Regulatory Focus, SNL Regulatory Research Associates, Major Rate Case  
Decisions, July 9; 2013 and Exhibit SCH-1, page 2.

\*2013 average is for first two quarters only.

1 Q28. WHAT DO THESE RESULTS IMPLY FOR THE COST OF EQUITY  
2 RELATIVE TO THE DECLINE IN INTEREST RATES?

3 A. While interest rates had dropped by 150 basis points or more over the  
4 past three years, allowed ROE has dropped by only about one-half that  
5 amount. This result is consistent with most regulators recognizing the  
6 artificial impact that the government's expansive monetary policy has had  
7 on interest rates. The federal government responded to the economic  
8 crisis by artificially depressing interest rates through its ongoing purchases  
9 of Treasury bonds and other securities. This action dropped interest rates  
10 and removed yield opportunities for traditional investors in safe, fixed  
11 income investments. As discussed above by Value Line and Standard &  
12 Poor's, investors responded by buying dividend paying stocks, like utilities,  
13 at rates not consistent with normal risk-return relationships. Their search  
14 for income pushed up utility stock prices to potentially excessive levels,  
15 which thus reduced dividend yields and, therefore, ROE estimates from  
16 the traditional "yield plus growth" DCF model. The quantitative COE  
17 estimation models, both risk premium models and DCF models, skewed  
18 by government-induced low interest rates and resulting low dividend  
19 yields, therefore, produced artificially low estimates of ROE.

1 IV. ESTIMATING THE COST OF EQUITY CAPITAL

2 Q29. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS SECTION OF YOUR TESTIMONY?

3 A. The purpose of this section is to present a general definition of the cost of  
4 equity capital and to compare the strengths and weaknesses of several of  
5 the most widely used methods for estimating the cost of equity.  
6 Estimating the cost of equity is fundamentally a matter of informed  
7 judgment. The various models provide a concrete link to actual capital  
8 market data and assist with defining the various relationships that underlie  
9 the ROE estimation process.

10

11 Q30. CAN YOU ILLUSTRATE THE COST OF EQUITY CONCEPT?

12 A. Yes. As noted previously, the cost of equity is the rate of return that equity  
13 investors expect to receive. Unlike returns from debt and preferred  
14 stocks, however, the equity return cannot be observable directly and,  
15 therefore, it must be estimated or inferred from capital market data and  
16 trading activity.

17 An example helps to illustrate the cost of equity concept. Assume  
18 that an investor buys a share of common stock for \$20 per share. If the  
19 stock's expected dividend is \$1.00, the expected dividend yield is  
20 5.0 percent ( $\$1.00 / \$20 = 5.0$  percent). If the stock price is also expected  
21 to increase to \$21.00 after one year, this one dollar expected gain adds an  
22 additional 5.0 percent to the total expected rate of return ( $\$1.00 / \$20 =$   
23 5.0 percent). Therefore, buying the stock at \$20 per share, the investor

1 expects a total return of 10.0 percent: 5.0 percent dividend yield, plus  
2 5.0 percent price appreciation. In this example, the total expected rate of  
3 return of 10.0 percent is the appropriate measure of the cost of equity  
4 capital, because it is this rate of return that caused the investor to commit  
5 the \$20 of equity capital in the first place. If the stock had been riskier, or  
6 if expected returns from other investments were higher, investors would  
7 have required a higher rate of return from the stock, which would have  
8 resulted in a lower initial purchase price in market trading.

9 Each day market rates of return and prices change to reflect new  
10 investor expectations and requirements. For example, when interest rates  
11 on bonds and savings accounts rise, utility stock prices usually fall. This is  
12 true, at least in part, because higher interest rates on these alternative  
13 investments make utility stocks relatively less attractive, which causes  
14 utility stock prices to decline in market trading. This competitive market  
15 adjustment process is quick and continuous, so that market prices  
16 generally reflect investor expectations and the relative attractiveness of  
17 one investment versus another. In this context, to estimate the cost of  
18 equity one must apply informed judgment about the relative risk of the  
19 company in question and knowledge about the risk and expected rate of  
20 return characteristics of other available investments as well.

1 Q31. HOW DOES THE MARKET ACCOUNT FOR RISK DIFFERENCES  
2 AMONG THE VARIOUS INVESTMENTS?

3 A. Risk-return tradeoffs among capital market investments have been the  
4 subject of extensive financial research. Literally dozens of textbooks and  
5 hundreds of academic articles have addressed the issue. Generally, such  
6 research confirms the common sense conclusion that investors will take  
7 additional risks only if they expect to receive a higher rate of return.  
8 Empirical tests consistently show that returns from low risk securities,  
9 such as U.S. Treasury bills, are the lowest; that returns from longer-term  
10 Treasury bonds and corporate bonds are increasingly higher as risks  
11 increase; and generally, returns from common stocks and other more risky  
12 investments are even higher. These observations provide a sound  
13 theoretical foundation for both the DCF and risk premium methods for  
14 estimating the cost of equity capital. These methods attempt to capture  
15 the well founded risk-return principle and explicitly measure investors' rate  
16 of return requirements.


17

18 Q32. CAN YOU ILLUSTRATE THE CAPITAL MARKET RISK-RETURN  
19 PRINCIPLE THAT YOU JUST DESCRIBED?

20 A. Yes. The following graph depicts the risk-return relationship that has  
21 become widely known as the Capital Market Line ("CML"). The CML  
22 offers a graphical representation of the capital market risk-return principle.  
23 The graph is not meant to illustrate the actual expected rate of return for

- 1           any particular investment, but merely to illustrate in a general way the risk-  
2           return relationship.

## Risk-Return Tradeoffs



- 3           As a continuum, the CML can be viewed as an available opportunity set  
4           for investors. Those investors with low risk tolerance or investment  
5           objectives that mandate a low risk profile should invest in assets depicted  
6           in the lower left-hand portion of the graph. Investments in this area, such  
7           as Treasury bills and short-maturity, high quality corporate commercial  
8           paper, offer a high degree of investor certainty. In nominal terms (before

1       considering the potential effects of inflation), such assets are virtually risk-  
2       free.

3               Investment risks increase as one moves up and to the right along  
4       the CML. A higher degree of uncertainty exists about the level of  
5       investment value at any point in time and about the level of income  
6       payments that may be received. Among these investments, long-term  
7       bonds and preferred stocks, which offer priority claims to assets and  
8       income payments, are relatively low risk, but they are not risk-free. The  
9       market value of long-term bonds, even those issued by the U.S. Treasury,  
10      often fluctuates widely when government policies or other factors cause  
11      interest rates to change.

12             Farther up the CML continuum, common stocks are exposed to  
13      even more risk, depending on the nature of the underlying business and  
14      the financial strength of the issuing corporation. Common stock risks  
15      include market-wide factors, such as general changes in capital costs, as  
16      well as industry and company specific elements that may add further to  
17      the volatility of a given company's performance. As I will illustrate in my  
18      risk premium analysis, common stocks typically are more volatile (have  
19      higher risk) than high quality bond investments and, therefore, they reside  
20      above and to the right of bonds on the CML graph. Other more  
21      speculative investments, such as stock options and commodity futures  
22      contracts, offer even higher risks (and higher potential returns). The  
23      CML's depiction of the risk-return tradeoffs available in the capital markets



1 provides a useful perspective for estimating investors' required rates  
2 of return.

3

4 Q33. HOW IS THE FAIR RATE OF RETURN IN THE REGULATORY  
5 PROCESS RELATED TO THE ESTIMATED COST OF EQUITY  
6 CAPITAL?

7 A. The regulatory process is guided by fair rate of return principles  
8 established in the U.S. Supreme Court cases, *Bluefield Water Works* and  
9 *Hope Natural Gas*:

10 A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn  
11 a return on the value of the property which it employs for the  
12 convenience of the public equal to that generally being made  
13 at the same time and in the same general part of the country  
14 on investments in other business undertakings which are  
15 attended by corresponding risks and uncertainties; but it has  
16 no constitutional right to profits such as are realized or  
17 anticipated in highly profitable enterprises or speculative  
18 ventures. *Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Company*  
19 *v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia*, 262 U.S.  
20 679, 692-693 (1923).

21 From the investor or company point of view, it is important  
22 that there be enough revenue not only for operating  
23 expenses, but also for the capital costs of the business.  
24 These include service on the debt and dividends on the  
25 stock. By that standard the return to the equity owner should  
26 be commensurate with returns on investments in other  
27 enterprises having corresponding risks. That return,  
28 moreover, should be sufficient to assure confidence in the  
29 financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its  
30 credit and to attract capital. *Federal Power Commission v.*  
31 *Hope Natural Gas Co.*, 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944).

32 Based on these principles, the fair rate of return should closely parallel  
33 investor opportunity costs as discussed above. If a utility earns its market

1 cost of equity, neither its stockholders nor its customers should be  
2 disadvantaged.

3

4 Q34. WHAT SPECIFIC METHODS AND CAPITAL MARKET DATA ARE USED  
5 TO EVALUATE THE COST OF EQUITY?

6 A. Techniques for estimating the cost of equity normally fall into three groups:  
7 comparable earnings methods, risk premium methods, and DCF methods.  
8 The first set of estimation techniques, the comparable earnings methods,  
9 has evolved over time. The original comparable earnings methods were  
10 based on book accounting returns. This approach developed ROE  
11 estimates by reviewing accounting returns for unregulated companies  
12 thought to have risks similar to those of the regulated company in  
13 question. These methods have generally been rejected because they  
14 assume that the unregulated group is earning its actual cost of capital, and  
15 that its equity book value is the same as its market value. In most  
16 situations these assumptions are not valid, and, therefore, accounting-  
17 based methods do not generally provide reliable cost of equity estimates.

18 More recent comparable earnings methods are based on historical  
19 stock market returns rather than book accounting returns. While this  
20 approach has some merit, it too has been criticized because there can be  
21 no assurance that historical returns actually reflect current or future market  
22 requirements. Also, in practical application, earned market returns tend to  
23 fluctuate widely from year to year. For these reasons, a current cost of

1 equity estimate (based on the DCF model or a risk premium analysis) is  
2 usually required.

3 The second set of estimation techniques is grouped under the  
4 heading of risk premium methods. These methods begin with currently  
5 observable market returns, such as yields on government or corporate  
6 bonds, and add an increment to account for the additional equity risk. The  
7 capital asset pricing model ("CAPM") and arbitrage pricing theory ("APT")  
8 model are more sophisticated risk premium approaches. The CAPM and  
9 APT methods estimate the cost of equity directly by combining the "risk-  
10 free" government bond rate with explicit risk measures to determine the  
11 risk premium required by the market. Although these methods are widely  
12 used in academic cost of capital research, their additional data  
13 requirements and their potentially questionable underlying assumptions  
14 have detracted from their use in most regulatory jurisdictions. The basic  
15 risk premium methods provide a useful parallel approach with the DCF  
16 model and assures consistency with other capital market data in the equity  
17 cost estimation process.

18 The third set of estimation techniques, based on the DCF model, is  
19 the most widely used regulatory cost of equity estimation method. Like  
20 the risk premium approach, the DCF model has a sound basis in theory,  
21 and many argue that it has the additional advantage of simplicity. I will  
22 describe the DCF model in detail below, but in essence its estimate of  
23 ROE is simply the sum of the expected dividend yield and the expected

1 long-term dividend, earnings, or price growth rate (all of which are  
2 assumed to grow at the same rate). While dividend yields are easy to  
3 obtain, estimating long-term growth is more difficult. Because the  
4 constant growth DCF model also requires very long-term growth estimates  
5 (technically to infinity), some argue that its application is too speculative to  
6 provide reliable results, resulting in the preference for the multistage  
7 growth DCF analysis.

8  
9 Q35. OF THE THREE ESTIMATION METHODS, WHICH DO YOU BELIEVE  
10 PROVIDES THE MOST RELIABLE RESULTS?

11 A. From my experience, in periods of reasonable capital market equilibrium,  
12 a combination of DCF and the basic risk premium methods usually provide  
13 the most reliable approach. While the caveat about estimating long-term  
14 growth must be observed, the DCF model's other inputs are readily  
15 obtainable, and the model's results typically are consistent with equilibrium  
16 capital market behavior. The basic risk premium methods provide a good  
17 parallel approach to the DCF model and further ensure that current market  
18 conditions are accurately reflected in the cost of equity estimate.  
19 However, due to the government's stimulative monetary policy, which I  
20 previously discussed in this testimony, low COE estimates obtained from  
21 all of these methods should be discounted accordingly.

1 Q36. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE DCF MODEL.

2 A. The DCF model is predicated on the concept that stock prices represent  
3 the present value or discounted value of all future dividends that investors  
4 expect to receive. In the most general form, the DCF model is expressed  
5 in the following formula:

$$6 \quad P_0 = D_1/(1+k) + D_2/(1+k)^2 + \dots + D_\infty/(1+k)^\infty \quad (1)$$

7 where  $P_0$  is today's stock price;  $D_1$ ,  $D_2$ , etc. are all future dividends and  $k$   
8 is the discount rate, or the investor's required rate of return on equity.  
9 Equation (1) is a routine present value calculation based on the  
10 assumption that the stock's price is the present value of all dividends  
11 expected to be paid in the future.

12 Under the additional assumption that dividends are expected to  
13 grow at a constant rate "g" and that  $k$  is strictly greater than  $g$ , equation (1)  
14 can be solved for  $k$  and rearranged into the simple form:

$$15 \quad k = D_1/P_0 + g \quad (2)$$

16 Equation (2) is the familiar constant growth DCF model for cost of equity  
17 estimation, where  $D_1/P_0$  is the expected dividend yield and  $g$  is the long-  
18 term expected dividend growth rate.

19 Under circumstances when growth rates are expected to fluctuate  
20 or when future growth rates are highly uncertain, the constant growth  
21 model may not give reliable results. Although the DCF model itself is still  
22 valid (equation 1 is mathematically correct), under such circumstances the

1       simplified form of the model must be modified to capture market  
2       expectations accurately.

3               Recent events and current market conditions in the electric utility  
4       industry as discussed elsewhere in this testimony appear to challenge the  
5       constant growth assumption of the traditional DCF model. Since the mid-  
6       1980s, dividend growth expectations for many electric utilities have  
7       fluctuated widely. In fact, over one-third of the electric utilities in the U.S.  
8       have reduced or eliminated their common dividends over this time period.  
9       Some of these companies have reestablished their dividends, producing  
10      exceptionally high growth rates. Under these circumstances, long-term  
11      growth rate estimates may be highly uncertain, and estimating a reliable  
12      “constant” growth rate for many companies is often difficult.

13

14   Q37. CAN THE DCF MODEL BE APPLIED WHEN THE CONSTANT GROWTH  
15      ASSUMPTION IS VIOLATED?

16   A.   Yes. When growth expectations are uncertain, the more general version  
17      of the model represented in equation (1) should be solved explicitly over a  
18      finite “transition” period while uncertainty prevails. The constant growth  
19      version of the model can then be applied after the transition period, under  
20      the assumption that more stable conditions will prevail in the future. There  
21      are two alternatives for dealing with the nonconstant growth  
22      transition period.

Under the “terminal price” nonconstant growth approach, equation (1) is written in a slightly different form:

$$P_0 = D_1/(1+k) + D_2/(1+k)^2 + \dots + P_T/(1+k)^T \quad (3)$$

where the variables are the same as in equation (1) except that  $P_T$  is the estimated stock price at the end of the transition period  $T$ . Under the assumption that normal growth resumes after the transition period, the price  $P_T$  is then expected to be based on constant growth assumptions. With the terminal price approach, the estimated cost of equity,  $k$ , is just the rate of return that investors would expect to earn if they bought the stock at today’s market price, held it and received dividends through the transition period (until period  $T$ ), and then sold it for price  $P_T$ . In this approach, the analyst’s task is to estimate the rate of return that investors expect to receive given the current level of market prices they are willing to pay.

Under the “multistage” nonconstant growth approach, equation (1) is simply expanded to incorporate two or more growth rate periods, with the assumption that a permanent constant growth rate can be estimated for some point in the future:

$$P_0 = D_0(1+g_1)/(1+k) + \dots + D_2(1+g_2)^n/(1+k)^n + \dots + [D_T(1+g_T)^{(T+1)}/(k-g_T)]/(1+k)^T \quad (4)$$

where the variables are the same as in equation (1), but  $g_1$  represents the growth rate for the first period;  $D_2$  is the dividend at the beginning of the second period and  $g_2$  is the growth rate for the second period; and  $D_T$  is

1 the dividend at the beginning of the third period and  $g_T$  for the period from  
2 year T (the end of the transition period) to infinity. The difficult task for  
3 analysts in the multistage approach is determining the various growth  
4 rates for each period.

5 Although less convenient for exposition purposes, the nonconstant  
6 growth models are based on the same valid capital market assumptions  
7 as the constant growth version. The nonconstant growth approach simply  
8 requires more explicit data inputs and more work to solve for the discount  
9 rate,  $k$ . Fortunately, the required data are available from investment and  
10 economic forecasting services and computer algorithms can easily  
11 produce the required solutions. Both constant and nonconstant growth  
12 DCF analyses are presented in a subsequent section of my testimony.

13  
14 Q38. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE RISK PREMIUM METHODOLOGY.

15 A. Risk premium methods are based on the assumption that equity securities  
16 are riskier than debt and, therefore, that equity investors require a higher  
17 rate of return. This basic premise is well-supported by legal and economic  
18 distinctions between debt and equity securities, and it is widely accepted  
19 as a fundamental capital market principle. For example, debt holders'  
20 claims to the earnings and assets of the borrower have priority over all  
21 claims of equity investors. The contractual interest on mortgage debt  
22 must be paid in full before any dividends can be paid to shareholders, and  
23 secured mortgage claims must be fully satisfied before any assets can be



1 distributed to shareholders in bankruptcy. Also, the guaranteed, fixed-  
2 income nature of interest payments makes year-to-year returns from  
3 bonds typically more stable than capital gains and dividend payments on  
4 stocks. All these factors demonstrate the more risky position of  
5 stockholders and support the equity risk premium concept.

6

7 Q39. ARE RISK PREMIUM ESTIMATES OF THE COST OF EQUITY  
8 CONSISTENT WITH OTHER CURRENT CAPITAL MARKET COSTS?

9 A. Yes. Under normal market conditions, the risk premium approach typically  
10 has provided a useful perspective because it is founded on current market  
11 interest rates, which are directly observable. Over the past two years,,  
12 however, risk premium estimates based on government-induced,  
13 artificially low interest rates have been below the market cost of equity  
14 capital.

15

16 Q40. IS THERE CONSENSUS ABOUT HOW RISK PREMIUM DATA SHOULD  
17 BE EMPLOYED?

18 A. No. In regulatory practice there is often considerable debate about how  
19 risk premium data should be interpreted and used. Since the analyst's  
20 basic task is to gauge investors' required returns on long-term  
21 investments, some argue that the estimated equity risk premium should be  
22 based on the longest possible time period. Others argue that market  
23 relationships between debt and equity from several decades ago are

1 irrelevant and that only recent debt-equity observations should be given  
2 any weight in estimating investor requirements. There is no consensus on  
3 this issue. Since analysts cannot observe or measure investors'  
4 expectations directly, it is not possible to know exactly how such  
5 expectations are formed or, therefore, to know exactly what time period is  
6 most appropriate in a risk premium analysis.

7 The important point is to answer the following question: "What rate  
8 of return should equity investors reasonably expect relative to returns that  
9 are currently available from long-term bonds?" The risk premium studies  
10 and analyses I discuss later address this question. My risk premium  
11 recommendation is based on an intermediate position that avoids some of  
12 the problems and concerns that have been expressed about both very  
13 long and very short periods of analysis with the risk premium model.

14  
15 Q41. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR DISCUSSION OF COST OF EQUITY  
16 ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES.

17 A. Estimating the cost of equity is one of the most controversial issues in  
18 utility ratemaking. Because actual investor requirements are not directly  
19 observable, several methods have been developed to assist in the  
20 estimation process. The comparable earnings method is the oldest but  
21 perhaps least reliable. Its use of accounting rates of return, or even  
22 historical market returns, may or may not reflect current investor

1 requirements. Differences in accounting methods among companies and  
2 issues of comparability also detract from this approach.

3 The DCF and risk premium methods have become the most widely  
4 accepted in regulatory practice. In my professional judgment, a  
5 combination of the DCF model and a review of risk premium data provides  
6 the most reliable cost of equity estimate. While the DCF model does  
7 require judgment about future growth rates, the dividend yield is  
8 straightforward, and the model's results are generally consistent with  
9 actual capital market behavior. As noted previously, under present market  
10 conditions, and with the government's ongoing capital market intervention,  
11 estimates provided by all the quantitative models are more difficult to  
12 interpret. In addition to the quantitative model estimates, capital market  
13 turbulence and the heightened investor risk aversion that has resulted  
14 should also be considered.

15  
16 V. COST OF EQUITY CAPITAL FOR ETI

17 Q42. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS SECTION OF YOUR TESTIMONY?

18 A. The purpose of this section is to present my quantitative studies of the  
19 cost of equity capital for ETI and to discuss the details and results of my  
20 analysis.

1 Q43. HOW ARE YOUR STUDIES ORGANIZED?

2 A. In the first part of my analysis, I apply three versions of the DCF model to  
3 a 24-company group of electric utilities based on the selection criteria  
4 discussed previously. In the second part of my analysis, I apply basic  
5 equity risk premium models based on current and projected capital costs  
6 for the coming year.

7 My DCF analysis is based on three versions of the DCF model. In  
8 the first version of the DCF model, I use the constant growth format with  
9 long-term expected growth based on analysts' estimates of five-year utility  
10 earnings growth. While I continue to endorse a longer-term growth  
11 estimation approach based on growth in overall gross domestic product, I  
12 show the analyst growth rate DCF results because this is the approach  
13 that has traditionally been used by many regulators. In the second version  
14 of the DCF model, for the estimated growth rate, I use only the long-term  
15 estimated GDP growth rate. In the third version of the DCF model, I use a  
16 two-stage growth approach, with stage one based on Value Line's three-  
17 to-five-year dividend projections and stage two based on long-term  
18 projected growth in GDP. The dividend yields in all three of the annual  
19 models are from Value Line's projections of dividends for the coming year  
20 and stock prices are from the three-month average for the months that  
21 correspond to the Value Line editions from which the underlying financial  
22 data are taken.

1 Q44. WHY DO YOU BELIEVE THE LONG-TERM GDP GROWTH RATE  
2 SHOULD BE USED TO ESTIMATE LONG-TERM GROWTH  
3 EXPECTATIONS IN THE DCF MODEL?

4 A. Growth in nominal GDP (real GDP plus inflation) is the most general  
5 measure of economic growth in the U.S. economy. For long time periods,  
6 such as those used in the Morningstar/Ibbotson Associates rate of return  
7 data, GDP growth has averaged between 5 percent and 8 percent per  
8 year. From this observation, Professors Brigham and Houston offer the  
9 following observation concerning the appropriate long-term growth rate in  
10 the DCF Model:

11 Expected growth rates vary somewhat among companies,  
12 but dividends for mature firms are often expected to grow in  
13 the future at about the same rate as nominal gross domestic  
14 product (real GDP plus inflation). On this basis, one might  
15 expect the dividend of an average, or "normal," company to  
16 grow at a rate of 5 to 8 percent a year. (Eugene F. Brigham  
17 and Joel F. Houston, *Fundamentals of Financial*  
18 *Management*, 11th Ed. 2007, page 298.)

19 Other academic research on corporate growth rates offers similar  
20 conclusions about GDP growth as well as concerns about the long-term  
21 adequacy of analysts' forecasts:

22 Our estimated median growth rate is reasonable when  
23 compared to the overall economy's growth rate. On average  
24 over the sample period, the median growth rate over 10  
25 years for income before extraordinary items is about  
26 10 percent for all firms. ... After deducting the dividend yield  
27 (the median yield is 2.5 percent per year), as well as inflation  
28 (which averages 4 percent per year over the sample period),  
29 the growth in real income before extraordinary items is  
30 roughly 3.5 percent per year. This is consistent with the  
31 historical growth rate in real gross domestic product, which

1 has averaged about 3.4 percent per year over the period  
2 1950-1998. (Louis K. C. Chan, Jason Karceski, and Josef  
3 Lakonishok, "The Level and Persistence of Growth Rates,"  
4 The Journal of Finance, April 2003, p. 649.)

5 IBES long-term growth estimates are associated with  
6 realized growth in the immediate short-term future. Over  
7 long horizons, however, there is little forecastability in  
8 earnings, and analysts' estimates tend to be overly  
9 optimistic. ... On the whole, the absence of predictability in  
10 growth fits in with the economic intuition that competitive  
11 pressures ultimately work to correct excessively high or  
12 excessively low profitability growth. (Ibid, page 683.)

13 These findings support the notion that long-term growth expectations are  
14 more closely predicted by broader measures of economic growth than by  
15 near-term analysts' estimates. Especially for the very long-term growth  
16 rate requirements of the DCF model, the growth in nominal GDP should  
17 be considered an important input.

18  
19 Q45. HOW DID YOU ESTIMATE THE EXPECTED LONG-RUN GDP  
20 GROWTH RATE?

21 A. I developed my long-term GDP growth forecast from nominal GDP data  
22 contained in the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank data base. That data for  
23 the period 1952 through 2012 are summarized on page 1 of my  
24 Exhibit SCH-3. As shown at the bottom of that exhibit, the overall average  
25 for the period was 6.5 percent. The data also show, however, that after  
26 the early 1980s, lower inflation has resulted in lower nominal GDP growth.  
27 For this reason I gave more weight to the more recent years in my GDP  
28 forecast. This approach is consistent with the concept that more recent

1 data should have a greater effect on expectations and with generally lower  
2 near- and intermediate-term growth rate forecasts that presently exist.  
3 Based on this approach, my overall forecast for long-term GDP growth is  
4 somewhat lower than the long-term average, at a level of 5.6 percent.  
5

6 Q46. THE DCF MODEL REQUIRES AN ESTIMATE OF INVESTORS' LONG-  
7 TERM GROWTH RATE EXPECTATIONS. WHY DO YOU BELIEVE  
8 YOUR FORECAST OF GDP GROWTH BASED ON LONG-TERM  
9 HISTORICAL DATA IS APPROPRIATE?

10 A. There are at least three reasons. First, most econometric forecasts are  
11 derived from the trending of historical data or the use of weighted  
12 averages. This is the approach I have taken in my GDP growth forecast  
13 shown on page 1 of Exhibit SCH-3. The data in that exhibit show that the  
14 long-run historical average GDP growth rate is 6.5 percent. My estimate  
15 of expected growth, at 5.6 percent, however, is lower because my  
16 forecasting method gives much more weight to the more recent 10- and  
17 20-year periods. Also, as shown on page 2 of Exhibit SCH-3, my  
18 5.6 percent growth rate estimate is in line with the Congressional Budget  
19 Office ("CBO") GDP growth estimate (5.7%) for the 2015-2018 time  
20 period.

21 Second, some currently lower GDP growth forecasts, such as the  
22 CBO forecast for 2019-2023 shown on page 2 of Exhibit SCH-3, likely  
23 understate very long growth rate expectations that are required in the

1 DCF model. Many of those forecasts are currently low because they are  
2 based on the assumption of permanently low inflation rates, in the range  
3 of 2 percent. As shown in my Exhibit SCH-3, page 1, the average long-  
4 term inflation rate has been near or above 3 percent in all but the most  
5 recent 10- and 20- year periods.

6 Finally, the current economic uncertainty makes it even more  
7 important to consider longer-term economic data in the growth rate  
8 estimate. For the past several years, near-term forecasts for both real  
9 GDP and inflation have been severely depressed. To the extent that even  
10 the longer-term outlooks of professional economists are also depressed,  
11 their forecasts will be low. Under these circumstances, a longer-term  
12 balance is even more important. For all these reasons, while I present  
13 other growth rate approaches based on analysts' estimates in this  
14 testimony, I believe that long-term GDP growth should also be considered  
15 in estimating the DCF model's required very long-term growth rate.

16  
17 Q47. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE RESULTS OF YOUR DCF ANALYSES.

18 A. The DCF results for my comparable company group are presented in  
19 Exhibit SCH-4. As shown in the first column of page 1 of that exhibit, the  
20 traditional constant growth model indicates a COE of 9.0 percent to  
21 9.1 percent. In the second column of page 1, I recalculate the constant  
22 growth results with the growth rate based on long-term forecasted growth  
23 in GDP. With the GDP growth rate, the constant growth model indicates a



1 COE of 9.6 percent. Finally, in the third column of page 1, I present the  
2 results from the multistage DCF model which indicate a COE range of  
3 9.5 percent to 9.6 percent. The DCF models, therefore, indicate a COE  
4 range of 9.0 percent to 9.6 percent. As discussed previously, I discount  
5 these quantitative results because they have been depressed by the  
6 government's stimulative monetary policy and they cannot fully reflect the  
7 rising interest rate environment that has resulted from the FOMC's more  
8 recent policy statements.

9  
10 Q48. WHAT ARE THE RESULTS OF YOUR EQUITY RISK PREMIUM  
11 STUDIES?

12 A. The details and results of my equity risk premium studies are shown in my  
13 Exhibit SCH-5. In these studies, I have added a third risk premium  
14 analysis designed to capture the recent FOMC policy shift and the  
15 increasing interest rate environment that the FOMC announcement has  
16 created. The risk premium models indicate a COE range of 10.0 percent  
17 to 10.4 percent.

18  
19 Q49. HOW ARE YOUR EQUITY RISK PREMIUM STUDIES STRUCTURED?


20 A. My equity risk premium studies are divided into two parts. First, I compare  
21 electric utility authorized ROEs for the period 1980-2012 to  
22 contemporaneous long-term utility interest rates. I believe this long-term  
23 data is most appropriate because it includes both the exceptionally high

1 interest rates that existed in the early 1980s as well as the recent,  
2 historically low interest rate levels. The differences between the average  
3 authorized ROEs and the average interest rate for the year is the indicated  
4 equity risk premium. I then add the indicated equity risk premium to the  
5 forecasted and current triple-B utility bond interest rate to estimate COE.  
6 Because there is a strong inverse relationship between equity risk  
7 premiums and interest rates (when interest rates are high, risk premiums  
8 are low and vice versa), further analysis is required to estimate the current  
9 equity risk premium level.

10 The inverse relationship between equity risk premiums and interest  
11 rate levels is well documented in numerous, well-respected academic  
12 studies. These studies typically use regression analysis or other statistical  
13 methods to predict or measure the equity risk premium relationship under  
14 varying interest rate conditions. On page 4 of Exhibit SCH-5, I provide  
15 regression analyses of the allowed annual equity risk premiums relative to  
16 interest rate levels. The negative and statistically significant regression  
17 coefficients confirm the inverse relationship between equity risk premiums  
18 and interest rates. This means that when interest rates rise by  
19 one percentage point, the cost of equity increases, but by a smaller  
20 amount. Similarly, when interest rates decline by one percentage point,  
21 the cost of equity declines by less than one percentage point. I use this  
22 negative interest rate change coefficient in conjunction with current and  
23 forecasted interest rates to establish the appropriate COE.

1 Q50. CAN YOU ILLUSTRATE THE INVERSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN  
2 EQUITY RISK PREMIUMS AND INTEREST RATES WITHOUT USING  
3 THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS DESCRIBED ABOVE?

4 A. Yes. Statistical analysis is often used, especially in academic research, to  
5 substantiate certain economic and financial relationships. For equity risk  
6 premium analysis, however, the fundamental issue can be observed by  
7 simply averaging the data for various time periods without further  
8 statistical analysis. In Graph 1 below, I show average utility bond yields  
9 and equity risk premiums for each non-overlapping, five-year period  
10 between 1980 and 2010 and for 2011-2012.



1        These data show that equity risk premiums have consistently increased as  
2        interest rates have declined, and that they were lower when interest rates  
3        were high. This result is a market-based reflection, which shows that  
4        required rates of return in the stock market do not move in lockstep with  
5        changes in interest rates. Because utilities must compete with other types  
6        of equity investments for capital, the ROE for utilities does not change by  
7        as much as the observed changes in interest rates. Arguments that  
8        unadjusted, long-term average risk premiums can be used with current,  
9        historically low interest rates to estimate COE are mistaken. That  
10       approach to equity risk premium analysis will consistently understate the  
11       required rate of return.

12  
13    Q51. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE RESULTS OF YOUR RISK PREMIUM  
14       ANALYSIS.

15    A.    My risk premium models indicate a COE range of 10.0 percent to  
16       10.4 percent. The low end of the range is based on the average Baa  
17       Utility interest rate for the three months ended July 2013. The upper end  
18       of the range is based on the Bloomberg Forward Curve projected rate for  
19       December 31, 2014. The intermediate result based on the average  
20       month-to-date Baa Utility yield for August 2013, is 10.1 percent. The  
21       projected and August rates reflect the Fed's more recent policy position  
22       and, therefore, are more reasonable estimates of the cost of equity.

1 Q52. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE RESULTS OF YOUR COST OF EQUITY  
2 ANALYSIS.

3 A. The following table summarizes my results:

**Table 5**

Summary of Cost of Equity Estimates

<u>DCF Analysis</u>	<u>Indicated Cost</u>
Constant Growth (Analysts' Growth)	9.0%-9.1%
Constant Growth (GDP Growth)	9.6%
Multistage Growth Model	9.5%-9.6%
Indicated DCF Range	<u>9.0%-9.6%</u>
<u>Equity Risk Premium Analysis</u>	<u>Indicated Cost</u>
Forecast Utility Yield + Equity Risk Premium	
Equity Risk Premium ROE (5.78%+4.65%)	10.4%
3-Month Average Utility Yield + Equity Risk Premium	
Equity Risk Premium ROE (4.98%+5.00%)	10.0%
Aug. 5, 2013 Spot Utility Yield +Equity Risk Premium	
Equity Risk Premium ROE (5.26%+4.88%)	10.1%
<u>ETI Requested ROE</u>	<u>10.4%</u>

4 Q53. HOW SHOULD THESE RESULTS BE INTERPRETED TO DETERMINE  
5 THE FAIR COST OF EQUITY FOR ETI?

6 A. The Company's requested ROE of 10.4 percent is reasonable. Although  
7 the requested ROE is at the top of my quantitative model results, as  
8 explained previously, under current market conditions, the DCF results are  
9 out of sync. The data required for estimates of ROE from that model do  
10 not yet reflect the rising interest rate environment that has resulted from  
11 the tapering down of the Fed's stimulative monetary policy. The  
12 continuing effects of that policy on capital market conditions make it

1           problematic to strictly interpret quantitative model estimates for the cost of  
2           equity. Under these conditions, use of a lower DCF range or equity risk  
3           premium estimates based strictly on historical risk premium relationships  
4           understates the cost of equity. Based on all these factors, the Company's  
5           requested 10.4 percent ROE is a reasonable required rate of return to be  
6           used for setting rates in this case.

7

8   Q54. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?

9   A.    Yes, it does.

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**SUMMARY OF QUALIFICATIONS**

- Principal, Financial Analysis Consultants (FINANCO, Inc.).
- Ph.D. in Finance and Economics.
- Extensive expert witness testimony in court and before regulatory agencies.
- Management of professional research staff in academic and regulatory organizations.
- Professional presentations before executive development groups, the National Rate of Return Analysts' Forum, and the New York Society of Security Analysts.
- Financial Management Association, previously Vice President for Practitioner Services.

**EDUCATION**

**The University of Texas at Austin  
Ph.D., Finance and Econometrics  
January 1975**

*Dissertation: An Evaluation of the  
Original and Recent Variants of the  
Capital Asset Pricing Model.*

**The University of Texas at Austin  
MBA, Finance  
June 1973**

*Thesis: The Pricing of Risk on the  
New York Stock Exchange.*

**Southern Methodist University  
BA, Economics  
June 1969**

Honors program. Departmental  
distinction.

**OTHER EXPERIENCE**

**University of Texas at Austin  
Adjunct Associate Professor  
1985-1988, 2004-Present**

Corporate Financial Management,  
Investments, and Integrative Finance  
Cases.

**Texas State University San Marcos  
Associate Professor of Finance  
1983-1984, 2003-2004**

Graduate and undergraduate courses  
in Financial Management, Managerial  
Economics, and Investment Analysis.

**Public Utility Commission of Texas  
Chief Economist and Director of  
Economic Research Division  
August 1980-August 1983**

Lead financial witness. Supervised  
Commission staff in research and  
testimony on rate of return, financial  
condition, and economic analysis.

**Assistant Professor of Finance  
Texas Tech University  
July 1978-July 1980  
University of Alabama  
January 1975-June 1978**

Member of graduate faculty. Conducted  
Ph.D. seminars and directed doctoral  
dissertations in capital market theory.  
Served as consultant to industry,  
church and governmental organizations.



**FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC TESTIMONY IN REGULATORY  
PROCEEDINGS (Client in parenthesis)**

**Cost of Money Testimony**

- New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission, Docket No. 2013-086, April 15, 2013 (Northern Utilities, Inc.)
- Maine Public Utilities Commission, Docket No. 2013-00133, April 1, 2013 (Northern Utilities, Inc.)
- Arkansas Public Service Commission, Docket No. 13-028-U, March 1, 2013, (Entergy-Arkansas)
- Louisiana Public Service Commission, Docket No. U-32707, February 15, 2013 (Entergy Gulf States Louisiana).
- Louisiana Public Service Commission, Docket No. U-32708, February 15, 2013 (Entergy Louisiana).
- Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission, Docket UE-130043, January 11, 2013 (PacifiCorp).
- Louisiana Public Service Commission, Docket No. U-32425, October 5, 2012 (Entergy Gulf States Louisiana).
- Maryland Public Service Commission, Case No. 9299, July 27, 2012 (Baltimore Gas and Electric Company).
- Kansas Corporation Commission, Docket No. 12-KCPE-764-RTS, April 20, 2012 (Kansas City Power & Light Company).
- Oregon Public Utility Commission, Docket No. UE 246, March 1, 2012 (PacifiCorp).
- Missouri Public Service Commission, Case No. ER-2012-0174, February 27, 2012 (Kansas City Power & Light Company).
- Missouri Public Service Commission, Case No. ER-2012-0175, February 27, 2012 (KCP&L Greater Missouri Operations Company).
- Utah Public Service Commission, Docket No. 11-035-200, February 15, 2012 (Rocky Mountain Power/PacifiCorp).
- Texas Public Utility Commission, Docket No. 40094, February 1, 2012, (El Paso Electric Company).
- Oregon Public Utility Commission, Docket No. UG 221, December 30, 2011 (NW Natural Gas Company).
- Wyoming Public Service Commission, Docket No. 20000-405-ER-11, December 9, 2011 (Rocky Mountain Power dba/PacifiCorp).
- Texas Public Utility Commission, Docket No. 39896, November 28, 2011, (Entergy Texas, Inc.)
- Idaho Public Utilities Commission, Case No. PAC-E-111-12, May 27, 2011 (Rocky Mountain Power/PacifiCorp).
- Maine Public Utilities Commission, Docket No. 2011-92, May 5, 2011 (Northern Utilities, Inc.)
- New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission, Docket No. DG 11-069, May 4, 2011 (Northern Utilities, Inc.)
- Arizona Corporation Commission, Docket No. G-04204A-11-0158, April 8, 2011 (UNS Gas, Inc.)
- Utah Public Service Commission, Docket No. 10-035-124, January 24, 2011 (Rocky Mountain Power/PacifiCorp).
- Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities, D.P.U. 11.01 (Electric) and D.P.U. 11.02 (Gas), January 14, 2011, (Fitchburg Gas and Electric Light Company d/b/a/ Unitil)
- Wyoming Public Service Commission, Docket No. 20000-384-ER-10, November 22, 2010 (Rocky Mountain Power dba/PacifiCorp).
- Illinois Commerce Commission, Docket No. 10-0467, July 28, 2010 (Commonwealth Edison Company).

- Missouri Public Service Commission, Case No. ER-2010-0355, June 4, 2010 (Kansas City Power & Light Company).
- Missouri Public Service Commission, Case No. ER-2010-0356, June 4, 2010 (KCP&L Greater Missouri Operations Company).
- Idaho Public Utilities Commission, Case No. PAC-E-10-07, May 28, 2010 (Rocky Mountain Power/PacifiCorp).
- Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission, Docket UE-100749, May 4, 2010 (PacifiCorp).
- New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission, Docket No. DE 10-055, April 15, 2010 (Unitil Energy Systems)
- Oregon Public Utility Commission, Docket No. UE-217, March 1, 2010 (PacifiCorp).
- Texas Public Utility Commission, Docket No. 37744, December 30, 2009,(Entergy Texas, Inc.)
- Kansas Corporation Commission, Docket No. 10-KCPE-415-RTS, December 17, 2009 (Kansas City Power & Light Company).
- Texas Public Utility Commission, Docket No. 37690, December 9, 2009,(El Paso Electric Company).
- California Public Utilities Commission, Application No. 09-11-015, November 20, 2009 (PacifiCorp).
- Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Docket No. ER10-230-000, November 6, 2009 (Kansas City Power & Light Company and KCP&L Greater Missouri Operations Company).
- Wyoming Public Service Commission, Docket No. 20000-352-ER-09, October 2, 2009 (Rocky Mountain Power dba/PacifiCorp).
- Arkansas Public Service Commission, Docket No. 09-084-U, September 4, 2009, (Entergy-Arkansas)
- Texas Public Utility Commission, Docket No. 37364, August 28, 2009,(American Electric Power-SWEPCO)
- Utah Public Service Commission, Docket No. 09-035-23, June 23, 2009 (Rocky Mountain Power/PacifiCorp).
- New Mexico Public Regulation Commission, Case No. 09-00171-UT, May 2009, (El Paso Electric Company).
- Oregon Public Utility Commission, Docket No. UE-207, April 2, 2009 (PacifiCorp).
- Arkansas Public Service Commission, Docket No. 09-008-U, February 19, 2009 (American Electric Power-SWEPCO).
- Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission, Docket UE-090205, February 9, 2009 (PacifiCorp).
- Idaho Public Utilities Commission, Case No. PAC-E-08-07, September 19, 2008 (Rocky Mountain Power/PacifiCorp).
- Missouri Public Service Commission, Case No. ER-2009-089, September 5, 2008 (Kansas City Power & Light Company).
- Kansas Corporation Commission, Docket No. 09-KCPE-246-RTS, September 5, 2008 (Kansas City Power & Light Company).
- Missouri Public Service Commission, Case No. ER-2009-090, September 5, 2008 (Aquila, Inc. dba/KCP&L Greater Missouri Operations Company).
- Utah Public Service Commission, Docket No. 08-035-38, July 17, 2008 (Rocky Mountain Power/PacifiCorp).
- Wyoming Public Service Commission, Docket No. 20000-333-ER-08, July 2008 (Rocky Mountain Power dba/PacifiCorp).
- Texas Public Utility Commission, Docket No. 35717, June 27, 2008, (Oncor Electric Delivery Company LLC).
- Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission, Docket UG-080546, March 28, 2008 (NW Natural).